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Coordination of the Peace Studies Group:

José Manuel Pureza

Coordination of the P@X Bulletin:

Mónica Rafael Simões

Thematic issue organised by:

Margarida Calafate Ribeiro

Special thanks to Jessica Galeria and Kátia Cardoso

Peace Studies Group

Centre for Social Studies of the School of Economics -
University of Coimbra

Colégio S. Jerónimo, Apartado 3087

3001-401 Coimbra

Portugal

Tel: + 351 239 855593

Fax: + 351 239 855589

<http://www.ces.uc.pt/nucleos/nep>

nep@ces.uc.pt

Editorial

This fifth issue of P@x is devoted to Sudan. The peace accords of January 9th 2005 brought an end to the war fought in Africa's biggest country since its independence in 1956, that opposed the Arab government of the North, controlled by a small elite, to the mainly Christian and animist impoverished and resource stripped South. These accords, a landmark in an equally long peace process, are ambitious. The possibility of secession of the South, through a referendum to be held after six years of national unity government, is foreseen for the first time, together with other protocols concerning power and resource sharing between both parts. But Sudan lives an uncertain peace, challenged by the genocidal violence in Darfur and a growing instability in the East, with difficulties in an effective implementation of the accords. The conflict in Darfur involving, since 2003, Muslim populations and rebel groups from the region and the *janjaweed* armed militias supported by the government, made the peace scenario extremely fragile. Notwithstanding external pressures, the absence of international consensus on what to do in Darfur and the lack of will of the Sudanese government in controlling the militia and providing security to the population led to a huge humanitarian crisis that has caused over 100.000 deaths and more than 2 million refugees and internally displaced people. In the East the growing instability threatens the government's control over one of the country's wealthiest regions in resources, where some of the poorest peoples of Sudan live.

These conflicts are therefore the consequence of a strategy - led to extremes by al-Bashir's dictatorship since 1989 - of political and economic marginalisation of these populations, whose ethnic, religious and cultural diversity has been ignored. The agreement with the South did bring new perspectives of a more prosperous future to the populations devastated by war, but it also seems to have contributed to the awakening of similar aspirations in other regions of the country.

In this issue, the insights of Margarida Calafate Ribeiro and the experience of Carlos Veloso enlarge our knowledge about Sudan's complex history, about the enrooted causes of its conflicts and about what has been done to overcome them. They endow us, above all, with further arguments to keep on believing that, despite all the challenges, conflicts aren't inevitable and that peace is possible.

*Daniela Nascimento
School of Economics*

Khartoum, Port-Sudan, Juba, Geneina or the cardinal points of a complex geography

When we look at the vast territory occupied by Sudan on the map of Africa, at the many countries with which it shares borders, we understand its matriarchal duplicity. Located at the edges of the African and Arab world, colonised by Egypt under British protectorate and having achieved the status of modern State with its independence in 1955, Sudan is often considered a vaguely 'Islamicized' African country. However, it prefers to be officially seen as an Arab country located in Africa.

With an area of 2.5 million Km² (five times the size of France) and an estimated population of 33,61 million (IMF estimative), Sudan is in fact the biggest country of Africa and of the Arab world. With Arabic as the main language in the North, English as the main language in the South, and over 115 tribal languages throughout the country's regions, it is also one of the most complex countries to describe. This is not only due to its ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural diversity, but also because of the complex and delicate political puzzle that shapes it. Although the country was described in some articles from the 1960s as Africa's most likely center of grain production, and in spite of significant agricultural production in the central-eastern part of the country, today Sudan faces a devastating humanitarian crisis in the region of Darfur. This is a crisis that goes beyond the concept of war; instead it is known as genocide. It is a crisis that goes beyond a situation of food insecurity; here, famine strikes many different layers of the population. In the same somewhat paradoxical way, Sudan maintains a peace accord with the South, after one of Africa's longest wars - from independence until 2004, with a significant (though not absolute) break over between 1972 and 1983 - while at the same time, starting one of the region's most violent wars, in Darfur. This war officially began in 2003, but in fact it has a much longer historical background of discrimination and persecution, which extends politically, socially and economically to neighbouring countries Chad and Libya.

