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## PEACEBUILDING

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### P@X

Coordination of the Peace Studies Group:

José Manuel Pureza

Coordination of the P@X Bulletin:

Mónica Rafael Simões

Editing and translation

Mónica Rafael Simões and Rita Santos

Peace Studies Group

Centre for Social Studies of the School of Economics -  
University of Coimbra

Colégio S. Jerónimo, Apartado 3087

3001-401 Coimbra

Portugal

Tel: + 351 239 855593

Fax: + 351 239 855589

<http://www.ces.uc.pt/nucleos/nep>

[nep@ces.uc.pt](mailto:nep@ces.uc.pt)

## Editorial

### FRAGILE PEACE

As paradoxical as it may seem, state building has too often led to the fragilisation of states. In practice, it has been producing social polarisation and community's outwardness towards the State, effects that are contrary to those announced by its main actors (the creation of conditions for a self-sustainable and lasting peace).

The “market democracy” dogma and the growing internationalisation of state building processes have led to the perpetuation of the missions that sustain them, whilst simultaneously promoting highly contradictory dynamics. In fact, although many of those processes originated in a critique to the allegedly nominal character of several sovereignties conquered by the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century anti-colonialism, the concrete result of the international community of donors' induced institutional building policies has invariably been a striking dualism between the “inwards State” (strong, discriminatory and oppressor) and the “outwards State” (fragile, dependent and converted to the standardised “good practices”). This dualism, blessed by the international community, has served to expand the institutional fragility and the dependence of peripheral states and to legitimise donors' policies that, exclusively focused on the State, tend to ignore the community's strengths and weaknesses.

This understanding of reality deeply questions the entire architecture of development co-operation policies. The apparent depoliticisation that wraps today's relationship between development aid donors and recipients (poorly) disguises a power relation in which state fragility occupies a strategic function. And the issue of peace itself is at stake here. Today's dominant discourse of liberal peace legitimises this relation worldwide. In this discourse, state building - as a macro-exercise of institutional and social engineering - appears veiled as repair of previous frailties. But it stimulates new frailties. It is thus of fragile peace, too fragile, that we're talking about.

*José Manuel Pureza*

## THE EUROPE-AFRICA SUMMIT: A PROBLEM CALLED EPA

*It's over for us. We ask the European Union to start new negotiations with the Africa Union on the commercial agreements between the two continents (...).[1]*

These sentences by the Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade, stated at the end of the II European Union (EU)-Africa summit, which took place in Lisbon, in December 8 and 9 2007, summarise the position of a part of the African countries regarding the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). In both continents harsh criticisms to the EPAs have emerged - namely at the non-governmental level -, as they are regarded as "a weapon of mass destruction of the ACP economies".[2]

At the root of the alteration of the commercial regime between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) is the incompatibility of the non-reciprocal preferences with the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), specifically the principle of non-discrimination, which has led to ongoing negotiations between the European Union and these countries since 2002.

Taking into account the deadline stipulated by the WTO (December 2007) for the modification of the preferential regimes in the Lomé and Cotonou Conventions, EPAs have assumed a central position in the II EU-Africa summit agenda. This meeting, regarded as a success by both country groups, ended up being marked by the failure of the negotiations of the new EPAs, which were rejected by some African States, thus dictating the postponement of the discussions to 2008. Hence, only partial agreements were signed. In the opinion of the Portuguese State Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, João Gomes Cravinho, this stalemate was due to the bad preparation of the dossier since the beginning of the process, in both African and European sides.[3]

At the centre of the controversy between the EU and the EPAs critics, both in Europe and in the ACP, are issues relating to the EPAs' content and procedure. Put differently, the sceptics of this "new partnership" warn against the harmful effects of EPAs in ACP economies - especially in the agricultural and industrial sectors - with manifest impacts on the social sector: the "increase of the profit margins of European exporters, instead of diminishing consumer and ACP importers prices; an accentuated reduction in the custom rights' revenues, not compensated by the diversification of the fiscal revenues in short and medium term; the pressure upon the ACP countries to liberalise their commercial regimes in a "sub-optimal" proportion, in comparison to what would happen unilaterally; and the obstacles to the diversification of ACP trade with other commercial partners other than the EU" (ECDPM, 2001: 14).

