P@X online bulletin

MINORITIES DURING AND IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS

This P@x Bulletin is a result of the collective work of young researchers, pursuing their PhD degrees throughout Europe, and who participated in the Intensive Programme (IP) on "Peacebuilding: dilemmas and challenges" in November 4-13, 2013 at the University of Coimbra. The theme they chose focuses on the status of minority groups during and in the aftermath of violent conflict that is considered crucial when promoting sustainable peace. Most peacebuilding efforts are led by international actors and, among other pressing issues, the status and role of minorities in those countries and how they are involved (or not), protected (or not) and recognized (or not) constitutes a crucial element contributing to the (un)sustainability of any and every peacebuilding approach. The researchers had full autonomy regarding the choice of the topic of their contribution and the arguments they put forward. This Bulletin constitutes a brief and partial mapping of the research avenues these young academics are working on the European field of conflict and peace studies.

Paula Duarte Lopes
pdl@fe.uc.pt

IP Coordinator, CES|FEUC

EDITORIAL

In 1990 the independence of Namibia ended the last war for self-determination in Africa. Just a year later the disintegration of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War. A mood of optimism took hold of policy makers and academics alike. It seemed that important steps had been set on the road to world peace. Three years later the Rwandan genocide brought home the message how violent a place our planet still was. Subsequently conflict scholars identified ethnic conflicts and intrastate wars as a leading source of insecurity, loss of life and displacement of peoples,

and sought to understand the underlying conditions and processes that lead to communal strife. Simultaneously the collective rights of national minorities received increased attention, for example by endorsement of their right to autonomy, and prohibition against suppressive measures such as forced assimilation and population transfer (Gurr 2007:151). By the late 1990s prospects for the protection of minorities seemed good. However, in 2001 the focus on protection of minority groups was transcended by the events of 9/11 and its aftermath. In fact, in name of the War on Terror, minority groups came under renewed pressure in a number of states.

More than a decade later, contemporary conflicts still overwhelmingly involve communal groups that seek to address the disadvantages of their minority status. Minorities have been defined as "culturally distinct groups in plural societies who seek equal rights, opportunities and access to power within existing political communities" (*Idem*: 133). Gurr argues that in states where such access is denied and protest suppressed, leaders of minority peoples may choose strategies of violence, which in time may escalate to protracted conflicts (*Ibidem*). His argument is supported by the liberal notion that good governance, democratization and respect for human rights, including minority rights, together will lead countries to peace and prosperity. This view has increasingly come under criticism. Rather, it has been argued that such 'cures' may in fact be the cause of new conflicts by destabilizing existing social hierarchies, and promoting cycles of political mobilization,

repression and violence (Wimmer, 2004: 349).
In this edition of P@X we hope to contribute to the debate about minorities during and in the aftermath of violent conflict. We will look both at the problems that minorities face and discuss some measures that protect or may contribute to the inclusion of minorities. The first article is written by Hahn and explores International Criminal Law's minority-protection dimensions. Yoo's contribution is about statebuilding in post-conflict settings and argues that the view of ordinary people should be taken into account in this process. The two articles that follow are case studies that zoom in on the complex difficulties that particular minority groups are confronted with. Imai looks at the current state of the 'Kurdish Question' in Turkey and Mukasa discusses the multilayered exclusion of war child mothers in contemporary Uganda. The last two contributions of P@x focus attention on two books related to minority issues. Ramović interviews Paula Pickering, author of the book *Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The View from the Ground Floor* (2007), and Goshu reviews the book *National Minorities in Inter-state Relations: Filling the Legal Vacuum?*, (2011).

Luuk Slooter
l.slooter@uu.nl

PhD candidate at the Centre for Conflict Studies/ Utrecht University and the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (Paris).

Lineke Eloff de Visser
l.a.eloff@gmail.com

Phd candidate at the Vrjie University of Amsterdam.

P@X Theory

MINORITY PROTECTION THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Building upon the legacy of the Nuremberg Trials and the *ad hoc*-tribunals, the protection of – certain – minority groups is an incremental element of contemporary international criminal law as codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Established in 2002 as the first permanent international tribunal for the punishment of international core crimes – i.e. genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. Of these, essentially only the crime of genocide (Art. 6) and some crimes against humanity (Art. 7) partake of a minority protection-function.

Genocide (Art. 6 Rome Statute)

The modes of genocide enumerated in Art. 6 encompass both acts of physical (killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm or imposing conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of a group in whole or in part) and biological destruction (measures intended to prevent reproduction within a group and the forcible transfer of children), but cover neither cultural genocide through e.g. the destruction of a group's cultural heritage nor ethnic cleansing as such (Schabas in Triffterer, 2008: art.6 para. 14-16; Schabas, 2002; Boot, 2010: para. 421; Ambos, 2006: para. 129, 135, 143 s; Werle, 2005: Principles para. 587, 604 s.)

Art. 6 establishes criminal liability for the intentional commission of any of the five distinct acts it identifies, targeting individuals because of their membership of any of the protected groups enumerated in the definition of the crime and aimed at annihilating the group as such (Cassese, 2008: 137; Schabas in Triffterer, 2008: art. 6, para. 7s; Schabas, 2010: 126) [1]. The primarily protected value here is not so much the life and integrity of an individual group member, but the physical and biological existence of the group itself (Ambos, 2006: para. 129 s; Ambos, 2006: 464-466, 486-489).

Pertaining to the protected groups, it is important to note that only national, ethnic, racial or religious groups are covered by Art. 6, while social and political groups are not included in the exhaustive enumeration - arguably because *inter alia* the latter are 'mobile groups' as opposed to 'stable groups' membership of which is determined by birth [and is] normally not changeable by its members (Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 1998: para. 551; Ambos, 2006: para. 132). However, the standard for determining group membership has over time shifted from an objective to a more subjective-constructivist one, relying on self-identification and identification by others, thus taking into account the strong subjective element in concepts such as ethnicity (Schabas in Triffterer, 2008: art. 6, para. 11 s.; Cassese, 2008: 138-140; Schabas, 2010: 129; Safferling, 2011: art. 6, para. 17 s., 21; Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, 1999: para. 98; Ambos, 2006: para. 133) [2].

The perpetrator, even if he need not seek to annihilate the group in its entirety, must act with the specific intention not only to destroy or to contribute to the destruction of a small number of individuals belonging to any of these groups, but a substantial part thereof, which might also consist of a relatively small number of people with leadership-function for the group or a substantial part of a sub-group living in a certain territory or region, targeting his victim precisely because of its membership of the group in question (Schabas in Triffterer, 2008: Art. 6 para. 9 s; Cassese, 2008: 138; Schabas, 2010: 127 s; Safferling, 2011: 6, para. 11, 36-40; ICC-02/05-01/09-3 para. 138-146).

Crimes against Humanity (Art. 7 Rome Statute)

Although crimes against humanity do not, in general, protect specific groups, but rather civilian populations in their entirety, some of them exhibit a more or less strongly pronounced slant towards specifically protecting certain minority groups within these civilian populations (Schabas in Triffterer, 2008: Art 6 para. 29).

P@X Theory

The entrance of the International Criminal Court. © 2011 Reuters (http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/17/qa-syria-and-international-criminal-court)

Although historically linked closely to genocide, over time the two crimes have evolved independently so that now their relationship is one of reciprocal speciality, differing from each other with regard to intent, context and the primarily protected value (Kreß, 2006: 469).

