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Editorial

Can Europe seriously be a global peace producer? In an international system increasingly summoned to a trivialization of the use of force, where the word and spirit of the United Nations Charter are slandered accordingly to the strategies of global or regional powers, Europe is challenged to affirm itself as a specific actor, bearer of a different political culture.

Between the fidelity to the civilian power model and the temptation to compete with robust foreign policy formulae, imitating them, Europe decides the identity of its own political project. But this won't be an option taken in the void. There is a path already covered that must be taken in due account at the moment of making choices. In this issue of P@x, we present three experiences that witness this specific temperament of Europe in the international system. In the European Union's relation to the Colombian conflict, a substantially different approach from the one of Plan Colombia or Plan Patriot stands out: the primacy of negotiated solution and of a “structural diplomacy” aimed at the roots of conflict are an expression of that difference. On the other hand, the folder of Turkey's adhesion to the European Union has been a chance to highlight the vein of regional stabilizer and multilateralism promoter as central elements of the Union's security culture. Last but not the least, OSCE's experience as an enlarged platform of international dialogue and as a conflict prevention structure is also a ballast of international identity in which the culture of peace prevails over the military solution.

In sum, it is the primacy of politics over its subordination to force that is at stake in this option that Europe faces. “Clausewitz in reverse” could well be the motto of European contribution to the affirmation of a culture of peace in the XXI century.

José Manuel Pureza
Peace Studies Group

THE ROLE OF OSCE IN CONFLICT PREVENTION *

The "détente" period, in the final stage of the Cold War, was in historical terms the most successful process of political dialogue between national entities, with antagonistic projects of strategic global affirmation, in a framework of potential antagonism.

The Helsinki Final Act, which in 1975 created the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), set up mechanisms that created a conception cycle of confidence building measures. These measures were probably instrumental in preventing the Soviet Union's final period to escalate from rupture to uncontrollable violence. In this context, it is only worth recall the success of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. [1]

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to which the CSCE evolved in 1994, suffers from the natural limitations of a structure that deals with issues related to the core of States' sovereignty and it was inevitably affected by the new balances consecrated with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Eastern and Central European countries, formerly under the USSR's political tutelage or strategic influence, accomplished an extremely quick evolution towards their integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures, marked by the philosophy of a West that claimed an ideological victory in the Cold War's balance. This happened before the undisguised irritation of Moscow, whose economic reaction impotence didn't allow for more than to extend residual historical influences, through the support to separatist forces of some countries that resulted from the USSR's dismantlement.

On the other hand, the indiscrete and inedited North-American action in that Russian "near abroad", which claimed legitimacy based on the global fight against terrorism, ended up increasing Moscow's uneasiness and, consequently, aggravated the cleavages within OSCE, strongly damaging its operationality. [2]

Despite living a relative stalemate, the OSCE is still known presently as an irreplaceable international political dialogue platform, whose dimension is only ousted by the UN - by joining 56 countries [3], from North America to all Europe and Central Asia.

It is worth mentioning that the organisation represents a common space of commitments towards a quite large body of principles (Human Rights, rule of law, minorities, etc.), although fragilised by some divergence regarding their reading, a result of the geopolitical diversity and differentiated democratic consistency of their members' institutions.

Deriving from the previously mentioned, the OSCE ends up being a real structure of conflict prevention, showing that as its natural calling. Integrated in its Secretariat, operates a Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) that promotes a constant monitoring of tension situations in all of the organisation's geographical space. It manages the work of the field missions [4] in several countries, where worrying situations of institutional fragility, potential for conflict or dependency from the aid mechanisms provided by the organisation's structures. The experience shows that these field structures have worked in some cases as in important tension diluting factor and have often prevented the emergency of serious crisis.

The OSCE missions articulate in a very positive way with structures that other international entities have in the same areas (UN, European Union, NATO). The organisation's action also has a vocation to operationally conjugate with the activity of other organisations, such as the Council of Europe, the World Bank, BERD, etc.