At the negotiation level, critics draw attention, on the one side, to their undemocratic nature, lack of transparency and weak openness to the participation of non-governmental actors and, on the other hand, to the need to adapt the pace of the negotiations and its implementation to the realities and capabilities of each country. The EU is also accused of using EPAs to obtain the approval of ACP countries in sensitive topics, namely those related to investment and competition policies, and which were declined by these countries in the WTO negotiations, in 2003 (Melber, 2005).

In face of this divergence, a fundamental doubt arises: why opting for the EPAs when there are other alternatives in line with WTO rules, namely the extension of the preferences to all developing countries?

The current EPAs' configuration is, thus, contrary to the principles of equality and partnership advocated by the EU and reduces the potentialities of South-South cooperation and trade consolidation (BOND, 2005). As emphasised by the European and African representatives present at the Civil Society Forum on the Europe-Africa Dialogue, which took place in Lisbon, in November 15-17 2007, EPAs are incoherent with the Development goals, once they "undermine the very same processes of regional integration they allegedly seek to support".[4]

In this context, besides the conduction of the already accomplished and long-awaited Summit, the Portuguese diplomacy and particularly the Portuguese cooperation and development policies are faced with the challenge of balancing their foreign policy interests (and those derived by EU membership) with the support and assistance to partner countries. More concretely, the challenge is to adopt commercial policies coherent with the development of these countries, some of which are undergoing "post-war" reconstruction processes and are labelled as "fragile States", avoiding precisely what EPAs represent, that is, State fragilisation through the loss of economic resources.

*Katia Cardoso*

[1] <http://aeiou.expresso.pt/gen.pl?p=sqtories&op=view&fokey=ex.stories/188542>

[2] <http://www.enda.sn/ape.html>

[3] [http://diariodigital.sapo.pt/news.asp?id\\_news=314341](http://diariodigital.sapo.pt/news.asp?id_news=314341)

[4] "Acordos de Parceria Económica representam mais interesses da UE do que dos países africanos", *Público*, 18 de Novembro de 2007.

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- BOND (2005), "BOND's Response to the Commission's: "EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development", November
- ECDPM, 2001. Infokit de Cotonou: O Infokit (1). Maastricht: ECDPM
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- "UE/Presidência: Negociações 'difíceis' com África sobre acordos comerciais levam Europa a aceitar prolongamento (SÍNTESE)", *Expresso*, 9 de Dezembro de 2007, <http://aeiou.expresso.pt/gen.pl?p=sqtories&op=view&fokey=ex.stories/188542>
- "Un Autre Monde est Possible: La coalition des ONG exige une autre cooperation EU/ACP", <http://www.enda.sn/ape.html>
- "UE/África: Negociações sobre parcerias foram mal conduzidas", *Diário Digital*, 18 de Janeiro de 2008, [http://diariodigital.sapo.pt/news.asp?id\\_news=314341](http://diariodigital.sapo.pt/news.asp?id_news=314341)

## PROJECT PEACEBUILDING PROCESSES AND STATE FAILURE STRATEGIES. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THREE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES

### ACTIVITIES, REPORTS AND PUBLICATIONS

#### Dissemination Activities

20 March 2007

[Report from the workshop "Aid and peace building in contexts of institutional fragility"](#), organised by the Peace Studies Group and by the Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas (INEP) of Guinea-Bissau, in Bissau.

24 April 2007

[Report from the meeting on 'International aid and peace building in Angola'](#), organised by the Peace Studies Group, in Luanda.

28 May 2007

Meeting on the [Challenges to the Portuguese Co-operation](#), with the presentation of some conclusions and recommendations to Portuguese government and non-government development co-operation actors, Fundação Cidade Lisboa, in Lisbon.

-[Working documents](#)

-[Document presentation](#)

#### Project's Working Papers

Pureza, José Manuel; Rafael, Mónica; Roque, Sílvia; Cravo, Teresa; ["Do States Fail or Are They Pushed? Lessons Learned From Three Former Portuguese Colonies"](#), Oficina do CES, nº 273, April 2007, Coimbra

Sogge, David; ["Papering Over the Gap. Dutch Policy and Post-Independence Fragility in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique"](#), Oficina do CES nº 262, December 2006, Coimbra

Pacheco, Fernando; Jao, Mamadú; Cravo, Teresa de Almeida; Schiefer, Ulrich; ["The Role of External Development Actors in Post-Conflict Scenarios"](#), Oficina do CES nº 258, September 2006, Coimbra