Sudan's long civil war produced a total of around 2 million deaths and 4 million displaced people. To describe this experience as a conflict between the Muslim and Arab North and the animist, Christian and African South would make it easier to understand - it would meet the usual expectations of a conflict

between civilizations. The same goes for Darfur: a rushed interpretation finds a conflict between Arabs and Africans or, according to other social and economic parameters -- which also have some ethnic lines -- between shepherds and farmers, between nomad and sedentary populations.

Without a doubt, all over Sudan (not just in the South or Darfur), there is a tension between the different pieces of this ethnic and religious mosaic; that is, a tension between Muslim Arabs and Christian Arabs, Muslim Africans and Christian Africans, between Arabs and Africans, between nomad and sedentary populations, between northerners and southerners, and between the several tribes that populate the territory. This tense coexistence become unbalanced when one of the identities - religious, ethnic or of livelihood - is valued or even overvalued, to the detriment of another. It is important to understand that this does not happen by itself. At the root of such imbalances there are always external factors, which are fundamental to people's lives: drought; with the lack of harvests, scarcity of resources; rupture of traditional livelihoods and consequent market disturbances; insecurity of communications; war in neighbouring areas, and abandonment of a certain region or people by the central government. Khartoum, with its multiple churches of all beliefs existing side by side, is a good example of this tense, centuries-long coexistence. But Khartoum is also an example of a non-democratic central government, particularly authoritarian and belligerent. To start, the government is led by General Omar Hassan al-Beshir - in power after a state-sponsored coup in June 1989, followed by an opportune cohabitation with the Islamist leader Hassan Al-Tourabi, excluded from power in 1999, by a palatial coup) that had been led by the president himself. The Khartoum regime is an expression of a harmful symbiosis between the remnants of the political Islam experience first seen in the late 80s and early 90s, and the characteristic authoritarianism of the Arab or African dictatorships^[1]. Thus, the many components of the struggles in Sudan are also a strong expression of the conflictual contestation between a non-democratic and non-dialoguing central government and a set of peripheral groups/regions from many parts of the country, which are often more connected with other

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bordering countries than with the centre that theoretically governs them, but that in fact abandons them. Neglect of the South is many faceted. It is characterised by absolute economic disinvestment over thirty years, as stated recently by a UN high official who complained about the huge difficulty of accessing populations, due to the almost complete lack of communication. It is characterised by cultural disinvestment, with the transfer of the University of Juba, the historical capital of the South, to Khartoum. Also human disinvestment, brought about by the death and displacement of millions of people searching for a better life, in the vast refugee camps of the northern Kenya or emigrating to Khartoum, or to the neighbouring or Gulf countries. And finally, disinvestment of identities, caused by allowing the region's cultural and economic fabric to be penetrated by a constant affirmation of Kenyans - overwhelming in some sectors and with traces of colonialism - who control most of the economy and other possible development sectors that impact development in the region. Historically, economically and politically, Darfur has been abandoned. Historically, this has occurred from colonial times, through the successive Sudanese governments, particularly after the devastating drought of 84/85. This drought destroyed most of the region's agricultural and pastoral land. It also made communication difficult and the paths to local markets and the roads to Chad, Egypt and Libya insecure. This made it nearly impossible for this fragile economy to export camels and labour, and men from Darfur wound up going to Libya to work in the oil fields^[2]. Social and economic abandonment of Darfur occurred through the predictable harvest failures, market failures and the failure of population to access natural resources. Political abandonment of Darfur occurred by investing in the civil war with the South and allowing, among other things, the latent conflict in Chad and between Chad and Libya to also take place in Darfur. Further, the political negotiations between the many factions that were involved in tense struggles for access to the sparse resources over the 90s were also abandoned, and the government also never responded to attempts at dialogue made by those who would become the leaders of the rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). These movements were comprised essentially of elements from African sedentary tribes, like the Fur, the Zaghawa and the Masalit,