By understanding that this organisation works compulsory by consensus (that necessarily comprises the monitored countries), it's easier to recognize the difficulty that its mechanisms have to effectively influence certain national or regional processes, some of them characterised by tensions of a magnitude that overcomes the OSCE's action capacity. [5]

THE ROLE OF OSCE IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

In sum, it can be concluded that:

-the OSCE is an excellent example of a political dialogue structure that, despite all the historical difficulties it faced, has given an admirable contribution to the peaceful management of the end of the Cold War and remains today the most operational Conflict Prevention structure in the Euro-Asiatic area;

-it was at the core of OSCE, particularly in its Political-Military Dimension, that the most complete and effective CSBM's (confidence and security building measures) -central element at the basis of any conflict prevention framework - were developed and continue to work;

-the Conflict Prevention work in the OSCE area is even more relevant in the international context due to the failure of establishing a similar model at a global scale, at the time of the recent UN structure reforms;

- the OSCE Conflict Prevention model has virtualities that would recommend its adoption, with the required adaptations, to the action of other regional political organisations in conflict or risk areas, namely in Africa and Asia. [6]

** Francisco Seixas da Costa, Ambassador in Brazil.*

Former State Secretary of European Affairs and Ambassador in the UN and the OSCE

[1] The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed in Paris in 1990 and entered into force in 1992. Considered a landmark document in the realm of OSCE - for its legally binding status -, the CFE Treaty allowed for the destruction of over 60.000 pieces of military equipment, mostly proceeding from the former USSR and from countries of the former Warsaw Pact. Given the need to update, the CFE Adaptation Agreement was signed at the Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999, but it has not entered into force so far, due to diverse interpretations regarding regional issues attached to it.

[2] For the record, the Portuguese Presidency of the OSCE, in 2002, was the last in the organisation's history able to approve unanimous conclusions within the OSCE.

[3] With the adhesion of Montenegro, in 2006.

[4] Actually 18, with very differentiated structures and mandates.


[5] Although Chechnya was also illustrative, Former Yugoslavia was the most obvious example of the OSCE's intervention capacity limits. On the OSCE operational action, see Francisco Seixas da Costa (2006), "A OSCE e a Segurança Internacional", *Uma Segunda Opinião - Notas de Política Externa e Diplomacia*. Lisboa: Publicações Dom Quixote.

[6] The author of this text participated in dissemination seminars of the OSCE Conflict Prevention model, in the Republic of Korea (2003), Jordan (2003) and Egypt (2004). In the latter two cases, with the purpose of studying its possible application to the Mediterranean region and to the Middle East.

Peace builders

Tatiana Moura (2007), *Rostos Invisíveis da Violência Armada. Um estudo de caso sobre o Rio de Janeiro*. Rio de Janeiro: 7 Letras.

(soon available in English at www.ces.uc.pt/nucleos/nep/apresentacaoen.php)



“This book - and the research it sums up - aims to unveil one of the less studied areas of the urban violence: the different faces of the relation between women and girls and armed violence. Unsurprisingly, what this study reveals is the unbearable weight of that invisibility: with little statistical relevance, the condition of women victims of armed violence becomes socially ignored. From this to the scarcity of public policies on this topic, adjusted to the specificity of women’s conditions, is a small step.

The struggle for public policies that overcome this serious deficit starts precisely with a more rigorous knowledge of the reality that makes visible the faces and facts usually hidden in the shade, oversimplifying and misrepresenting reality. Only this way will be possible to draw policies aimed at reducing armed violence in a serious and capable way, assuming an inclusive meaning.”

*José Manuel Pureza
Peace Studies Group*

Peace Studies

May 28th 2006 signals the first presidential re-election in Colombia, the oldest Latin-American democracy. However, the normality and regular functioning of the electoral process hide a different reality: over 40 years of internal conflict, one of the world's worst humanitarian situations and daily violence and suffering for a large majority of the Colombian population.