Pureza, José Manuel; Duffield, Mark; Matthews, Robert; Woodward, Susan; Sogge, David; ["Peacebuilding and Failed States. Some Theoretical Notes"](#), Oficina do CES nº 256, July 2006, Coimbra

#### Project's Final Publications

In the forthcoming months, the project's case studies and thematic studies will be published on our website. Please visit [www.ces.uc.pt/nucleos/nep/apresentacaoen.php](http://www.ces.uc.pt/nucleos/nep/apresentacaoen.php)

*In his traditional new year's message, the President of the Republic, José Eduardo dos Santos, declared that "... the Angolan citizens will be called to elect their representatives in Parliament [...] a process that will deepen our democratic process and allow it to function normally". Last year's end in Angola was thus marked by the long expected announcement of the holding of legislative elections in September 5-6, 2008.*

Angola is recovering from a violent civil war that lasted almost three decades and that has had dramatic consequences for the country, with severe degrees of destruction of the physical, economic and social infrastructures, degradation of basic social services and fragmentation of the social fabric. Similarly to other post-war reconstruction contexts, external pressure for the holding of elections in the period following the end of the armed conflict was constant in the international discourse towards the country. Yet, and as in so many other dimensions of its relationship with foreign actors, the country revealed to be a particular case, seeming to accept the international donors' community's pressure at the level of political discourse, but with no immediate practical result, without leading to any consequences for the Angolan State *status quo* or to its international relations.

The international community regarded the signature of the cease-fire in the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, in April 2002, as the opening of a dialogue opportunity with the country on the provision of aid and on the model of internal governance. In fact, despite the formal adoption of the democratic multiparty politics model in the beginning of the nineties, the Angolan State's performance was still characterised by a democratic minimalism. In reality, even though frequently described as a "fragile" or "failed" State by international analysis, Angola can more accurately be portrayed as a State that fails its citizens, due to the deficient provision of basic services, the rupture of the social pact and the fragility of democratic processes. It is furthermore characterised by economic and social institutions and dynamics which are

frequently hijacked by patrimonial practices. As such, with the end of the armed conflict, at the discourse level, international attention sought to focus more specifically on the role that centralised and authoritarian governance has played in the perpetuation and increase of the country's striking inequalities. The consolidation of democracy, including the promotion of conditions to hold free and fair elections, was thus presented as one of the main multilateral and bilateral donors' central aims.

The fact is that the country's relation with the donor community was always characterised by some specificities and ambiguities and it was, since the end of the conflict, strongly marked by the controversy about an international donor conference, aimed at identifying and gathering financial support to answer the post-war most pressing assistance needs. This conference never took place due to the fact the international community's three demands were not fully met: transparency in the management of oil revenues, approval of a poverty reduction strategy in line with World Bank's criteria and a deal with the International Monetary Fund on economic and financial reforms leading to the negotiation of foreign debt (Pacheco, 2006: 6). Although, like in other post-war contexts, aid policies towards peace building and consolidation in Angola have sought to implement standardised formulae aimed at institutional change centred in the reformulation of the role of the State, the reality is that post-conflict international aid's impact and reach in the country was short-termed and to some extent superficial. In reality, the Angolan peace consolidation process is being run by the State, with no major interferences by the international community. This is greatly the result of its lack of strategic vision and lack of understanding that the economic and political conditionality usually employed by international actors in post-war contexts simply doesn't work in Angola.

However, the situation lived by the country as a recipient of international humanitarian assistance and aid during the nineties was utterly different and presented an influence and action potential for international aid

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actors in the area of governance; but this was widely wasted. In fact, and although international assistance was fundamental to save the lives of millions of Angolans and to support the emergence and development of the national civil society, the truth is that the way it was provided not only produced a dependency context in many sectors of the population, but also reinforced the separation between the State and most of the people. As such, instead of being a checks-and-balance factor, the provision of aid by the international community ended up replacing the State when it should have complemented it, ignoring the lack of reciprocity between the governing elite and the citizens and hence significantly contributing to reinforce and legitimise the style and course of the country's governance.