Art. 7 (1) requires that the criminalized acts, enumerated in Art. 7(1)(a)-(k), be committed in the context of a "widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population", i.e. a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of these acts pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy to commit such attack (Art. 7(2)(a)), and with knowledge of this attack, thus not covering single, isolated acts (Dixon/Hall in Triffterer, 2008: Art. 7 para. 87-92; Safferling, 2011: art. 6 para. 62; Boot, 2002: para. 455 s; Werle, 2005: para. 652). In order to meet the policy-requirement, though, it is sufficient that the attack follows an actual, regular pattern, without the policy having in any way to be formalized (Safferling, 2011: art. 6 para. 62; Werle, 2005: para. 661).

Extermination (Art. 7(1)(b), (2)(b)) denotes the large-scale murder of members of a civilian population, thus neither limiting the provision's scope to nor requiring the targeting of a specific group, so that both a variety of groups, including those not covered by genocide (e.g. political, economic, social or linguistic groups) and groups of civilians with no collectively distinctive features enjoy the protection of this provision (Hall in Triffterer, 2008: Art. 7 para. 24, 50, 95; Schabas, 2010: 158 s.)

Concerning *crimes against sexual self-determination*, Art. 7(1)(g) and Art. 7(2)(f) define the crime of *forced pregnancy* as "the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law", thus protecting, *inter alia*, the physical existence of ethnic or national minority groups (Boot, 2002: para. 490), while *enforced sterilization* may be utilized to prevent births within a group and can constitute genocide, when committed with genocidal intent against members of a protected group (Boot/Hall in Triffterer, 2008: Art. 7 para. 52; Boot, 2002: para. 491). Art. 8(2)(b)(xxii) and (2)(e)(vi), explicitly referring to art. 7(2)(f), create analogous war crimes, both in inter-state and intra-state armed conflict.

Persecution (Art. 7(1)(h) and (2)(g)) is the crime against humanity with the most explicit minority protection-dimension and proscribes intentionally [3] and severely depriving (members of) "any identifiable group or collectivity" of fundamental rights in breach of international law because of this group's identity. Other than genocide, the protection is not limited to national, racial, ethnic or religious groups but extends to culture- or gender-based and other kinds of discrimination universally recognized as impermissible (Hall in Triffterer, 2008: Art. 7 para. 117; Schabas, 2010: 179; Ambos, 2006: para. 214; Boot, 2002: para. 494, 497). The most controversial issue concerning the protected groups is the precise extent of protection against discrimination on the grounds of gender, as Art. 7 (3) of the Rome Statute stipulates that "[t]he term 'gender' refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society", so as not to seem to endorse homosexuality (Boot/Hall in Triffterer, 2008: Art. 7 para. 69; Schabas, 2010: 177, 186; Boot, 2002: para. 497).

The crime of *apartheid* (Art. 7(1)(j) and (2)(h)) proscribes a wide variety of discriminatory practices, amounting or similar to the other crimes listed in Art. 7 (1) of the Rome Statute, committed in the context of institutionalized and systematic racial, national or ethnic oppression and racial domination of one group over another with the intent to maintain this regime (Hall in Triffterer, 2008: Art. 7 para. 78; Schabas, 2010: 182 s.; Ambos, 2006: para. 218) [4].

P@X Theory

Lastly, *deportation or forcible transfer of a population* (Art. 7 (1)(d) and (2)(d)) might also be seen to partake of a – less explicit – minority protection-function, insofar as it protects them from being driven from their native territory and proscribes repressive minority management-practices, such as deportations in the course of an ethnic cleansing-campaign (Hall in Triffterer, 2008: Art. 7 para. 31-34, 99-105; Schabas, 2010: 163-165; Boot, 2002: para. 478 s.) [5].

Magdalena Hahn

magdalena.hahn@edu.uni-graz.at.

Doctoral Student of Law, Karl-Franzens-University of Graz.

Notes:
[1] For a comprehensive definition of the protected groups and the incriminated acts cf. Kreß, 2006.

[2] For a critique of a purely subjective approach, see *Kreß*, 2006: 474 s.

[3] On discriminatory intent cf. e.g. Boot/Hall in Triffterer, 2008, Art. 7 para. 63; Hall in Triffterer, 2008: Art. 7 para. 116, 118; Schabas, 2010: 178; Boot, 2002: para. 497.

[4] On problems related to the specific intent requirement, see Hall in Triffterer, 2008: Art. 7 para. 126; Safferling, 2011: art. 6, para. 99.

[5] Safferling, 2011: art. 6 para. 76 s; art. 8(2)(a)(vii) enshrines a similarly-worded war crime, which however only applies in international armed conflict, thus protecting the civilian population in an Occupied Territory as such on the basis of their nationality rather than their ethnicity.

References:
Ambos Kai. 2006. Internationales Strafrecht: Strafanwendungsrecht, Völkerrecht, europäisches Strafrecht. München: C.. H. Beck.

Boot Machteld. 2002. *Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court*. Intersentia, Antwerpen: Intersentia.

Cassese Antonio, 2008. International Criminal Law. Oxford: OUP.

Kreß Claus. 2006. 'The Crime of Genocide under International Law*', International Criminal Law Review,* 461-502.

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 1998. *Judgment of the Trial Chamber [ICTR-96-4-T] of 2 September* .

Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, 1999. *Judgement of the Trial Chamber [ICTR-95-1-T] of 21 May*.

Safferling, Christoph*.* 2011. *Internationales Strafrecht: Strafanwendungsrecht – Völkerstrafrecht – Europäisches Strafrecht*. Berlin: Springer.

Schabas, William*,* 2010. *The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute.* Oxford: OUP.

Triffterer, Otto (ed.). 2008. *The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes Article by Article.* München: C. H. Beck.

Werle Gerhard. 2005. *Principles of International Criminal Law.* Leiden: T.M.C Asser Press.

P@x Theory

STATEBUILDING AND THE ORDINARY PEOPLE

In both practical and theoretical debates, the major political actors involved in statebuilding and peacebuilding in post-violent conflict circumstances have been held to be the international community and local elites. However, as international orthodox statebuilding and peacebuilding operations failed to build self-sustainable states and peace, the focus has moved to the ordinary people in order to find the reasons for failure and suggest a new agenda. The importance of the ordinary in post-violent conflict circumstances has recently been discussed on the central ground of the literature of statebuilding and peacebuilding. In particular, critical peacebuilding scholars have drawn on Post-colonial and Subaltern Studies (see Bhabha, Spivak, Chakrabarty), in order to emphasise the civil power of ordinary agents. With respect to the recent discussion on the subaltern, local and the ordinary, but differently from the literature, this section discusses the ordinary people regarding a new agenda by drawing upon 'state legitimacy' rather than Post-colonial and Subaltern Studies. It is argued that the 'legitimacy' of Western Weberian statebuilders has been narrowly understood as a product naturally resulting in effective institution-building, with less attention to the ordinary people as further major political actors in statebuilding and state-formation in accounts of legitimacy generation.