If Álvaro Uribe Velez's first mandate was marked by some successes, namely in the economic domain and in terms of urban security, the failure of the fundamental policies and objectives he had proposed himself to in terms of conflict resolution must be highlighted. The conflict intensified in the last 4 years, with little perspective for its resolution in the present, despite the current demobilisation process of some paramilitary groups. After the disruption of the negotiation process in 2001, during the Pastrana administration, Uribe's approach to the conflict, characterised by a clear confrontation policy with the guerrillas and supported by Washington's military, political and strategic support, had also no effect.

Despite Uribe's administration notorious incapacity in finding the path to peace in Colombia, it should however be highlighted that this fits a historical conflict resolution difficulty. To many analysts, Colombia is an 'intractable conflict', a long-term conflict, of great complexity and difficult resolution. [1]

Several factors can explain this situation.

A first thing to bear in mind is the fact that the Colombian conflict has its origins in profound and structural causes that support it. The echoes of the Cuban revolution alone aren't enough to explain the origin of the conflict. A deeply unequal socio-economic structure, the historical absence of political participation mechanisms and the culture of violence that ravages this Andean country since its foundation are factors that lay at the basis of the conflict and its continuity.

Another essential feature of the conflict and that conditions its resolution, although it is sometimes overestimated, is drug traffic. With its origins mainly in the eighties, drug traffic would contaminate the entire Colombian society, as well as the several parts involved in the conflict. The ties developed with the several armed actors enabled thus far militarily fragile groups to strengthen strongly, at the same time they introduced economic agendas in the conflict. It would become a structuring factor of violence in Colombia and one of the fundamental elements to understand the continuation and perpetuation of the conflict in a post-Cold War scenario.

This difficult framework makes it necessary to find new conflict resolution dynamics and, eventually, even a new approach to the conflict and its resolution. Conveyed by Bogotá and supported by Washington, the actual strategy of shy appeals and incentive to negotiation, whilst simultaneously crushing the guerrillas through Plan Colombia and Plan Patriot, has proved not to be the best path to peace.

This robust approach to conflict and had a counterpoint in several peace building initiatives from other civil society and international community actors. In this context, the European Union (EU) actions have assumed particular relevance.

Although neither Colombia nor Latin America figure in its priority

European Union and Colombia: in search for alternative conflict resolution paths?

Miguel Barreto

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geographic area, the EU has nonetheless been developing policies and initiatives towards this country. These policies and initiatives shape a European approach to the resolution of the Colombian conflict, based mainly in two pillars: a search for a negotiated political solution and an attempt to tackle to the conflict's deep causes.

The search for a negotiated political solution to the conflict has been developed in the diplomatic field, though mediation and facilitation efforts. These are based specially in the framework of the *Group of Friends* with FARC and ELN, to which several EU member states are part, but where the European Commission has also had some relevance. Despite its importance, they have, however, been unfruitful processes, presenting neither great results nor a particular efficacy or visibility of the EU.

The quest to eliminate the conflict's deep causes and roots is mainly expressed in the EU's development cooperation policies. Clearly directed to peace in the Colombian context, they have been conveyed through a set of mechanisms and initiatives, among which stands the so-called Peace Laboratories, a new and innovative peace building tool meant to create the social, economic and cultural conditions for a peace at the micro level.

The European approach to the resolution of the Colombian conflict represents, especially at this level, what can be called by an attempt of structural conflict resolution. Included in a long-term reasoning and a conception of positive peace, it aims to attack and eliminate what considers being the profound causes of conflict, the structures that support it. It is a perspective that answers to and highlights aspects, such as social inequalities, thus distinguishing from other more simplistic or security based approaches, which totally blame the guerrillas for the conflict. It inscribes itself in EU's culture of relations with other regions of the world and in what Stephan Keukeleire [2] calls structural diplomacy: the promotion of long-term structural changes in regions and states, based on the transference of the ideological and governance principles that characterise the European system.