Finally, on the one hand, as Chabal (2006: XXXV) highlights, Angola belongs today to a reduced group of countries with enough internal resources and oil revenues to refuse the conditionality of bilateral and multilateral aid and to accomplish that the international community ignores the internal political abuses. Thus, this country is a particular case within the international system and doesn't represent nowadays an example of dependency from international aid, which has a virtually irrelevant weight, be it in the State budget or in the definition of the national macroeconomic and financial policy and development plans. On the other hand, and despite the recognition of this limited influence of aid policies on the national peace consolidation and governance process, it is important to underline that the issue of governance in Angola is intimately associated to the control of the exploitation of oil resources and has for long been led simultaneously by national and foreign elites. In fact, many of the countries involved in this game of interests are the same that play the role of international donors, thus being fundamental to draw attention to their contradiction and lack of accountability towards the Angolan population. In the meantime, the national elite is still largely immune to international pressure for good governance - more specifically directed at the

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technical issues of transparency and conditions for a secure foreign investment climate, than at the political and substantial dimension of democracy, human rights, social justice and poverty relief.

Mónica Rafael

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- Chabal, P. (2006), "Transições Políticas em Angola: Et Pluribus Unum", in Vidal, N. e Pinto de Andrade, J., *O Processo de Transição para o Multipartidarismo em Angola*. Lisboa: Edições Firmamento.
- "Mensagem de Ano Novo de Sua Excelência José Eduardo dos Santos, Presidente da República de Angola", *Jornal de Angola*, 28 de Dezembro de 2007.
- Pacheco, F. (2006), "The case of Angola", *The Role of External Development Actors in Post-conflict Scenarios*, Oficina do CES nº 258, Coimbra, September 2006.

## Peace Studies

*After an eleventh month conflict between 1998 and 1999, Guinea-Bissau is going through a period internationally designated as stabilisation or post-conflict. In reality, this period coincides with the impoverishment of a vast majority of the population, a process of economic stagnation, political and military unrest and strengthening of its position as a transit point of illegal commercial routes. It also coincides with its classification as fragile or failed state by international organisations and diverse studies. Yet, this label demands not so much the need to inquire its fairness or appropriateness to reality, but rather its causes and consequences, namely in terms of internationally designed policies to respond to this scenario.*

In December 2007, a week mediated two apparently disparate initiatives. A donors' conference in Lisbon to discuss and finance the combat to drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau and, a week earlier, the unanimous approval of an amnesty law to crimes and violent acts committed against the Republic's institutions until 2004 in the National Popular Assembly in Guinea-Bissau. The latter event was unworthy of a single line in the Portuguese press, in striking contrast to the scandal and consternation conveyed by the pieces of news which drew attention to the progressive criminalisation of a "weak" State through international drug trafficking. However, these two events are part of the same process, to which several governance schemes - local and global - contribute to and participate in. This process provokes, at the same time, the simulation of peace and State building and the material and symbolic construction of several collapses. This means that peacebuilding initiatives in Guinea-Bissau constitute an illusion, supported for several purposes, ranging from fundraising to the justification of external intervention strategies, and that the aid system, which has sought, at least in terms of discourse, to avoid collapse, has failed massively. In effect, these have actively contributed to build a phased and almost imperceptible collapse. One of the ways to do so is through neglect and absence, namely by ignoring an amnesty law and its social consequences, and only paying attention to external security-threatening factors.

### Simulating peace...

The formulation of policies of chaos control emerges in a context of crystallisation of a dormant state, labelled as 'post-conflict', which justifies the absence of relevant and long-term policies. At present, policies aimed at peace "building" in Guinea-Bissau are either irrelevant or not necessarily able to impede a renewed armed conflict, not even the proliferation of locus of social, economic and political violence. The tendencies to policy harmonisation and labour division have generated no more than the gross implementation of the economic theories of market niche and scale economies, irrespective of its functioning in development aid contexts (Munro, 2004) and thus disregarding the creative potential and survival strategies of societies. Within the aid system, it is not reflected upon nor acknowledged that aid has contributed to conflict and to economic stagnation. Aid actors suffer from a chronic lack of analysis and action capacity, as well as evaluation absence, within a paradigm that does not allow autocriticism. In face of the deterioration of life conditions and the

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inflation of expectations which aid introduces, the levels of frustration augment, access strategies to aid resources diversify and, subsequently, mistrust relations, as well as, simultaneously, complicity ties broaden between “donors”, “recipients” and “intermediaries”.

The idea that it is possible to build peace through a set of disconnected and time dispersed interventions is, at least, ambitious, but it can also be pernicious, as it happens in this case, due to the neglect of the prevalence and aggravation of institutional and political violence or of those who make non organised violence a constant threat to human lives.