The main political actors that appeared in the extensive literature on statebuilding and state-formation are the international community and local elites. First, in the statebuilding literature, the international community involves undeniably major political actors. Statebuilding is the international-community-driven mechanism to address 'fragile states' as a security concern for the international community, particularly donor states and neighbouring states. Non-Western States are expected to transplant Western liberal democracy and market economy in order to reduce the instability of fragile states which can threaten international security. In this sense, the international community's interest has been set at the centre of statebuilding.

Their interest has even influenced civil society actions. In the past couple of years, civil society has been discussed as a complementary actor to the international community in statebuilding, as a response to criticism of donor-driven statebuilding. However, most civil society organisations in fragile states are financially reliant on the international donor community, and therefore tend to reflect the international community's intentions. As shown, the international community are not ignorable actors in the discussion of statebuilding. Second, the state-formation literature addresses external powers in the war and self-interested elites in the process of internal centralisation as major political actors. This is mainly from Tilly's war-state theory, which explains that state-formation is about the process of centralising and monopolising state power through bargaining between rulers and various types of elites. As seen above, in the statebuilding and state-formation literature, the international community and local elites have been the main political actors, but there are important actors missing in these literatures, namely the ordinary people.

The importance of the ordinary people can be accounted for in terms of state legitimacy. One standard definition of legitimacy is "the belief in the rightness of a state… so that commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest because subjects believe that they ought to obey" (Barker, 1990: 11). This legitimacy can be predicated upon the subjects' consciousness. Therefore, in order to understand state legitimacy, the subjects, who are generally the ordinary people, should be the centre of the legitimacy study. Moving from the general definition of legitimacy to the more specific issue of international statebuilding and state-formation, the ordinary people should also take seats as major political actors in the process, because they are those who grant legitimacy to the state, which can be a vital factor to decide the strong and weak state (Hosti, 1996). The importance of state legitimacy in statebuilding has been highlighted by a group of scholars who criticise the orthodox statebuilding. The scholars argue that the international community's statebuilding has failed, and the reason for this is derived from the low level of state legitimacy.

P@x Theory

The main aim of statebuilding has often been institution-building, which rests on liberal democracy and market economy as two central pillars of ideology. The underpinning thought to focus on institutions is derived from the strong belief that institutions will naturally lead to political, social and economic stability and also state legitimacy. In contrast to their anticipation, the majority of states in which international statebuilding was operated relapsed into conflicts and the critics find that one of the causes of failure derives from the lack of state legitimacy (Lemay-Hebert, 2013; Richmond, 2011).

Literature highlighting the lack of state legitimacy in statebuilding tends to understand this legitimacy as mainly derived from social values and norms, following the sociological view on legitimacy. In the literature, state legitimacy has not been strongly generated by international statebuilding or the state has even been delegitimised as a result of the intervention. The legitimacy which international statebuilding expected to be generated through the institutions established by the international community stands on the procedural legitimacy from the tradition of the Western Weberian state (Lemay-Hebert, 2013). In this tradition, procedural legitimacy tends to be considered as a by-product of institution-building. However, in fact, it is only possible when the procedural legitimacy rests upon social norms and values widely accepted by the ordinary people. Another type of legitimacy discussed in the international statebuilding operation is performance legitimacy. In terms of performance legitimacy, international peacebuilding operations have also failed to produce legitimacy, because their performance has not met the needs of ordinary people and has failed to provide human security (Richmond, 2011). Two legitimacy failures show that the ordinary people in society are vital political actors to produce effective legitimacy.

Following the argument above, the next possible question is: what can the ordinary people do in order to increase the level of state legitimacy? In order to answer the question, how the legitimacy is constructed and deconstructed should be explained. However, this question is difficult to answer, firstly, because the legitimacy is intangible, so difficult to define or measure, and

secondly, albeit it is a comparably crucial issue in politics, studies on legitimacy are surprisingly limited (White, 2005). In addition, difficulty is caused by the fact that legitimacy has various forms depending on degrees, objects, time and space. For these reasons, it is difficult to talk about state legitimacy in spite of its importance. However, if we focus on specific time and space and objects, it would be possible to analyse how state legitimacy is constructed and so move naturally to discussing the process of state-formation in a particular context. In addition, the role of the ordinary people in legitimacy generation can be analysed in the process.

Ordinary people waiting to vote in the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste. © Raquel Freire (2012)

Recently bourgeoning literature on hybridity in statebuilding and peacebuilding would open the ground to analyse state legitimacy in a specific time (post-violent conflict) and space (fragile states) and object (institutions). The 'hybridity' is often discussed on the basis of interactions that are top-down (the international community) and bottom-up (local actors). The presumption of hybridity is that the interplay top-down and bottom-up can suggest alternative forms which have a higher level of legitimacy in local eyes. The hybrid in statebuilding would suggest the type of collective behaviour of ordinary people to respond to institutions of statebuilding; and the level of legitimacy can be predicated upon these: adaptation, modification and rejection. If the ordinary accept the institution built by the power of statebuilding, the state can be presumed to rest on social norms and values,

P@x Theory

and meet the needs of the ordinary people, and provide human security, therefore gaining legitimacy. If the ordinary people reject this, the state can be said to be illegitimate. The rejection can be shown through various patterns such as resistance and ignorance. Instead of following state institutions, the ordinary people follow their legitimate institutions which reflect their social values and norms. This could reveal dual or multiple political systems, witnessed in Africa and in the Pacific Islands. Lastly, the ordinary people and the power of statebuilding can negotiate, which can lead to a transition from being illegitimate to being legitimate. The ordinary people has the key to the interaction with the international community, which could show the process of legitimacy construction, the level of state legitimacy, and finally the process of different types of state-formation.

In both practical and theoretical discussions on statebuilding and state-formation, the ordinary people have often been dismissed because the Western Weberian state and state legitimacy have overwhelmingly dominated international statebuilding operations. However, the ordinary people should not be ignored, since their reaction to the statebuilding power is critical to whether statebuilding is successful or not, through how effective legitimacy has been produced. In this sense, the ordinary people's reaction to statebuilding power should be more carefully observed and the ordinary people need to be studied as active political actors in statebuilding and state-formation.

Minji Yoo

minji.yoo@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk

PhD Candidate at the University of Manchester.

References:
Barker, Rodney. 1990. *Political Legitimacy and the State*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Holsti, Kalevi J. 1996. *The State, War, and State of War* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lemay-Hebert, Nicolas. 2013. 'Everyday Legitimacy and International Administration: Global Governance and Local Legitimacy in Kosovo', *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 7(1): 87-104.

Richmond, Oliver. 2011. *A Post-Liberal Peace*, London: Routledge.

Tilly, Charles. 1985. 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime'. In: Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol (eds.) *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

White, Lynn T. (ed.). 2005. *Legitimacy: Ambiguities of Political Success or Failure in East and Southeast Asia*, London: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

P@x Observatory

Resources on Minorities during and in the aftermath of violent conflict

Gurr, T. R. 2007. **Minorities, nationalists, and islamists. Managing communal conflict in the twenty-first century**. In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson & P. Aall (Eds.), *Leashing the dogs of war,* pp. 131-160.

Minorities – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (United Nations)
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/MinoritiesIndex.aspx

Council of Europe – Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/default_en.asp

Minority Rights Group International
http://www.minorityrights.org/

The Rights of Ethnic and Racial Minorities (Human Rights Educations Associates)
http://www.hrea.org/index.php?base_id=142

European Centre for Minority Issues
http://www.ecmi.de/

Wimmer, Andreas et al (eds.). 2004. *Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a New Realism*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 333-360.

High Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE
http://www.osce.org/hcnm

Minorities at Risk – Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/

State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2012 (Minority Rights Group International)
http://www.unesco.org/library/PDF/MRG.pdf

Institute for Minority Rights – European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano
http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/institutes/imr/default.html

TURKEY: THE REAL ISSUE OF A MINORITY HIDDEN BY "KURDS' SEPARATISM"

P@X Studies

To what extent should minority rights be recognized while maintaining a cohesive state? This question has been ignored in Turkey since the creation of the Republic in 1923. Turkey's founding father, Kemal Atatürk's strategy to create a strong and modern state was to label every citizen "Turk". Until the 1980s, there was even no word "Kurdish" or "Kurd" in a dictionary in Turkey (Kojima, 1991). However, slowly, the country has been recognizing the existence of ethnic minorities living in Turkey. In 2009, the national television, TRT, started some transmissions in Kurdish languages (Sorani and Kurmanji) and Zaza language (one of the minorities' languages spoken in Turkey). Furthermore, in 2011, the vice Prime Minister, Blent Arinc, by declaring the government's consideration of the minorities' rights, gave hope to the long lasting issue of the Kurdish people.

Turkey has been struggling to improve its treatment of the minorities living in the country out of regard for the European Union and, for their public stance as a "modern laic" country in the Middle East. Especially today, the international community is more and more paying attention to the issue, due to the current situation in the neighbouring country, Syria, in which the Kurds make up 9% of the total population. A Syrian Kurdish party, Democratic Union Party (DYP), has established their interim administration, and its leader Salih Muslim announced their autonomy in northeast Syria in November 2013. DYP is affiliated to Turkey's Kurdish organization, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the United States of America, the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. To the Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the progress regarding the Syrian Kurds' autonomy is a source of concern as his own Kurdish population might gain a similar status in the future.

Turkey's long-running propaganda, using its mass media and centralised national education, has contributed to label Kurdish people as "separatists" or "terrorists" by the general public, claiming a disturbance to the state's security and stability. The government has justified its exercise of force against Kurd-populated areas in southeast of Turkey in the name of the fight against terrorism. However, as we can see from the fact that the Turkish military forces have sometimes recruited also Kurds to combat against the PKK (Matsuura, 2003), the "Kurdish issue" is not caused by the Kurds neither is about Turkey vs. Kurds.

In addition, according to the study published by the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) and Pollmark, in 2009, among 10,577 respondents, both Turks and Kurds pointed out socio-economic reasons as the most important source of the issues related to the Kurds. Then, the opinion is divided: for Turks, the "PKK/Terrorism" issue is the second biggest problem, and for Kurds, the "discrimination" follows. The survey also shows an interesting reaction to the problem. Nearly half of the Turk respondents answered to the question, "In your opinion, is the Kurdish question an important problem of Turkey?" with "No" and some of them with "No such a problem exists". When it comes to the government's policies implemented in the last 25 years against terrorism, more than 70% of the respondents consider them "unsuccessful". And more than 50% of the Turk respondents think that the military forces used to fight against the PKK would not resolve the Kurdish question but the agreement among the political parties represented in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey would. However, while Turks recognise the futility of the use of arms for settling the issue, another section of the research reveals the unwillingness of Turks to further provide cultural rights, constitutional recognition of Kurdish identities and free use of minorities' languages.

In Turkey, after decades of silence and ignorance of the Kurdish identities, since 10 years or so, the government has turned its position to recognise the "existence" of the Kurdish minorities. By admitting it officially, Ankara seems to have transmitted an image of being sincere to the minorities living in Turkey, while clearly showing its position to condemn by its military any armed/non-armed protest or demonstration occurring from the Kurdish sides.

P@X Studies

Besides, when it comes to the recognition of the minorities' languages as the official languages or other cultural rights (for example, to refuse a daily recitation of the declaration of being happy to be Turk, "Andımız", at elementary schools), Turk citizens tend to associate it with separatism probably due to the media's influence (Radikal, 2005). But it is undeniable that not all the Kurdish minorities seek for independence but rather recognition and respect of their identity (Cengiz, 2011). One's identity is not always coherent with one's state. And one's identity should not necessarily be one. Identities might overlap one another, or be switchable depending on situations. For which reason, one cannot call her/himself "Kurdish-Turkish" or "Kurdish origin but Turkish" (Baskin, 2011)? Or why not think "I'm Kurdish but from Turkey" or "I do not feel any identity attached to my country"?

In addition to the identity's recognition, as pointed out by Turkey's citizens, it is also valuable to reconsider the socio-economic development in the Kurd-populated areas and to reduce the internal economic disparity (Aziz, 2000). According to Turkey's demographic survey, the illiteracy rate of the youth (more than 15 years old) in the Kurd-populated southeast regions will reach 17-30% in the coming years. During 1985-1995, half of the schools in the regions have been closed, and this led to the lower level of education: the Kurdish youths in average have 2 years less of education than Turk ones (Konda, 2010).

A state's stability and sustainability depends on how well the state includes in its politics and policies the most geographically-unfavored regions and minorities, under a generous umbrella called "country". The simple recognition of minorities does not automatically generate its sustainable integration within the country. A further effort is required to move towards a unified Turkey where ethnic and cultural diversities can be more appreciated.

Kaori Imai

kaori.imai@deusto.es

Marie Curie Fellow within the Sustainable Peacebuilding Network, Universidad de Deusto.

References:

Aziz, Namo. 2000. *Kurdistan, Storia di un Popolo e della sua Lotta con un Saggio di Abdullah Ocalan*, Roma: Manifestolibri Srl.

Baskın, Oran. 2011. 'The issue of "Turkish" and "Türkiyeli"'(Turkey National; from Turkey)'. Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNews ById.action?newsId=232143 (accessed on 16.08.2012)

Cengiz, Orhan Kemal. 2011. 'What do Kurds want?'. Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-239174-what-do-kurds-want.html (accessed on 15.12.2013)

Kojima, Goichi. 1991. *Toruko no mouhitotsu no kao*, Tokyo: Chuukou Shinsho.

Konda Araştırma ve Danışmanlık. 2010. 'Kürt Meslesini Yeniden Düşünmek'. Available at: http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2010_12_KOND A_Kurt_Meselesini_Yeniden_Dusunmek.pdf. (accessed 14.12.2013)

Matsuura, Noriko. 2003. *Kurdistan wo tazunete*, Tokyo: Shinsensya.

Radikal. 2005. 'Andımız' tartışılamaz mı?'. Available at: http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=Radi kalDetayV3&ArticleID=758625&Date=22.06.2011&C ategoryID=99. (accessed 20.08.2012).

WAR CHILD MOTHERS' EXCLUSION IN UGANDA

The term 'war child mother' broadly applies to (former) abducted or returnee girls forced into sexual servitude or to 'marry' rebels, resulting into early pregnancy and motherhood. Adversely, this connotation limits the scope to only (former) abducted or returnees, albeit there are other girls affected by conflict circumstances—girls coerced by the conflict ambiance to give birth before they are 18 years old. The situation of war child mothers in Northern Uganda [1] reveals the effects of the two decades (1987-2006) of armed violence orchestrated by Lord´s Resistance Army (LRA) against the central government (and civilians). This civil war targeted juvenile girls [2] and boys in Northern Uganda like none other, leading to the increase of child mothers and children born of war. It should be noted, however, that the challenge of child mothers is not an isolated case for Northern Uganda as a war affected zone, but a countrywide challenge [3]. The difference between early pregnancy among girls affected by violent conflict and those not affected by it, is that those affected by violent conflict are faced with the twin tragedy of violence from the war as well as the persistent stigmatization that comes with early pregnancy (UNICEF, 2004).