who declared from the outset that they weren't fighting the Arabs specifically, but rather years of abandonment and marginalisation. In response, these politically unsophisticated movements, born of a struggle for survival, were met with the military muscle of the state Armed Forces, and with the stimulation and manipulation of ethnic tensions and livelihoods (between farmers and shepherds). The final blow inflicted by the government was to arm Arab militias tasked with wiping out African populations that had supported the rebel movements. This eminently warlike policy led to the dislodgment of around two million civilians, as well as the death of at least 50,000 people, and the total destruction of hundreds of villages. It also led to abuses of all sorts and, consequently, the destruction of the fragile economic fabric, producing one of the greatest humanitarian crises of the African continent, as it became known in televised reports. The cease-fire agreement between the government and the Darfur forces, signed in April 2004, was a complete failure, as was the one signed in November of that same year. This is because violence was, by that point, already out of control, and because a huge influx of desperate people struggling to survive were moving to refugee camps in Chad or to internal displacement camps under the protection of the United Nations with aid from several humanitarian organisations. Thus, in the same year the international community mourned the ten year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide by swearing "Never again", news broke of a large-scale genocide in Darfur, that had occurred with the support of the Sudanese government. One really compelling question is the following: who actually supports this central government, which seems internally devoid of a social base, and has brought about a long war in the South and stimulated violence and insecurity in Darfur? According to some analysts, namely Ali Ali-Dinar in his incisive article "*Why Khartoum wants a war in Darfur*", the war is an essential instrument to sustain this regime. The war keeps the support base of this government - that is, the military - quite busy (in the true meaning of the term): it provides them with work, makes them richer, and strokes their military pride, which had been shaken by the peace accord with the South, by strengthening the party that supports them. At the same time, this same government allows for the declaration of states of emergency, the passage of restrictive laws, and postpones elections that would surely shake its power. It is clear that the armed movements

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of Darfur already have the solidarity and the seeds of political parties to oppose the government of Khartoum. The war in Darfur today, then, is also the silent war of power for Khartoum.

But it is also important not to ignore the external support given to this government; this is where the puzzle becomes more intricate. This enabled the Sudanese government to overcome the regional system of power relations that contain this African subsystem, which is very permeable to the Middle Eastern influences, and to open itself to the world of globalisation as we know it. China is the biggest investor in the country and the main trading partner. It dominates the oil business but also commerce in general, guaranteeing that the regime in Sudan won't be bothered by international organisations. In spite of constant accusations of human rights violations or genocide in Darfur by international organisations and by the United States, China protects and supports this government. From its platform in Sudan, China puts itself forward as a fundamental player in the region, though the reach of its influence is as yet undetermined.

In addition to these political and social, national and international factors, the common denominator underlying the two major conflicts shaping modern Sudan is the struggle for natural resources. These resources range from the most essential -- water -- to the most internationally attractive -- oil. But what is also at stake here is an ideological and cultural conflict between a government with considerable Islamic religious undertones, a belligerent military expression, and a series of authoritarian and fragmented rebel movements. It is not clear whether the latter are capable of putting forward viable models of civilian democracy. Not to mention the educated urban elites, nostalgic of European and Egyptian influence, or eager to replicate the Gulf countries' models, in detriment to the new Chinese partners, with whom they share no cultural or political identification.

Land, water and oil are the axes on which the economic problems and struggles rest. On the one hand, these three elements bring the Sudan closer to the Gulf countries and allow for the overwhelming entry of China, Malaysia and India into the Sudanese economic fabric. But, on the other hand, they also separate it from its former colonial power, Egypt -- one of the greatest economic and cultural investors in the country -- because of the need to revise the

agreement on the Nile waters dating from 1959. This agreement, of clearly colonial contours, establishes that Egypt is entitled to a minimum of 55.5bn cu meters of water per year, as opposed to 18.5bn cu meters for Sudan.

But land, water and oil -- the three axes of discord -- could also be axes of peace for a just division, fundamentally through international support for the region's effective development. Internally, this is the great unknown within the peace agreement with the South, signed in January 2005. The agreement integrated Southerners in the central government, after a long negotiations process, which was observed by the United States, Italy and IGAD (the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development), a group of seven countries (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Kenya) fundamental to ensure the regional policy committed to war and, now, to peace. The recent death of John Garand, historical leader of SPLA, in a helicopter crash in north Uganda, shook this fragile agreement, which was again immediately supported by the international community. The agreement was more dear to the international community, particularly the United States, than to the Sudanese -- and specifically to some of its cultural and financial elites, which are closely connected to the Islamic political blocks that established themselves in the country through a tenuous relationship with the government and the Sudanese emigrant communities in the Arabic peninsula. The agreement was to be an example, opening the way to peace talks in Darfur. John Garang, a former guerrilla, historically opposed to the Khartoum government, and an internationally recognised leader, was expected to play a leading role in the peace talks. It is undoubtedly up to the Southerners in the coalition government to choose the best path to bring this hard negotiation to good terms. The last meetings were held last December under the auspices of the OUA, in Nigeria. These resulted in a committed agenda that essentially aims at a humanitarian cease-fire and a proper cease-fire, which would open the way to re-establish security, and work towards social reintegration. The timetable for implementing these agreements is not likely to be long, but this agenda could represent an important first step. After all, peace in Darfur is essential not only to the people of Darfur, but to all bordering regions including the south of Sudan, Chad, Libya or the Central African Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Somalia and others. All the countries in this part of Africa oscillate between

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the region's own dynamics, the convulsions in the Middle East, and the emerging powers of a galloping globalisation led by India and China, which act in a sometimes open dispute with the United States.