Post-war policies based on general amnesty contribute negatively to these dynamics, by endorsing policies of forget and memory erase and merely technical security reforms. Hence, a culture of impunity is perpetuated materially and symbolically, hampering the respect for human rights and the valorisation of justice, in contrast to plans of institutional reforms. In this context, the resistance of violence in the society becomes as serious as it diminishes the resistance of society to violence.

#### Building collapse...

How can a State, which already “was” a State before international recognition, continue to “be” a state after recognition? This is the integration dilemma of Guinea-Bissau as an independent State in the international system, an integration of colonial and neo-colonial features - dependency, citizenship bifurcation (Mamdani, 1996) and peripheral economy - which international aid has neither circumvented nor altered.

The international obsession with the control of so-called “fragile, failed and collapsing” States contributes in large part to the substitution of the need to turn Guinea-Bissau into a model country by the logic of unsolvable case, chronic disenchantment and the internalisation of responsibilities. As a result of ascribing to Guinea-Bissau a permanent treatment of exception and emergency, nothing is discussed politically, but rather handled bureaucratically; policies are harmonised by their lower common denominator, allegedly creating peace and development-friendly institutions, without debating which kind of peace or development one is trying to promote and for whom. It is increasingly clearer that what is really at stake in the interventions of traditional donors<sup>[1]</sup> in Guinea-Bissau is nothing more than their own protection. Indeed, what is sought is the normalisation of tension and turbulence *foci* (Duffield, 2001) - that is, migration and drugs fluxes -, regarded as a security threat by donor countries.

On the other hand, “recipients” recreate their own vision of collapse, promoting ignorance in relation to their selectivity. The impacts of aid policies, as well as the effects of war and collapse of some dimensions of the modern State are selective. They affect predominantly certain groups and sectors. Nevertheless, for some other groups, what is considered as fragility phenomena can indeed signify new forms and opportunities for achieving or consolidating power. This is the case of political and economic elites and development intermediaries, for whom collapse means an increase or re-diversion of funds.

# Guinea- Bissau: simulating peace, building collapse

*Sílvia Roque*

However, the key issue here, absent in international discourses and practices, is that the reversal of “failed States” is not only dependent upon changes in internal governance, but also in global governance spheres. This means that it is necessary to acknowledge that the history of collapses, violences and aid in Guinea-Bissau has always been connected to the production of spaces for global circuits - ranging from slave trafficking, the export of agricultural products, the import of consumption goods, the exploitation of “potential” mineral resources, arms trafficking to, more recently, drug trafficking, immigration and terrorist circuits containment - and its cooption by local and international actors.

Thus, the much-feared “failed” State is rather an “outcome” State, without normative judgements, resulting from more or less visible and more or less intentional processes: the dynamics of modern State building and collapse; the interests of groups who have guided it or interacted with it; the dynamics of organisation and authority, parallel, alternative or associate, which challenge it and substitute it; the dichotomised and simplistic views on the economic, political and social realities; the external interference in previous dynamics and in peace and development policies, either in its passive form, exemplified in the Lisbon Conference, or in its active form, epitomised in the silence in relation to Bissau’s proclaimed amnesty.

<sup>[1]</sup> By traditional donors I mean those who are inserted in the logic and rules of DAC/OECD, generally designated as North/South cooperation actors, as opposed to South/South cooperation, also in expansion in Guinea-Bissau, but with rather distinct traits (Angola, Brazil and China).

#### References

Duffield, M. (2001), *Global governance and the new wars, the merging of development and security*. London and New York: Zed Books.

Mamdani, M. (1996), *Citizen and Subject. Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Munro, L. (2004), *Focus-Pocus? Thinking Critically about why Aid Donors Should Focus on Doing Fewer Things in Fewer Countries*. Draft.

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*Sílvia Roque*

## DOING OUR BEST NOT TO UNDERSTAND

In May 2000, *The Economist's* cover page featured the map of Africa with the headline "The Hopeless Continent". Singling out stories like the civil war in Sierra Leone, the ex-combatants aggressive backlash in Zimbabwe or the calamitous floods in Mozambique, this renowned and highly influential newsmagazine reduced at the time a whole continent to a discouraging and futureless condition of violence and disaster.