The atrocities committed by LRA rebels ascertained that in contemporary wars, children are caught up not merely as bystanders, but also as targets or weapons of war (Machel, 1996:12-3). Unfortunately, the immediate and long-term impacts advanced by the LRA war are not precisely quantifiable, but evidence indicates that the impact of war on child mothers took a multitude of ways. Firstly, child mothers were among the 20,000 children abducted and forced to serve in the LRA rebel enclave in different capacities. Secondly, the massive camp settlements and night commuting of children exposed girls (and boys) to violence of many kinds, including sexual assault and prostitution [4]. Thirdly, forced 'marriages' to armed leaders led to forced pregnancy of innocent girls (Machel, 1996: 13). Due to these impacts, there is concrete understanding of the impact of the war, but there are limited long-term interventions to mitigate the plight of war child mothers.

A girl pupil in a crowd of boys inside the Karas Primary School in Uganda's Nakapiripirit District. ©UNICEF Uganda/2007/Hyun

Even though child mothers, in general, face enormous risks including health problems, like high risk of maternal related death, unsafe abortions and sexually transmitted diseases (like HIV/AIDS), their discrimination compounds all their future social, economic and health possibilities. The exclusion of child mothers is complex to mitigate because it is often advanced from immediate family and the community, and this discrimination occurs in different domains. In many cases, stigmatization and rejection of their kids as 'rebel´s kids' defines their plight and struggling (Apio, 2007). Besides such blame, cultural and social restrictions are allotted to them; they are not only forced to assume the roles of motherhood at an early age—an immediate transmission to maturity after birth—but sadly negated access and ownership of family or husband´s property, like land, which increases their likelihood to fall below the poverty line. Additionally, due to the current school systems in Uganda, pregnancy is condemned in the standard education system as a "bad example to students". The only avenue for further education to child mothers is vocational institutions. Clearly, it is hard for war child mothers to overcome the identity associated with the conflict atrocity, which is an inherent challenge (Carpenter, 2007) and the socio-cultural discrimination.

These innocent girls face a twofold dilemma. On the one hand, they are sexually assaulted with impunity and, on the other hand, they are confronted with continual unforgettable suffering from rejection by family, communities and in government failure to intervene (Apio, 2007).

P@X Studies

For instance, the ordeal of denial by the community, relatives and family re-echoes emotions of being identified with "bearing ´rebel´s kids´, failure or disgrace to the family, wasting the parent´s earning and future security" among other negative connotations of the sort [5]. In one way or another, child mothers are victims subjected to threats and stigmatization, but not offered agency tools.

Summarily, although the situation is worse in post-violent conflict regions of Northern Uganda, the degree of suffering is equally alarming whether they were victims of rebel´s impregnation or through other forms of violence, such as rape, during violent conflict. The government needs to focus on how policies or programs, like the current education system or special model schools, could accommodate all pregnant child mothers. Secondly, essential interventions, especially by international agencies should target not only male youth and former soldiers, but also the female youth. Explicitly, denial and rejection after pregnancy is complex and needs long-term interventions programs rather than just addressing the immediate psychological effects. The agenda should centre on the individual child mother´s agency as well as community interventions to enhance change of perceptions on integration and assimilation of child mothers.

Norman Mukasa

normanmukasa@gmail.com

PhD Candidate at Deusto University.

Notes:
[1] Northern Uganda includes the districts of Agago, Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum, Nwoya, Lamwo and Pader.

[2] In the LRA war, girls were offered as 'rewards' to senior officers; as a result, a significant number of returnees were child mothers. For more information see UNICEF NEW YORK, 20 December 2004 new-line entitled Child mothers face stigma of rejection (Chulho Hyun, UNICEF Communication Officer in Uganda).

[3] According to the Uganda Demographic Health survey, 2011, the rate of early pregnancy is at 24%, one out of four teenagers gets pregnant before their 18th birthday.

[4] The UN report by Machel asserts that "unaccompanied children are especially vulnerable and at risk of neglect, violence, military recruitment, sexual assault and other abuses" (1996:19).

[5] Based on interviews of five girls and a matron of Pader Girls Academy in Northern Uganda—the only school in Northern Uganda, and Uganda in general, that focuses on secondary standard education, vocational education and provides a daycare centre for children of child mothers. It also provides housing and child care trains to child mothers.

References:
Apio, E. 2007. 'Uganda´s Forgotten Children of War'. In Carpenter, C. *Born of War: Protecting Children of Sexual Violence Survivors in Conflict Zones*. Kumarian Press, Inc., 94-109.

Carpenter, C. 2007. 'Gender, Ethnicity, and Children ´s human Rights: Theorizing Babies Born of Wartime Rape and Sexual Exploitation'. *In* Carpenter, C. *Born of War: Protecting Children of Sexual Violence Survivors in Conflict Zones*. Kumarian Press, Inc., 1-20.

Machel, G. 1996. *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*. New York: United Nations.

UNICEF. 2004. *Child mothers face stigma of rejection*. New York.

INTERVIEW WITH PAULA PICKERING

Paula Pickering is Associate Professor at the Department of Government, College of William and Mary University, Williamsburg, Virginia, United States of America. She first visited Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, right after the end of the brutal war. Bosnia left an important mark on her life as a researcher as she was impressed by what she says the international officials often missed: the capacity of ordinary people to rebuild their lives. In her book *Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The View from the Ground Floor*, Pickering focuses on individuals who policy-makers of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina label as minorities, or to be more precise, individuals who are not members of the majority group in a particular region or locality. P@x talked to her about strategies these individuals use to rebuild their lives after the violent conflict of the 1990s, especially in terms of generating social capital with other ethnic groups in the country.

In your book you refer to the neighbourhood as one of the venues for generation of social capital in Bosnia, albeit not the strongest one. What do you think of the power of neighbourhoods now, especially when it comes to minorities, i.e. people who are returning to places where they are now minorities? Can neighbourhoods still generate social capital for them?

I do think that as we move away from the war and that the people's choice of where they stay, where they decide to live, becomes more settled, there should be greater opportunities for the neighbourhood. When I was conducting my research it was still relatively close to war and there was lot of flux in neighbourhoods and questions about the ownership of property. I do think that on the one hand there should be some greater possibilities for engaging in social capital,

but the negatives are still in terms of engaging and building, bridging social capital. The neighbourhoods are more homogenous technically than they were before, then there is the economic situation which means that people don't have as much time, as many resources, to be engaging in as much social activity as before.

What do you think about the neighbourhoods in Bosnia and the Balkans in general? Some researchers who have spent some time living in Bosnia were not that persuaded about the potential of neighbourhoods. Do you think that the power of neighbourhood is there or is it just that in the previous political system people had to rely more on each other due to pervading scarcity, while in this system, capitalism has revealed the true potential of the neighbourhood, or to be more precise, lack of it?

