Editorial

More than ten years after Timor-Leste’s independence, studies on peace consolidation, very much centred on the role of the United Nations and other international organs in the territory, besides the development of bilateral cooperation between the Timorese authorities and partner states, demonstrate the dependency of this independence, not always highlighting the relevance of the internal dimension – from the governing to the communitarian level – throughout the last years.

This edition of P@X, which is one of the outcomes of the research project on “Peacebuilding and sustainable peace: UN missions in Timor-Leste and Portugal’s contribution” [1], seeks to look at the historical, political, social and economic course of Timor-Leste through distinct perspectives, which, in a very concrete way, demonstrate the relevance of understanding the local as a fundamental level of analysis for the cognition of varied dynamics and of the way these affirm themselves (or not).

This issue is in itself special, by rendering explicit how peace studies emerged in Timor-Leste and how this is an area that has been growing and seeking consolidation, how the rooting of democratic procedures has been taking place, in a context where formality and informality coexist side-by-side, how we can look and interpret the responses of communitarian groups to human rights issues and to matters of respect over a past still very much present, how the Portuguese presence was and is felt, in this particular case through a military perspective.

On a testimony record, it is added the experience of a Portuguese volunteer in the last United Nation’s mission, the report about communitarian work developed towards sustainable and equitative growth of a rich country in fossil resources, and an election observation report, elaborated by members of the research team that were in the country in June/July 2012.

Also in this edition of P@X, we inaugurate the new section “Under the Radar”, comprised of articles on current international affairs.

In these texts, the perspectives over Timor-Leste are distinct, but they converge on the understanding that, in different areas and in different ways, facing a sinuous course and many challenges, the consolidation of peace has been and will remain a fundamental topic on the agenda.

Maria Raquel Freire

rfreire@fe.uc.pt

Notes:
PEACE STUDIES: HOW THE DISCIPLINE EMERGED AND WHERE IT IS NOW

More than 500 military deserted the F-FDTL (Timor-Leste’s armed forces) general army headquarters and initiated a violent demonstration on April 28, 2006. Some days after, in Bebonuk, a small neighbourhood by the Comoro river in the western area of Dili, where I lived, children grabbed stones, young people with samurai swords formed groups, and got involved in violent conflicts with political objectives or just criminal ones. The families were displaced to their districts and a few managed to remain in the neighbourhood and the youngsters were identified with violence. In face of high insecurity, Babonuk’s neighbourhood was considered one of the red areas in Dili.

The main leaders of the country called for a new intervention by the international forces. Replying to this request, the Australians were the first to arrive. Nonetheless, the nature of the intervention was too militarised and led to the propagation of ethnic divisions: Lorosae and Loromono (east and west). Worried with the prevailing instability, as an old clandestine group we met at the airport on June 2, 2006 and we reached the conclusion that the situation was worsening. The civil war scenario played by external forces and some opposition political parties in the country became a real possibility.

The same scenario lived by the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) in August 1975 led to the Indonesian invasion. References also indicated that the politicisation of ethnicity was and is considered very dangerous. For example, we know well that the ethnic conflict in Rwanda left one million dead in two weeks. The ethnic conflict in Iraq allowed an intervention named pre-emptive war, by the United States of America, in March 2003.

It was then our decision, as conscious Timorese, of not admitting such evolution of events. Thus we tried everything possible to limit the expansion of armed conflict and also encouraged the younger ones to be agents of change and of solidarity. So we started our intervention taking as our base the Bebonuk neighbourhood, with a small group of young volunteers, mainly women, coming from different neighbourhoods in Dili. These went looking for their colleagues to avoid their involvement in criminal acts. The group was called Belum Komunitariu (Communitarian Friends). Time passed by and we grew in ideas and number of participants, and with support from the local institute, Kdadalak Sulimutuk Institute (KSI), and of the Students Solidarity Movement, we had our first critical dialogue in Bebonuk and another neighbourhood, Becusse, in the eastern part of the city. By critical dialogue I mean the participants discussed together and researched conflict analysis methods to understand the causes of the conflict, in order to define the strategies for intervention and transformation of the situation. We were surprised by the active participation of young people and members of the local communities that were traumatised. Consequently, we ended up concluding that the major reason for the conflict was multidimensional and, above all, political and structural, so our intervention was necessarily multileveled to correspond to the situation. We worked with the existing international solidarity networks, including a group known as Global Partnership of Armed Conflict Prevention (GPPAC). We promoted dialogue, facilitated meetings between different leaders as well as among the petitionaries’ group, particularly Gastão Salsinha, their leader.