One thing is clear: Sudan will continue to defy political analysts. It has almost never known a time of peace or democracy. It has only six years to implement the peace process with the South, in the shadows of a possible division if Southern voters decide against unity in a referendum set for 2011. There is also the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, which will have devastating effects for many years to come. Sudan has a non-democratic belligerent government with an Islamic slant, now shaped by exchanges with a former rebel movement that is both largely Christian and quite authoritarian. It also has China as its main investor and most important political partner in international organisations. The financial sector is dominated by the so-called "religious economy", led by the great Islamic banks. And last but certainly not least, Sudan plays a key role in moving towards urgently-needed stability in the region.

Over 70% of the Sudanese work in agriculture, while around 30% of the youth are under ten years of age. Most people have relatively precarious access to health and education. The population of Sudan will, for many years, be in need of international aid, as reflected in the budgets of the many humanitarian and development organizations based in Khartoum. This will become especially relevant if the exceptional, but socially asymmetric, economic growth of the country (12% per year) isn't used to correct the huge geographic, social and political inequalities in the Sudan. It is clear that the way forward is not to continue with 90% of the country's wealth concentrated among 10% of its population; nor can we continue to expect international agencies to solve the critical problem of a lack of access to essential goods experienced by most of the population. These people are deprived of these basic goods not only because of their poor economic standing, but mainly because the lack of roads does not allow for free movement to trade products. One of Sudan's greatest problems today is accessibility and insecurity in settlements for displaced people.

The example of Darfur is a good illustration of the pertinence of this observation. In Darfur,

life as always been hard and for that reason people have always been on the move, struggling to survive. From the moment mobility became impossible due to the lack of security, fragile economic and social life systems became disarticulated, and ethnic tensions, ably orchestrated by the government, broke out. Only sustained and long-term peace and development, with serious investment in roads, villages, towns and, above all, in people and reconciliation, can provide for the return of people now internally displaced or in refugee camps -- can allow these people to have somewhere to return to. Only an investment in peace and development can create conditions so that in ten years' time we won't have another Darfur on our hands -- while at the same time we mourn the tenth anniversary of one of today's main humanitarian crisis, once again swearing "Never again". As José Luandino Vieira, an Angolan, said, "We can't build the future, but we can fight in the present so that our future isn't built by others".

Margarida Calafate Ribeiro*
Centre for Social Studies

* The author thanks Carlos Veloso and Arif Hussein, from WFP/Sudan, for their contributions.

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[2] The money sent by these emigrants and the exports income represented a substantial slice of this economy, deeply shaken with the difficulties that Libya started to impose: in 2003, with the closure of the north Darfur border, for security reasons, and in 2004 by the demand of an expensive 'health certificate' to all emigrant workers.

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The World Food Programme in Sudan

Was Darfur defined as an emergency operation? What are the criteria used to define a situation in this way?

Perhaps I can best characterize the situation in Darfur by using a negative. When an act of war results in restrictions to freedom of movement, this has a negative impact on people's lives; they no longer have access to goods, to medical facilities, etc. In arid regions, access to water is also cut off. In the context of a fragile economy and precarious development, based on bartering of goods and services, freedom of movement immediately affects the way people live, insofar as their survival mechanisms are weakened. This affects children and women first, and the population in general. To this scenario we must add the most terrible face of conflict - the violation of basic human rights, such as imprisonment without being proven guilty or disappeared people, rapes of women, and indiscriminate killing and destroying villages and goods. A context like this requires very careful attention. This brings up another important element, also related to mobility. In conflict situations, people begin to move to other locations - whether within the country's borders or outside them - in search of security. These people, then, become uprooted: they abandoned their way of life, their economic, family and cultural spaces. This kind of situation brings about a response from the international community, through humanitarian agencies. The response normally begins this way, that is, through refugees or people who are internally displaced. This is the starting point from which we start to see the ravages of war. We can also calculate the potential damages the war will have on other people who were not able to make it to communal refugee or internal displacement camps. Normally our operations begin with these large concentrations, in an effort to expand from there and reach other people that remain in their place of origin. In contrast to what most people usually think, the camp is something the people themselves create, in places they consider to be safe. The objective of a humanitarian intervention is to let people stay where they are and support them. Ideally, people stay as close as possible to their place of origin, because they are nearer to their environment, and it is possible for them to produce. When large concentrations of people