This approach is necessarily an ambitious one and of difficult implementation. The socio-economic structures of a country are related to profound and complex problems that certainly can't be solved over night. And the means with which the EU can contribute, namely development cooperation, are unquestionably limited. However, the relevance of structural elements in the Colombian conflict, as in most of the Latin-American societies and conflicts, cannot be overlooked, namely in the resolution of conflicts. If Colombia has been fundamentally marked in the last years by a security approach based in hard power, with few results so far in regards to peace, a European structural approach based on its soft power could show alternative conflict resolution paths, in a country that desperately needs new and imaginative solutions. It remains to be known whether the EU will have the capacity or will to do so and whether the several actors of the Colombian conflict will be receptive to and can be involved by this approach.

[1] Maiese, Michelle (2003), "Underlying Causes of Intractable Conflict", *Beyond Intractability*, University of Colorado, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/underlying_causes/ [30/04/06]

[2] Keukeleire, Stephan (2003), "The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor: Internal, Traditional and Structural Diplomacy", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 14, N° 3.

European Union and Colombia: in search for alternative conflict resolution paths?

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TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S SECURITY CULTURE

Despite still very incipient, the European Union (EU) has been developing a common security culture based on the threats and answers expressed at the European Security Strategy, approved in the end of 2003. Regional stability and 'effective multilateralism' at the international level were the two paths highlighted by the document. This was the context that motivated Brussels' involvement in several missions within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), six of them already concluded and nine still operating. [1]

One of the charms of Turkey's adhesion to the EU is related to its military capacity, considered an important contribution to fill in the limitations felt so far by the member states. The military weight argument, together with the geopolitical relevance, are usually pointed as the most important ones to Ankara's adherence. The question is to know if the Turkish contribution can't be qualitatively better than the present one, with an eventual compatibility of its security culture with the Brussels' one.

Brussels and its security culture

The difference between a security strategy and culture lays in the fact that the last one needs a strategy, but is more than that. It involves the development of practices and discourses contextualised in a determined conceptual analysis framework. In that sense, we can identify two inherent dimensions to the European security culture: an internal dimension and an external dimension. The first one can be understood as a process of harmonisation of perceptions and identification of threats' and answers to those threats. The second, the external dimension, is the self image that the EU aims to convey, largely through its documents and discourses: the image of communion of interests, values, norms, practices and institutions among its member states.

The external dimension is based on three pillars: civil-military relations, perception of threats and international behaviour. With regards to the first one, the question is mainly related to the political control of security issues. The armed and security forces can only properly fulfil their duty in a democratic society under the jurisdiction of the political power. In this reasoning, to be out of the political game means to be outside the citizens' control. To the EU, the conception of security is primarily established in relation to its citizens and not so much in relation to the territory. Thus, to speak of security will only have meaning if it can be controlled by those recognised as their real reference goal. The threats defined by the EU in the European Security Strategy [2] are equally decisive in the creation and exportation of that security culture. They allow conveying Brussels concerns to the world in a concrete way, without abandoning a certain abstraction degree that allows answers that, going beyond short-term policies, demand a long-lasting coherent action line, that is, a common security culture. Finally, the EU's international behaviour. By defining regional stability and effective multilateralism as answers to the security threats, the EU defined its role at the international level: regional stabiliser and promoter of multilateralism at the international level. All together, these three pillars define the patterns that any state with perspectives to adhere to the EU must assure in terms of security.

Turkey and the security-based realism

It is now relevant to understand what has been the path covered by Turkey in the fulfilment of the three abovementioned parameters. In what concerns civil-military

relations, there have been significant changes in the last years. The EU has since 1998 underlined the need for Turkey to undergo profound reforms in its extremely closed security sector, almost totally controlled by the Turkish armed forces. In this line, between 2001 and 2005, Turkey implemented reforms that have to some extent contributed to a greater 'democratisation' of the security issues in the country, namely the withdraw of power from the National Security Council, the organ that traditionally defined Turkey's action traces in terms of security. Between other measures, there was a redefinition of the organ's arrangement, with a majority of governmental representatives. The almost legislative weight of the Council's deliberations was also revised, coming closer to what it had been drawn at the time of its creation: a consultative organ.

Yet, and despite a recognition of the efforts undertook, there still seems to be a long way to go. There are several still unsolved institutional issues, namely the fact that the Chief of Defence Staff doesn't answer to the Minister of Defence and that the National Defence Policy remains a secret document distant from the glances of the common citizen and also from a great part of the political class.