After three months of mobilisation, in September 2006, as Communitarian Friends, with support from KSI, the Students Solidarity movement, and the NGOs Forum, we gathered 200 young Timorese from the 13 districts in Oecusse and we jointly analysed the causes of the conflict, celebrating at the time the UN Peace Day, September 21, 2006. At that time, many international groups became involved in the intervention including the Group of Madrid, the Nelson Mandela Group and the Nobel Peace Committee from Norway, on top of the UN intervention with the goal of normalizing the situation. When the UN reported the result of an investigation on the conflict in October 2006, the ethnic
conflict had transformed into one of martial arts between Timorese. Nevertheless, the petitionaries persisted in their protests in the mountains until the death of Major Alfredo Reinado, in February 2008.

The National University of Timor Lorosa’e (UNTL), one of the symbolic institutions of national unity, was also divided by ethnic and political matters. With the support of UNTL’s structure, particularly the School of Social Sciences, and also with financial support from the Irish Mission in Timor-Leste we managed to establish what is today called the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS). The Institute facilitated a space of dialogue within the university to contribute to the transformation of the conflict which the university was facing. From the university, the IPCS managed to promote dialogue among young people from different organisations and neighbourhoods that ended up in a peace camp with the participation of 50 youngsters from Atauro Island in May 2007. That month there was also the second round of the presidential election in which the former diplomat Dr. José Ramos Horta was elected to lead the country in the following five years. After this activity in Atauro, we recruited some of the participants as volunteers and other were fundamental for the dialogues initiated by other agencies, including the government. When more than 30 houses were burned in Uato Lari (area defined as conflict zone) by young people from the Parliamentary Majority Government Alliance led by the former combatant Xanana Gusmão, once more the IPCS made a quick intervention and worked together with the local leaders, in a process that culminated in the Peace Declaration of Dare, Dili, at the end of 2006. From then on, the IPCS has facilitated a series of regional academic and student interchanges, leading to small researches with the students’ involvement, and we have been participating in public encounters and social movements.

To provide continuity to these activities, our major strength was the continuous voluntary and heroic contribution of our students and of some academics from UNTL. Fortunately, more than 20 people from our volunteers have already been admitted as local staff in UN agencies, whereas other are working in state offices as well as in NGOs. In the year 2012 we managed to publish a book about the petitionaries question and two other books, one concerning police transformation and the another about clandestine youth movements, now in the process of editing. In terms of researchers, when we started the programme, I was the only academic from Peace Studies. Today, we have a PhD in the area of Education for Peace and three magistrates in this area, and this year, for the first time, UNTL supports the IPCS in order to establish a postgraduate programme in the area of Peace and Conflict Studies. About 15 to 20 students were admitted to initiate the course and, among them, two students through a regional collaboration in Peace and Human Security are studying at Osaka University in Japan. IPCS is seeking to multiply its dynamic relations with regional and international academic platforms, including universities in Portugal.

Today, IPCS has three main pillars in its programme: post-graduate studies, research and training, particularly in the area of leadership. Last September, IPCS initiated a programme on Women, Peace and Leadership, and more than 20 students from various universities in Dili are enrolled in the programme. To assure the quality of teaching, we have plans to transform our pedagogy for education in Timor-Leste. We combine traditional tutorial methods with the most recent paradigms: participatory methods and research for action aiming at social transformation. Action research will allow the students to get used to the fundamental questions of our world and of the local communities, as well as those institutions where they are based. We have, therefore, great possibilities to contribute to a process of reconstruction of our country and possibly to also contribute to dialogue with other people and academic communities in the Asia Pacific region.

Antero Benedito da Silva
anterob@gmail.com
Professor, Peace Studies, National University of Timor-Leste (UNTL)
MAI HUSI NEEBE NO ATU BA NEEBE, ESTUDU BA DAME NIAN [1]

Militar sira atus lima resin mak hamamuk tiha kuartel geral FFDTLhodi organiza demonstrasaun antagonista iha loron 28 fulan Abril tinan 2006. Loron hirak tuir fali, iha bebonuk, knua kiik oan ida besik ba ponte Comoro nian, parte Lorosae Sidadi Dili nian, fatin neebe mos hau hela ba, labarik sira kaer fatuk, foinsae sira kaer samurai halibur iha grupu. Sira involve iha konfrontasaun violentu, ho objektivu politika ou dalaruma mos nuudar hahalok kriminal deit. Família sira hases an ba sira nian distritu original, no oituan deit mak kontinua hela iha bairo nee. Foinsae sira identifikadu ho aktu violentu. Ho inseguança neebe as tebes, bairo bebonuk sai zona mean ou perigozu iha sidade Dili.