begin to form, something essential is being destroyed and the reconstruction afterwards takes a long time. But let us be clear: the security of these people must always be the first priority. One cannot force people to stay in their place of origin, nor force people that are in internal displacement camps to go to back to their places of origin if they do not feel safe. The decision to move or not must be absolutely voluntary. Sometimes this complicates the situation. War situations are dynamic and an area that is calm today may not be in four months time. In spite of many attempts to sensitize the parties to the conflict, unfortunately, military objectives and military strategies often are superimposed over everything else. And then we become like firefighters - coming to put out the fire. One of the most important goals of emergency humanitarian aid is not to become firefighters. However, there is always a big chunk of this work that must be done. But we should try to avoid it. We need to go before or try to draw attention to the problem, or use all possible means to influence the situation so as to avoid certain ruptures. Our objective is to secure some kind of peacefulness, a certain security for people caught in the middle of conflict. Sometimes, in some conflicts, the presence of unarmed humanitarian agencies works to dissuade parties from resorting to armed incursions. This can guarantee some tranquility.

As you said, it is important not to go just to put out fires, but to be present before. Prior to famines is it common to see loss of goods, cutting off of communications, and restrictions on movements?

Darfur is a region that since colonial times has received very little attention, in spite of its strategic location in the center of Africa. An emergency intervention is by its very nature limited in time and in scope. One cannot hope that in Darfur an emergency intervention - which is fundamentally to save lives, and to a lesser degree to sustain lives - will resolve age-old problems of underdevelopment.

In Darfur life is hard and there are survival strategies that are typical in the region, based on commerce and services transactions. Before the war, part of the population of Darfur had already emigrated, in Sudan, in Khartoum, and in agricultural areas in the south of Khartoum, or

even outside the country, in Liberia and Saudi Arabia. The income sent by these émigré workers is an important source of wealth for the region. The dynamic of war and international policies - such as cutting off access to Liberia and Egypt, through which people passed to get to Saudi Arabia - modified this transit. In fact, with the war, it was also no longer safe to travel to Khartoum or to the south of Khartoum. All this resulted in a reduction in these remittances. Another important economic element was trade in camels. Darfur was the main supplier of camels from Liberia and from Egypt. During the first eighteen months of the conflict, this transit was cut off and this also reduced income. In addition to these economic impacts, the region produces a set of products that are not all related to agriculture; for example, women make and trade mats. But given the insecurity in communications the merchants would not buy, although women continued to produce the mats, even though there was no one to buy them. This, as is clear, has profound implications in the economic situation of the region and in the daily life of the people living there.

Is there one clear cause for the conflict in Darfur or are there many conflated causes?

There are many conflated causes for the conflict in Darfur, but at this moment I think that we can identify one main cause, although theoreticians on Darfur do not agree. At one point I also disagreed, but today I am more inclined to be convinced by this idea, based on much of what I have heard and read. But before I get into that, let me take a small aside. The conflict that we see today is not the first war in Darfur. The drought last year affected Darfur, and this was also not the first drought. Normally, it is in drought periods that conflicts arise, although this all comes within the package of marginalization and underdevelopment. But speaking with people in the field, who are not very sophisticated in their analyses, we see that there is a clear problem of environmental degradation. Water is a serious problem and there are two socio-economic groups that live side by side and both need water. One group is made up of farmers; they might also have cattle or other livestock. The other peoples are pastoral nomads, which is not the same thing as saying that they are Arabs. When they have no water, they go looking for it. When there is no water for their pastures, the places with the best pastures are

where the other cultures are. In this way they centuries-old routes of migration and movement in response to climatic changes are not respected and therefore they enter into conflict.