What was interesting about the choice to portray such accounts as metaphors for the state of Africa was the fact that, despite instigating significant indignation and protest, it actually reflected the views of many in the West. In reality, it did little more than endorsing the fatalist perspective countless non-Africans have of the continent in what has basically come to be regarded as "common sense". This perception, present in many of the speeches, articles or street conversations about that part of the world, mirrors the discrepancy between what was expected of Africa and what it failed to achieve. Moreover, it is, at the same time, a very blatant way of reminding us where the blame lies. Indeed, in this narrative, those hold responsible for the current state of affairs are elsewhere, conveniently disconnected from our own actions. Referring to "Africa's failures" assumes a one-sided fault that cannot resist a serious scrutiny. The attitude is one of moral domination which represents the other as the "deviant" in a behaviour set for him, when the imposed behaviour itself is rarely questioned.

However, one can ask, if this were the whole picture, then why not walk away? Giving up would in fact be the natural conclusion drawn from such an account of African "reality". Yet this kind of narrative must be read against the background of two other very present features of the West's relationship with Africa: guilt and interest. Indeed, in this schizophrenic Western way of dealing with the continent, the fact that it remains a "scar in the conscience of the world" does play a role. The attitudes of resignation and pessimism have often been challenged by those of active engagement and confidence. *The Economist* itself reflects this when going through its headlines related to Africa, where both failure and success epitomise the continent, in spite of clearly none representing its complexities. And evidently the fact that most of the world has a vested interest in maintaining their relations with these countries - with some more than others - makes "desertion" a hardly conceivable horizon. Hence why, only five years later, a surprising trend of optimism permeated even the G8 summit and Blair's Commission for Africa, putting the continent at the top of the international agenda and championing the campaign to "make poverty history".

This could have been the turning point of such an unbalanced relationship. The discussion of past mistakes was flourishing and it seemed to be coming up with new ideas to address Africa's issues. Nevertheless, problematising the failings as aid donors, though promising, did not go far. The "default mode" is inevitably very complicated to remove. Once used to take prejudice as a given, or the perfectness of a model without questioning, challenges and alternatives are bound to be shut off.

Let's take Mozambique as an example. Cheered as a star pupil by the international donor community, in a context where the exception makes the rule, this African country has been carefully promoted as a case study of the successful economic and political liberalisation. Regardless of Mozambican inherent vulnerabilities, which derive not only from the colonial legacy but also from flawed strategies, external actors

exhibit the progress made so far, in their quest to prove the overall viability of this development approach. And yet, despite the macro-economic successes, and even with a rapidly growing economy, Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in the world. The socio-economic deprivation faced by the overwhelming majority of the population, as well as the endemic disparities and inequalities that have been aggravated in recent years, expose the absence of a pro-poor strategy, in a country that remains heavily dependent on aid. Also the path to democracy did not change the power structures in any fundamental way. The exclusivist and largely unaccountable state and the lack of political agency of the population remain intact.

Well, the international donor community has chosen to deal with the information that contradicts its assumptions in a very autistic way: it still claims this model is the one that should be endorsed, while engaging in cosmetic alterations to please the critics. This premise can be deconstructed but it is hard to uproot. Especially since, following the end of the Cold War, the model upheld by the West is yet to be challenged by a consistent alternative, and we are aware of where the power in this relation lies.

Understanding why Africa has not been able to achieve emancipation is not an easy task. For neither those that live in the continent, nor for those that wish to relate to it. But attempting to make sense of the world by imposing our own view led us to the current dead end. As Heidegger and Gadamer pointed out, our capacity to understand ourselves and others needs to be based on a dialogue; only in the encounter with another can our prejudices be questioned and our understanding susceptible to change. In the attitude of domination that characterises the West, we have not been open to our interlocutor and their own understanding. Indeed what makes Africans noticeable is how absent they indeed are from having any voice in matters that relate so closely to them. If we act upon our own created representations as if they were true, namely failures as home-grown and successes as foreign-made, we are bound to remain clueless and never really grasp the complexity of the reality we are engaging with.

The case of Mozambique, particularly for its 'success story' label, is trying to tell us something. And we should listen.

*Teresa Cravo*

## PEACE STUDIES GROUP (NEP) AGENDA

### Publications

Pureza, José Manuel *et al*, "As novas operações de paz das Nações Unidas. Os casos de Angola, Timor Leste e Moçambique", *Oficina do CES*, nº 290, November 2007.

### NEP's Activities

#### 9-13 July 2007

Sílvia Roque participated in the IP of the EDEN Network *Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Peace and Conflict Research: A View from Europe*, Bilbao (Spain).

#### July/August 2007

Teresa Cravo participated in the Summer Israeli-Palestine Course in *Political Sciences and Studies of the Middle East*, Galilee College, Israel.