Besides the institutional issues, there is however another question, probably more complex and of more difficult resolution regarding the informal weight of the armed forces in the Turkish politics. Still reminded today as the guarantor of independence after World War I, the armed forces enjoy a legitimacy granted by the general Turkish population. The feeling of constant threat induced in the citizens and result of the constant internal instability that has accompanied the Turkish Republic since its assumption as an independent state, goes together with the perception of the political class as corrupt and incompetent, in opposition to capable and honest armed forces. The exclusivity of knowledge in matters of security adds to that legitimacy. In the Turkish context, security isn't identified as a political phenomenon, rather as a technical issue that, as such, must be managed by those technically more competent to do so. Security issues are thus largely defined outside the political system. Notwithstanding the recent changes, such as the more effective government participation in the elaboration of the National Security Policy of 2005, the previously defined competence delimitation pattern continues, in general terms.

With regards to the perception of threats, Turkey confirms some of those defined by Brussels, namely organised crime and terrorism. However, not only does it have a quite more 'realist' vision as to the way to fight those threats, but it also includes other more specific questions: internally, the Kurdish separatism and the Islamic fundamentalism and, externally, the danger proceeding from its Southern neighbours - Syria and Iraq -, as well as Greece, which despite notorious relation improvements is still looked at with precaution by the Turkish military elite.

Although its geographic situation isn't favourable to a less 'securitised' vision, Turkey also seems to want to distinguish itself as a regional stability focus. Not only has it improved its relationship with countries like Iran or Syria, it also has had an active role in trying to solve the several Middle East problems. Ankara has already proposed to play as mediator in the negotiations regarding nuclear energy between Iran and the EU and, at the time of the Lebanon crisis, it was in the frontline of the UN peace mission. It has also entered several cooperation projects with the countries of the Black Sea region. As such, multilateralism and regional stability are terms that also seem to belong to the Turkish lexicon.

Ankara on its way to Brussels?

Despite the still significant differences between Brussels and Ankara with regards to their perception of security, Ankara seems to be in the path to an understanding closer to what the EU wants. Internally, and despite the several unsolved issues, Turkey seems to have an increasingly democratised security sector. In what concerns threats perceived as such, besides a partial consensus with the EU, Turkey registers a more constructive attitude towards certain issues, such as the instability in the Middle East, compared to the isolationism chosen in the past. This attitude walks along the path defined by Brussels in terms of its action in the international security sphere.

Despite the obstacles initially placed by Turkey to the activation of ESDP, Ankara has been an active partner in the EU peace missions and nothing suggests it would stop doing so. Yet, Turkey can be more than this, it can be a decisive factor in EU's affirmation as a global stabilisation and peace-making actor. It will, however, be necessary that Brussels and Ankara start to speak the same language in security matters.

[1] EUFOR and EUPM (police) in Bosnia, a planning team in Kosovo, EUPOL COPPS (police) and EU BAM (border monitoring in Rafah) in Palestine, EUJUT Lex (support to the reinforcement of the rule of law) in Iraq, EUPOL Kinshasa (police) in the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the support mission AMIS II in Darfur, Sudan.

[2] Organised crime, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts and failed States.

André Barrinha

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and Visiting fellow at the Universidade of Kent, UK*

PEACE STUDIES GROUP (NEP) AGENDA

Publications

Freire, Maria Raquel (2006), "A Revolução Laranja na Ucrânia: Uma Democracia a Consolidar", *Relações Internacionais*, IPRI, 12, 49-64.

Pureza, José Manuel *et al*, "[Peacebuilding and failed states: some theoretical notes](#)", *Oficina do CES*, nº 256, July 2006.

Pureza, José Manuel (2006), "Dez anos de guerras e pazes: o velho, o novo e o novíssimo", *Janus 2007 Anuário de Relações Exteriores*. Lisboa: Público/UAL.