Conflict because they need access to natural resources. This is one of the factors of conflict. Another factor that is important in the ongoing conflict is the attempt of one ethnic group to dominate another. There were other dry spells that did not result in conflict, because there was not external interference; there were not other agendas, and therefore the mechanisms to resolve conflicts between the different parties, tribes and ways of life worked. I refer, for example, to the drought in the 80s. There is a mechanism for conflict resolution at the local level, but if an external element is injected, and this element is someone who knows the traditions well, and supports one side and not the other - this will upset the balance of forces in the area and conflict erupts. It is interesting to see today that there are still certain zones in Darfur where conflict resolution mechanisms continue to work - or at least where farmers continue trading with nomads, and nomads trading with farmers, as good neighbors, without hostilities. There are other zones in which this does not occur today, and in fact it is important to be very aware of this, because some peoples who were allies a year ago are in confrontation with each other now. These relationships change quickly. There is also another characteristic that is always present: divide and rule.

When you refer to "external elements" are you talking about the government-armed militias?

The militias and their weaponry is one thing; but the whole game is played by surrounding countries pitting one tribe against another. Specifically I am referring to Chad and Libya. Even within the SLA there is no unity. Fundamentally there are the Fur, the Zagawas and also, important but not so preponderant in terms of population expression, the Masalit. But we must also see and analyze the history of the Sudan, past and recent, which is a history of unresolved conflicts. From the time of the Ottomans, conflicts in the Sudan have always followed pseudo-negotiated resolutions of divide and conquer. In principal there can be two or three identified and identifiable groups, but at the end of some time these groups fight amongst themselves, and begin to have different agendas and enter into conflict. All we need to do it look to the south, to the quantity of militias that exist

and that jump from one side to another over time. This principal of divide and rule is a way of life here.

Do you think that the size of the country makes things more difficult?

Yes, it is important. Darfur is the size of France, or when we talk to people from the US, the size of Texas, and it is located more or less in the middle of Africa. There are some areas in Darfur that are equidistant from the Red Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean. One thing is the geographic situation, another is the size of the country; another is the quantity and size of the conflicts that develop simultaneously in the country. Another thing is oil, and yet another is regional politics, the space in which Sudan is integrated. There are constant tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which have influence within Sudan, the whole conflict in the Congo, the internal conflict in Uganda, in the north of Uganda with the Lords Resistance Army which has a great deal of influence in the south, and the situation in Chad, and particularly the way in which the president of Chad took power and wants to maintain it. The Zagawas are partly in Chad, partly in Darfur; and also we cannot forget Libya, which continues to play a mediation role here with objectives that we do not clearly understand. All of this is part of the puzzle. There are academics who study these issues and this knowledge is very important for us. When we delineate our operations, and when we implement them, we must take all this into consideration to know how to act and how to evolve. We do not develop detailed studies - we leave this to others who help us - but we have to have the knowledge, because if not our activities will not bring results. We must know the territory, know the history of the region, the personalities, try to perceive what it is that oriented these figures in the past, the ideals they defended and defend now, because all this knowledge allows for an essential approximation to create humanitarian space, and try to create, at least, zones of calm or periods of calm so that humanitarian aid can be distributed in order to reduce the people's suffering.

When you speak of humanitarian space, are you talking about establishing negotiations at the government level and at the local level and then the creation of refugee camps? Are you referring to diplomatic work?

There are two fundamental lines of work: one line has to do with what is not reported in the media - that for which there are no public denouncements. In this line we try to make people in situations of conflict visible, using for this either the influence of friendly countries, or through donor countries. This is the way we normally work. The other line is through public denouncements or criticisms. Public denouncements, in my opinion, are normally counterproductive and should be used only as a last resource.

When you talk about "public denouncements", do you mean bringing television cameras to these areas?

Exactly. I think that such criticisms should be left to politicians, because from the moment that a humanitarian agency makes a public denouncement, which is not well founded, it will close off the space for itself and for other agencies. Potentially it could create a gap, sometimes for long periods, where no humanitarian aid could be distributed - creating problems of survival for those who need this aid. These are very sensitive situations in which we must evaluate if what we hope to achieve through the criticism is worth what we could potentially lose - providing help for people in need. I can give an example: how many times have you seen or heard public denouncements by the International Committee of the Red Cross? Very few - and only in very extreme situations. But, at the same time, no one can say that the ICRC is not concerned about human rights; nobody can say that the ICRC is not as concerned with people's security as any other agency or organization. The question is in the way we approach the problem. Those who levy criticisms in the media have to do so with very strong grounding, with a clear understanding of all the data. Only this will give the person the moral authority needed to be effective. When someone does it superficially they cause problems, because they create obstacles for helping people.