#### 20 July-10 October

Sílvia Roque did field work for the project "Women and armed violences. War strategies against women in non-war contexts", in El Salvador.

#### August 2007

José Manuel Pureza conducted the module "State crisis, international governance and security", Master in International Studies, Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Buenos Aires (Argentina).

#### 16-20 August 2007

Rita Santos participated at the XIV Meeting of the International Network of Women in Black, Valencia (Spain). [link]

#### 3-6 September 2007

José Manuel Pureza and Mónica Rafael participated in the international seminar "International Conflicts in their multiple dimensions", PUC-SP, São Paulo (Brazil).

#### 10 September 2007

José Manuel Pureza and Mónica Rafael participated in the Round Table "Peace Operations: advances and uncertainties", IRI/PUC-RJ, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil).

#### 20 September 2007

José Manuel Pureza presented the conference "Words are important! The ambivalent relation between language and peace", First International Seminar on Language and Migration "Migration, polycentric identities, language(s) and power, organised by A.I.L.A., Centre for Social Studies, Coimbra.

#### 19 October 2007

Teresa Cravo presented the paper "Democratisation in Mozambique", Panel 'Civil Society and Democratization: Internal and External Pressures', African Studies Association, 50th Annual Meeting, New York.

#### 6 November 2007

Teresa Cravo participated as a *discussant* at the session "The Security-Development Nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa", 10th DGAP New Faces Conference: "From Conflict to Regional Stability - Linking Security and Development", Madrid (Spain)

#### 15 November 2007

Seminar of the Peace Studies Group, with the participation of Cláudio Ribeiro (PUC-SP, São Paulo - Brazil): "The political-economic relations between Brazil and Africa", Centre for Social Studies, Coimbra.

#### 20 November 2007

José Manuel Pureza took part in the Seminar Governance, state fragility and the role of Development Co-operation, na organisation of the Portuguese DNGO Platform, ACEP, NEP and University of Aveiro.

## NEP's Attic

### NEP's Activities

#### 26-27 November 2007

Mónica Rafael presented the case of [Angola](#) at the Seminar Cycle on "[Human Rights and Justice in post-conflict contexts](#)", organised by Fundación "la Caixa" and FRIDE, at the Universidad Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao (Spain).

#### 29 November 2007

Kátia Cardoso presented the paper "[Descentralisation at the core of development? The example of Cape Verde](#)" at the IV Jornadas Anuais de Cooperación (O compromisso global do mundo local) do Fondo Galego para a Cooperación e Solidariedade, Santiago de Compostela (Spain).

#### 4 December 2007

Presentation of "[As Duas Faces da Guerra](#)", a documentary by Diana Andringa and Flora Gomes. Debate with Diana Andringa, Sílvia Roque, Fernando Barata and Pedro Pizarat Correia, organised by NEP at the School of Economics (FEUC), University of Coimbra

#### 11 December 2007

José Manuel Pureza and Paula Duarte Lopes presented the conference "[Alterações Climáticas e Paz](#)", organised by NEP and the Master Programme in International Relations, FEUC.

#### 13 December 2007

Presentation of the [Project and the trailer of the Documentary "Invisible Faces"](#), ESCS, Lisbon (Portugal)

#### 12-14 December 2007

Rita Santos participated at the meeting "[Mujeres en los procesos de paz: la Resolución 1325](#)", Saragoza (Spain).

#### 18-19 December 2007

José Manuel Pureza, Paula Duarte Lopes, Raquel Freire, Mónica Rafael and Sílvia Roque presented the [Peace Studies Seminar](#), at the Curso de Estado Maior Conjunto, Instituto de Estudos Superiores Militares, Lisbon.

### NEP's Projects

#### October 2007

Beginning of the project [Trajectories of violence dissemination and containment: comparing Bissau and Praia](#), financed by FCT.

#### October 2007

Beginning of the project [Violence and Small Arms: the Portuguese case](#), financed by FCT.

#### September 2007

Beginning of the project [Portuguese co-operation and human security strengthening in institutionally fragile states. The cases of Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tomé and Príncipe](#), financed by the Portuguese Development Agency (IPAD).

#### January 2007

Beginning of the project [Support Programme to relatives of victims of slaughters in Rio de Janeiro](#), a partnership between NEP (CES/FEUC) and the Centre of Security and Citizenship Studies (CESeC - University Cândido Mendes, Rio de Janeiro), financed by the Ford Foundation.