I think that there's quite a bit of research by some scholars… Before the war there was significant power for the neighbourhood to generate bridging social capital. The literature that looks even during the Ottoman period sees the neighbourhood as being a strong mechanism for social activity, and for helping out each other. I guess one could argue that the Balkans challenging economic situations have encouraged the strength of the neighbourhood and people's reliance on informal networks to get things done and to help each other out. I do think that the capitalist system weakens the neighbourhood. There is a lot of choice now for people to select where it is they live, and all of the research shows that when people have a choice they tend to live with people who are similar to them, and the capitalist system of course requires that you work really hard to earn your living, and many people who have several different jobs don't have much energy left to spend time with their neighbourhoods. But I must say, in comparison with America[, the United States of America], and even I would say with closer countries like Russia, I think that the neighbourhood and the extent of expectations of the sociability and the level of help in the region is still fairly unique. What will be in 10 or 20 years is a question that hopefully scholars can be studying.

You discuss the potential of the 'supra-ethnic group' idea, especially in terms of attachment to the local community. You mention a Croat who is in a way witnessing this through his return to Bihac. How much do you think this is actually present now in post-conflict Bosnia, especially after almost 20 years since the end of the conflict? Are people still attached to their localities as they were right after the war, or have they been, in a way, 'distracted' by the pursuit of livelihoods, community pressure, etc.?

I am sure, like you, I am eager to see the results of the census. As I mentioned in the book there are still many strong pressures, from political parties, from strong members in civic community, religious organizations for example, for people to prioritize their ethno-national identity over any other possibility. Any other option, whether that be attachment to the local community, attachment to some kind of regional identification, or supra-ethnic Bosnian identity, I think all of that faces an uphill battle in terms of people officially declaring themselves something other than [their] ethno-national group. But I do think that there is a tradition in Bosnia and Herzegovina for people to be very connected to one's local community. Sometimes it doesn't necessarily involve defining some name, but still people often talk about their identity, partly at least, attached to their locality they live in and the uniqueness of life in community.

Do you think that the 'Sejdić-Finci' case and potential changes, that will hopefully be made, are going to influence much the position of minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)?

Well, we have to look at details of any reform but I do think it will provide an opening for people to behave and to select political parties that are maybe closer to their ideal preference. The research still shows that people are not very satisfied with [the] political options that they have, yet I think that [the] current system with its quotas really doesn't leave very realistic options for people who are minorities. So, I do think it holds some potential, but for minorities to feel more power[ful] there needs to be more systematic change of the political system.

Cover of the book "Peacebuilding in the Balkans", by Paula Pickering.
http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100981530 (2007)

In your book you are putting an emphasis on the workplace as a venue for creation of social capital. During your research have you identified with any particular type of workplace for the creation of social capital, especially in circumstances of post-conflict Bosnia?

In the book I do talk about not a workplace in a particular sector, but the kinds of characteristics of the workplace that would encourage bridging the social capital, so obviously it has to be a workplace where there is diversity and at the very least the leadership at the workplace creates an environment for horizontal interaction between people of different ethnicities to work together on tasks. So if it's a workplace situation where it is very hierarchical, where one group has power over another group, that's not a workplace that's going to be promoting bridging social capital or even allowing for workers on their own right to build bridging social capital. Workplaces that my informants worked in were very varied, some of them were private shops, state organizations, international organizations, it was really a kind of a variety of types of workplaces, but the important thing is that there needs to be a possibility for the vast majority of workers of various ethnicities to work together on common tasks.

P@x Studies

During your research, has any member of the international community in BiH ever mentioned the Annex 9 of the Dayton Peace Agreement which prescribes the establishment of public corporations at national level? Have any of them realized the potential that the establishment of these corporations could have had in terms of employment of minorities if each company would have had certain quotas of employees from every ethnic group?

I've never heard of them mention it. I don't think that it has attained much attention, but as you know the attention to economic development was very late, too late, in the reconstruction and peacebuilding process in BiH. The lack of attention to it really harmed the possibilities of creating the type of workplace situation that would promote the bridging social capital.

How do you see these minorities in Bosnia in 10 years from now? It's been almost 20 years after the conflict, and we have seen mostly elderly people returning to their places of origin, comprising these minorities.

Obviously, there are many factors that will affect the future of minorities. I must say that the situation is more challenging for minorities now than it was when I originally wrote my book, because the political system has become very entrenched, and political parties have adapted to the system, and are invested in the system, and benefit from the system, and they are not willing to meaningfully change it at this point without some kind of pressure. I think that [the] political system continues to marginalize minorities and to emphasize majorities in different regions and I think that very poorly done privatization, and economic development, also severely creates problems for minorities. If there was a window of opportunity to create a privatization, or even as you said with the public enterprises, to promote more favourable opportunities for citizens regardless of their ethno-national background, but particularly include and create possibilities for minority, it seems that that window of opportunity has been mostly closed. There is also the school system that I think is obviously very challenging for minorities.

I do think that there are possibilities for change and I do know that there are a lot of Bosnian citizens, both the majority and minority, who are not happy with the political system, or the economic system, but it's really up to them to bring pressure for change because political leaders on their own are not going to do it.

Interview by Jasmin Ramović,

jasmin.ramovic@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk

PhD Candidate at the Humanitarian and Conflict Responds Institutes, University of Manchester.

BOOK REVIEW

Francesco Palermo and Natalie Sabanadze (eds). 2011. *National Minorities in Inter-State Relations*, **Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.**

For purposes including state formation, rights protection and security, minority issues have been the subject of international relations for long. Minority treaties in the League of Nations providing for non-discrimination, right to use one's own language, the right to religious practices, and so on are examples of this. Currently, apart from the treatment of minorities in international or human rights law

In general, quite a few international instruments have emerged exclusively addressing minority questions. The *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992)* and *the Council of Europe's Framework Convention on National Minorities (1994)* (FCNM) are two of them. The *Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations* (the "Recommendations" hereinafter), which are the subject of the book under review, also fall in this category of legal and political instruments dealing with minorities.

The Recommendations were issued in 2008 by the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in exercising his mandate of preventing conflicts arising from issues of national minorities, a term encompassing "a wide range of minority groups, including religious, linguistic and cultural as well as ethnic minorities". The Recommendations lay down principles, obligations and guidelines to states, particularly of home-states (states where ethnic minorities reside) and kin-states (states having 'kin' relations with national minorities). They are organized in four sections: general principles, states' obligations, benefits by kin-states to national minorities, and multilateral and bilateral instruments and mechanisms. Among the notable principles recognised in the Recommendations are state sovereignty, state consent, friendly relations among states, respect for the rights of national minorities, principal responsibility of the home-state towards these minorities, minority rights as a legitimate concern for the international community, the interest of kin-states to support national minorities, and non-discrimination.

This edited book, which is organized in two parts and twelve chapters, elaborates and assesses the Recommendations. As explained in the first chapter, the book aims at exploring the challenges of these Recommendations in theoretical, practical (the first 8 chapters) and geographical terms (the remaining 4 chapters). The first contribution by Francesco Palermo, "National minorities in Inter-State Relations: Filling the Legal Vacuum?", offers background to the Recommendations, outlining laws and practices of states that have benefited their kin-nationals abroad but at the same time resulted in friction between kin-state "activism" and host state "resistance". The Chapter also connects the Recommendations to rules of international law including general principles and human rights law.