(....)

Find [here](#) a complete version of this interview.

* Carlos Veloso works with emergency operations at the United Nations for more than 16 years. He has been in Angola, Somalia, North Korea, Mozambique, and now in the Sudan. Currently, Carlos Veloso is director of the emergency operation of the World Food Program in Darfur.

PEACE STUDIES GROUP (NEP) AGENDA

Publications

Cardoso, Katia, "A relación entre a emigración e a política externa cabo-verdiana", *Tempo Exterior*, 11, July/December 2005, IGADI, 43 - 68.

Cravo, Teresa, "Entre a Centralidade e a Marginalização: a Reforma da ONU para o Séc. XXI", *Working Paper 15*, IPRI, October 2005.

Cravo, Teresa, "África à margem do «fim da história?»", Book Review of *África, Continente Acorrentado - o Passado, o Presente e o Futuro da África* (de Robert Guest, 2004, Porto: Livraria Civilização Editora), *Relações Internacionais*, 8, December 2005, 181-184.

Lopes, Paula Duarte, "Water Management in Shared Legal and Institutional Cases: Who is Managing What Water?", *Oficina do CES*, nº 244, January 2006.

Pureza, José Manuel, "Le Portugal et le nouveau internationalisme", *Pôle Sud*, Revue de Science Politique de l'Europe Méridionale, 22, May 2005.

Pureza, José Manuel, "Margem crítica e legitimação nos estudos para a paz" (co-autoria com Teresa Cravo), *Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais*, 71, June 2005.

Pureza, José Manuel, "Defensive and oppositional counter-hegemonic uses of international law: from the International Criminal Court to the common heritage of humankind", in Santos, B. e Rodriguez-Garavito, C. (orgs), *Law and globalization from below. Towards a cosmopolitan legality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005

Pureza, José Manuel, "Encrucijadas teóricas del Derecho Internacional en la transición paradigmática", *Soberanía del Estado y Derecho Internacional. Homenaje al Profesor Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo*. Universidades de Córdoba, Sevilla y Málaga, vol. II, 2005.

Pureza, José Manuel, "Governação do mar: enclosure ou património comum?", *Rua Larga*, 11, January 2006.

Roque, Sílvia, "Peacebuilding processes and weakening strategies in Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique: A comparative study", *Failing States or Failed States? The role of development models: Collected Works*, Working Paper 19, FRIDE, February 2006.

NEP's Activities

4-5 November 2005

International experts meeting of the project "[Women and girls in contexts of armed violence: a case study on Rio de Janeiro](#)", at the School of Economics of the University of Coimbra (FEUC).

8 November 2005

José Manuel Pureza (NEP/FEUC) presented the conference "[The United Nations reform and global governance](#)", FEUC, Coimbra.

11 November 2005

José Manuel Pureza (NEP/FEUC) presented the conference "[The United Nations reform: a lost opportunity?](#)" at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil).

17 November 2005

José Manuel Pureza (NEP/FEUC) presented the conference "[The United Nations reform and politics of global governance](#)" at the Fluminense Federal University, Niterói (Brazil).

November 2005 to March 2006

Conclusion of the second stage of field work of the project "[Women and girls in contexts of armed violence. A case study on Rio de Janeiro](#)", Rio de Janeiro (Brazil).

6-10 December 2005

Katia Cardoso (NEP) presented the conference "[Cabo Verde e as suas "ilhas exteriores"](#)" at the XI CODESRIA General Assembly, in Maputo (Mozambique).

12 December 2005

Sílvia Roque presented the study "[Peacebuilding processes and weakening strategies in the states of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique: a comparative study](#)", at the conference on *Failing States or Failed States? The role of development models*, organised by FRIDE, Madrid (Spain).

5 January 2006

Teresa Cravo (NEP/FEUC) presented the conference "[The humanitarian assistance in Angola](#)", FEUC, Coimbra.

11-17 February 2006

Paula Duarte Lopes (NEP/FEUC) conducted a training seminar on "[Management and Protection of Biodiversity: rules and challenges](#)" in Bissau (Guinea-Bissau).