Pureza, José Manuel; Cravo, Teresa, "Critical edge and legitimisation in peace studies", in F. Ferrándiz and A. Robben (eds.), *Multidisciplinary perspectives on peace and conflict research. A view from Europe*. Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto/HumanitarianNet.

Cravo, Teresa (2006), "Os Estados Unidos e a União Europeia face ao conflito sudanês: convergências e divergências de interesses e estratégias", in Ricardo Miguéis (ed.), *Europa, Estados Unidos e a Gestão de Conflitos*. Lisboa: Fundação Friedrich Ebert, 63-76.

Cravo, Teresa *et al*, "[The Role of External Development Actors in Post-Conflict Scenarios](#)", *Oficina do CES*, nº 258, September 2006.

Freire, Maria Raquel, (2006), "[Looking East: The EU and Rússia](#)", *Oficina do CES*, nº 261, November 2006.

Sílvia Roque e Alfredo Handem, "[Guiné-Bissau: a agonia controlada da paz](#)", *Público*, 1 February 2007.

NEP's Activities

18 November 2006

José Manuel Pureza participated at the round table "[Os média e a mentira](#)", Colóquios do Porto "O homem e a(s) mentira(s)", organised by the SPP and IPP, Oporto.

29 November 2006

José Manuel Pureza participated at the Panel on "[Cooperação e Desenvolvimento na Prevenção das Migrações Forçadas](#)", VII CPR Congress, Lisbon.

21 December 2006

Katia Cardoso presented the paper "[A Diplomacia Cabo-verdiana e a Diáspora](#)" at the panel "Migrações, Identidade e Transnacionalismo", I Encontro de Jovens Investigadores Cabo-verdianos, FCSH (UNL), Lisbon.

16 February 2007

Teresa Cravo presented the paper "[Processos de reconstrução pós-conflitos violentos](#)" at the Curso de Formação de Oficiais do IESM, Lisbon.

NEP's Activities

17 February 2007

Tatiana Moura presented the paper "[Women and armed violences: invisible faces of non-war contexts](#)" at the Seminar *Gender and Collective Violence*, City University, London.

23 February 2007

Mónica Rafael presented the Seminar "[A Responsabilidade Social dos Media na Ajuda Humanitária e na Cooperação](#)", at the Specialisation Course on Humanitarian Aid and Cooperation in Crisis Situations, University Moderna, Lisbon.

23-24 February 2007

José Manuel Pureza and Tatiana Moura coordinated the training course on "[Violências na paz e na guerra](#)", organised by the Peace Studies Group (NEP), CES, Coimbra.

2 March 2007

José Manuel Pureza and Raquel Freire presented the papers "[Do states fail or are they pushed? Lessons learned from three former Portuguese colonies](#)" and "[Ukraine in-between: Looking West while not Overlooking its Eastern Neighbour](#)", 48th Annual Convention, International Studies Association, Chicago, USA.

7 March 2007

Paula Duarte Lopes presented the paper "[Água: bem público ou privado](#)", at the Cycle of Conferences of the Livraria Almedina, University of Minho, Braga.

16 March 2007

Paula Duarte Lopes presented the paper "[Negotiating Bolivian Water Privately](#)", at the Political Science Seminar, ICS, Lisbon.

NEP's Projects

September 2006

Beginning of the project [Women and armed violences. War strategies against women in non-war contexts \(Rio de Janeiro, San Salvador and Medellin\)](#), financed by the Fundação Ford.

March 2007

Beginning of the project [Invisible Faces](#), a partnership between NEP and IMVF, financed by the Portuguese Development Agency (IPAD).

20 March 2007

Workshop "[Ajuda e construção da paz em contextos de fragilidade institucional](#)", organised by NEP and INEP (Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas da Guiné-Bissau), in Bissau, within the research project "[Peacebuilding processes and state failure strategies. Lessons learned from former Portuguese colonies](#)"

24 April 2007

Meeting on '[Ajuda internacional e construção da paz em Angola](#)', in Luanda, within the research project "[Peacebuilding processes and state failure strategies. Lessons learned from former Portuguese colonies](#)"