Jennifer Jackson Preece in her contribution "Diversity and Co-existence in International Society: The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations in Historical Perspective" offers a historical account of the Recommendations relating them to the origin of the international society, which she argues, is a response to diversity. In Chapter 3 titled "Minorities, State and International Security: The Contribution of the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations to Managing the 'minority problem'", Petra Roter outlines historical, international, and management contexts of the "minority problem", which consists on the perception that minorities are threats to "national" cohesion because of their claims to self-determination and kin relationship with third states.

In Chapter 4, "The "Kinterested" State and the HCNM Bolzano 'Rules of Engagement'", Bogdan Aurescu assesses the Recommendations, one by one, providing suggestions for improvement. In the 5th Chapter, Kristin Henrard provides an in-depth analysis of the relationship between non-discrimination on racial grounds and minority protection. In Chapter 6, Alan Philips offers a comparative analysis of the Recommendations with the FCNM, finding a number of similarities and mutual grounds between them, despite the latter being a human rights instrument. In the 7th Chapter, "The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations, Minority Rights and Trends in Minority Protection", Mitja Zagar explains the concept of diversity management as applied to contemporary societies particularly minority issues. In Chapter 8, "The Conferral of Citizenship en masse by Kin-States: Creeping Annexation or Responsibility to Protect?", Enrico Milano highlights the highly problematic issue of the conferral of citizenship *en masse* by kin-States as illustrated by the reported facilitation by Russia to confer citizenship to ethnic-Russians living in Crimea.

In Part II, three contributors discuss specific cases, highlighting the explanatory significance of the Recommendations, while one contributor provides a brief commentary on the Recommendations. Hence, in Chapter 9, Natalie Sabanadze takes the South Caucasus in general and Georgia in particular to address the responsibility of states to protect minorities. In Chapter 10, Annelies Verstichel discusses in theory the role of the Republic of Serbia towards Kosovo Serbs in light of the *Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement and the Recommendations*. In Chapter 11, Elena Jurado takes up the case of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia exploring issues arising from the Recommendations. And in the last chapter, Kinga Gal makes a brief commentary on the Recommendations from three perspectives: regional, national, and minority. The final pages of the book have the Recommendations (including the introduction by the HCNM and the Explanatory Note) and two other documents that enriched the Recommendations.

The contributors to the book come from diverse backgrounds, some of them with experience at the OSCE-HCNM (the owner of the Recommendations) and others from academia, ensuring diversity of opinions and comprehensive coverage. Finally, it should be recognised that the book, prefaced by Knut Volleback – the HCNM who issued the Recommendations – is an interesting read for policy makers not only within the OSCE, but in other regions of the world such as Africa, where issues related to national minorities still result in frequent violent conflicts and wars.

Wondemagegn T. Goshu

twondemagegn@yahoo.com

Doctoral Student, Institute of International Law, Karl-Franzens-University of Graz.

THE FIFA QUALITY STANDARD

In global capitalism, major sports events – such as the World Cup and the Olympics – are celebrations of exceptionality. These are shown as islands of order and peace amidst global disorder and global war. They are moments of hypocrisy par excellence, in which fair play and rules-based competition messages are sponsored by top global brands, which practice its exact opposite on a daily basis. But, first and foremost, these are hyper-securitized organizations, which oppose the expression of any type of social criticism that may draw attention to the concrete and daily conditions of the peoples who inhabit the spaces where these events take place. The very nature of such islands of order and peace requires the imposition of such exception state. Thus, the World Cup and the Olympics are increasingly becoming offshores in the face of the current law and social functioning.

The FIFA World Cup 2014, which is taking place is Brazil, combines all these elements. The "Lei Geral da Copa" (in English, the "World Cup general law", imposed by FIFA to the Brazilian state establishes areas of non application of the national law, namely the 2km radius around the soccer stadiums, where there is a strict monopoly of the commercial activity of the World Cup official sponsors. These very sponsors, like FIFA itself, will also benefit from total tax exemption in Brazil, which will amount to up to 1 billion of reais. More importantly, FIFA instituted as a requirement for the World Cup the adoption by Brazil of new criminal classifications and the creation of exceptional courts for ultra summary trials in which harsh sanctions will be applied, in detriment of defense rights. The state of exception of the 2014 World Cup is also manifested in the 2 billion of reais spent with public security (of which 54 million were affected to armament acquisition), the hyper-militarization of the host cities – and especially its poorest areas – and the training of special urban security forces in countries such as Israel. This is what constitutes the "FIFA quality standard".

The "FIFA quality standard" is also comprised of extremely lucrative revenues for those who never cease to win.

In Brazil, like in Portugal, these will be the beneficiaries of public-private partnerships, such as Odebrecht, which will profit from the benefits of the stadiums' construction and will tie the considerable losses to the State, that is, the tax payers. The state governments borrowed at least 4,8 billions of reais from BNDES to build stadiums which will become practically useless after the World Cup (the "UEFA quality standard" that the Portuguese are well aware of after the 2004 European Cup in areas such as Leiria and Olhão was implemented in Manaus, Cuiabá and in Bahia...).

For the hundreds of thousands of forcibly displaced people– in Rio de Janeiro alone 4,700 families were removed from their homes – without any assurance of reallocation and for the many girls who will become victims of the exponential growth of the commercial sexual exploitation of underage children and adolescents the "FIFA quality standard" is a synonym of despair, which will add to the despair they already feel in their daily lives. The other side of the hypocrisy of global events becomes evident in the lives of these people: while its rhetoric often has some sort of tranquilizing effect worldwide, its practice is based on the remorseless trampling over the human rights of those who have only experienced them in theory.

In face of this contradiction, a new social conscience is being generated. The fact that the Brazilian people, who are soccer lovers par excellence, are taking the streets demanding no less than the "FIFA quality standard" in the fields of health, education and other social rights is a significant seedbed of hope. This may well be the World Cup's major legacy.

José Manuel Pureza

jmp@ces.uc.pt

CES Researcher and International Relations professor, School of Economics, University of Coimbra.

*First published on the 13th June 2014, in *Diário de Notícias.*

In the Radar

PSG's Attic

PublicationsPS

Cardoso, Katia; **Roque, Sílvia** (2013) **"Entre a marginalização e a securitização: jovens e violências em Cabo Verde e na Guiné-Bissau"**, *Revista Cabo-verdiana de Ciências Sociais*, 1, 1, 61-84.

Cravo, Teresa Almeida; **Nascimento, Daniela**; Hornsby, David and **Santos, Sofia José** (2014) **'African Emerging Powers'**, NOREF Report, 4 July.

Cravo, Teresa Almeida (2014) **'Mudanças e continuidades na conceptualização da guerra'**, *JANUS 2014 - Anuário de Relações Exteriores*, Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, June 2014, pp.82-83

Freire, Maria Raquel; **Simão, Licínia** (2014) **'A Rússia e o Caúcaso do Sul: das relações neocoloniais à realpolitik no 'estrangeiro próximo'**, *in* Patricia Daehnhardt e Maria Raquel Freire (org.), *A Política Externa Russa no Espaço Transatlântico. Dinâmicas de Cooperação e Competição num Espaço Alargado*. Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra.

Nascimento, Daniela (2014) **'Sul do Sudão: os desafios à sustentabilidade de um Estado politicamente instável'**, *State Building and Fragility Monitor,* n. 8 (April), pp. 9-14.

Nascimento, Daniela (2014) **'Exclusão, violência e reconstrução pós-conflito'**, *JANUS 2014 - Anuário de Relações Exteriores*, Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, June 2014, pp.102-203.

Simão, Licínia (2014) **'A Rússia e a Ásia Central: globalização e competição hegemónica'**, *in* Patricia Daehnhardt e Maria Raquel Freire (org.), *A Política Externa Russa no Espaço Transatlântico. Dinâmicas de Cooperação e Competição num Espaço Alargado*. Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra.

Simão, Licínia (2014) **"The EU's Conflict Resolution Policies in the Black Sea Area"**, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 16, 3.

Simão, Licínia (2014) **"Narratives of the Ukrainian Crisis: The Power of Discourse and Media Wars"**, *IPRIS View Points*, 146.

ActivitiesPS

APRIL

Licínia Simão presented the communication **"A retirada da NATO do Afeganistão e o impacto na Ásia Central: novos desafios de segurança para as potências regionais"** [The NATO withdrawal in Afghanistan and the implications in Central Asia: new security challenges for regional powers], conference "A Ásia e o Mundo: perspetivas para o século XXI, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, New University of Lisbon, 3 April.

Teresa Almeida Cravo participated as a trainer at the *Crisis Management Course*, National Defense Institute, where she presented the lecture **"The EU Strategy for Contexts of Fragility: Interventions in Fragile States"**, Lisbon, 7 April.

Teresa Almeida Cravo presented the communication **'The EU as a Security Actor: The Legal Dimension of Security Sector Reform in the Periphery'**, ECPR Joint Sessions, Workshop on *Constitutionalising Security: The Case of the EU*, Salamanca, 10-15 April.

Daniela Nascimento presented the lecture **"The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Action"**, 14° Curso de Direitos Humanos, *Ius Gentium Conimbrigae*- Centro de Direitos Humanos, Law School, University of Coimbra, 12 April.

Daniela Nascimento presented the communication **"Para além das cinzas: uma avaliação crítica da cooperação portuguesa em Timor Leste"** [Beyond the ashes: a critical appraisal of the Portuguese development aid in Timor Leste], VII Convention of the Portuguese Association of Political Science, School of Economics, University of Coimbra, 14 April.

Licínia Simão presented the communication **"Insegurança e conflitos na Eurásia: novas lentes de análise"** [Insecurity and conflict in Eurasia: new lenses of analysis], VII Convention of the Portuguese Association of Political Science, School of Economics, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, 14-16 April.

Paula Duarte Lopes presented the communication **"Construção da paz e desenvolvimento em Timor-Leste: uma relação problemática"** [Peacebuilding and development in Timor Leste: a problematic relation], VII Convention of the Portuguese Association of Political Science, School of Economics, University of Coimbra, 14-16 de April.

Sílvia Roque presented the communication **"Pós-guerra ou a permanência das crises: uma análise da reprodução das violências na Guiné-Bissau"** [Post-war or the permanence of crises: an analysis of violence reproduction in Guinea-Bissau], VII Convention of the Portuguese Association of Political Science, School of Economics, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, 14-16 April.

Sílvia Roque and **Rita Santos** presented the communication **"Descolonizar o feminismo nas Relações Internacionais"** [Decolonizing feminism in International Relations], VII Convention of the Portuguese Association of Political Science, School of Economics, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, 14-16 April.

Sofia José Santos and Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho presented the communication **"Democracia, Tecnologia e Resistência: o papel da Ushahidi no Quénia** [Demcracy, Technology and Resistance: the role of Ushahidi in Kenya], VII Convention of the Portuguese Association of Political Science, School of Economics, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, 15 April.

Teresa Almeida Cravo participated in the roundtable **"The IR field in Portugal: Challenges and Opportunities"**, VII Convention of the Portuguese Association of Political Science, School of Economics, University of Coimbra, 15 April.

Teresa Almeida Cravo presented the communication **"Identities and foreign relations: Guinea-Bissau and the western donor community"**, Panel "Experiências do pós-guerra na periferia: o caso da Guiné-Bissau" [Postwar experiences in the periphery: the case of Guinea-Bissau], VII Convention of the Portuguese Association of Political Science, School of Economics, University of Coimbra, 16 April.

Teresa Cravo was awarded with the **2014 Best PhD Thesis in Political Science and International Relations 2012-2014** (ex-aecquo) from the Portuguese Political Science Association (APCP).

MAY

Sofia José Santos presented the lecture **"The Citizenship Academy in Portugal"**, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra, 5 May

Daniela Nascimento presented the lecture **"Socioeconomic inequalities, violent conflicts and peace building. An alternative approach based on the case of Sudan"**, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y de la Comunicación, País Vasco University, Bilbao, 14 May.

Daniela Nascimento presented the lecture **"Strategies of response to violent conflicts and of peace building. Theory and practice"**, Hegoa, País Vasco University, Bilbao, 15 May.

Teresa Almeida Cravo presented the communication **"Engaging in Security Sector Reform Abroad: The EU in Guinea-Bissau"**, Conference The European Union in International Affairs IV, Panel: CSDP Operations and African Crisis-Management, organised by the Institute for European Studies, Brussels, 22 May 2014.

Katia Cardoso presented the communication **"What has been the impact of securitised responses to violence from the margins. The case of Cape Verdean deportation"**, Workshop 'Local Grievances, Global Insecurity: Addressing Violence from the Margins' Oxford Research Group, London, 28 May.

JUNE

Paula Duarte Lopes and **Daniela Nascimento** gave a lecture on the **"Objectivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio: sonho ou realidade?"** [The Millenium Development Goals: dream or reality?], CES vai à escola [CES goes to School program], High School D.Maria, Coimbra, 4 June.

Licínia Simão presented the communication **"The EU's Conflict Resolution Policies in the Eastern Neighbourhood: Dilemmas and Opportunities in the Post-Vilnius Context"**, conference "EU, Russia and their common neighbours: new realities in the making", Center for EU-Russia Studies, University of Tartu, Estonia, 6 June.

Paula Duarte Lopes presented the communication **"Democracy in Timor-Leste: from imposition to practice"**, International conference Epistemologias do Sul, CES, Coimbra, 10-12 June.

Licínia Simão presented the communication **"The EaP's contribution to security in Europe: bringing the political back in?"**, conference "Europe's Near Abroad: Building an understanding of the changing Eastern Neighbourhood", Global Europe Centre, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, Canterbury, United Kingdom, 30 June.

JULY

Teresa Almeida Cravo was invited guest speaker at the II Observare International Conference – World War and International Relations, where she presented the communication **"The Morphology of Contemporary Wars"**, Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2 July.

Sofia José Santos presented the communication **"From the deconstruction of romanticism to the multiple faces of violence – Arab Spring, new online social media and contestation politics"**, II Observare International Conference – World War and International Relations, Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 3 July.

NEW PROJECT

The one year long research project **"Private and Public responses to default in water payments: the Portuguese case (PPWater)"**, funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), has recently been approved. The research team is comprised of Paula Duarte Lopes (principal researcher), Daniela Nascimento, CES|FEUC; Manuel Couret Branco, University of Évora; and the junior researchers Marisa Borges (PhD) and António Leitão (MA).