Nunee ami nian disposisaun nuudar timor oan neebe hatene diak sitausaun nee, atu la husik vai at liu tan, ami hare nesesariu atu halo buat hotu mak bele hodi limita deat konflitu kilat, nunee mos fo korajen ba foinsae sira hodi sai sujeitu ba mudansa no rekuperasaun solidariedade sosial.

Nunee ami hahu ami nian intervensaun neebe base iha bairu bebonuk, ho grupu voluntariu foinsae kiik oan ida maioria fetu sira mai husi bairu oioin iha sidade. Grupu nee hanaran Belum Komunitari. Tempu lao dadaun, ami nian ideas no numeru partisipante aumenta, no ho apoiu hudi instituto lokal ida, hanaran Kdadak Sulimutuk Institute (KSI), no movimento solidariedade estudante sira nian, ami realiza dialogu kritiku ba dahuluk iha bebonuk no bairu ida seluk hanaran Becusse iha parte leste sidade nian. Dialogu kritiku tanba partisipante sira diskuti hamutuk no investiga ho metodu analiza konflitu balun hodi identifika abut konflitu no defini estratégia intervensaun no transformasaun sitausaun ida nee. Ami hakfordak ho partisipasaun aktivi foinsae sira no membro komunidade lokal nian neebe moris iha taka laran. Ami mos too ba konklusaun ida katas konflitu ida nee ninian abut boot multi dimensional liu politiku no estrutural, entaun ami nian intervensaun mos nesesariu tenki iha nivel hototu, hodi koresponde sitausaun ida nee. Ami servisu ho redi solidariedade internacional sira inkluindu grupu ida mak konesidu ho Global Partnership of Armed Conflict Prevention (GPPAC), hodi promove dialogu, fasilita enkontru ho nain ulun boot sira nasaun nian, nunee mos fasilita dialogu ho elementu pensionariu balun, partikularliu Gastao Salsinha, nuudar lider.

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Noruega, no intervensaun boot liu tan mak ONU nian, hotu nee ho objektivu atu normaliza situausaun.

Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa’e (UNTL) nuudar instituisaun simbolika unidade nacional nian iha nasau nian laran, mos naksobu ba asuntu etniku no politiku. Ho apoiu estrutura UNTL nian, partikular liu Fakuldade Siensiia Sosiais, nunee mos ho apoiu finansieru oituan husi Missão Irlandesa iha Timor-Leste. Ami konsege estabelese fatin neebe ohin loran hanaran Instituto para Estudos de Paz e Conflito (IEPC). Instititu ida nee fasilita espasu dialogu iha universidade nian laran rasik hodi kontribui ba transformsaun konflitu neebe universidade nian iha hasoru dadaun. Iha Universidade, IEPC konsege organiza aktividade sira tuir mai nee, promote diálogo entre foinsae sira husi bairu no organizasaun oioin neebe rohan ba peace camp ida ho partisipasaun maksimu husi foinsae nain 50 resin, ba iha Ila Ataur fulan Maio de 2007. Fulan nee mos mak realiza segunda ronda eleisaun Presidensial, neebe antigu diplomata Doutor Jose Ramos Horta mak manan hodi kaer ukun tinan lima tuir fali.

Hafoin aktividade Ataur nian, ami rekruta participante balun hodi sai voluntariu no sira seluk sai agente importante ba dialogu sira neebe agensia seluk halao, inkluindu governu. Bainhira, klosan ran nakali sira sunu motuk uma populasaun nian tolulu iha Uato Lari (fatin neebe konsideradu zona konflitu komunal), hafoin formasaun Governu Aliança Maioria Parlamentária (AMP) neebe liderada husi antigu konvatente Xanana Gusmao, dala ida tan Instituto para Estudos de Paz e Conflito (IEPC) halo intervensaun lalais e servisu hamutuk ho nai ulun komunitariu sira, prosesu neebe rohan ba dialogu ida neebe hamosu Declaração de Paz iha Dare, fim de 2006. Hahu husi neeba IEPC fasilita ona interkambiu regional oioin ba akademiku no estudante sira, realiza peskiza ho partisipasaun estudante sira, no partisipa mos iha reuniaun publiku no movimento sosiais sira.

Atu fo kontinuidade ba actividade oioin, ami nian forsa maior mak kontribuisaun nafatin voluntária no heróica ami nian estudante sira no akademiku balun iha UNTL. Ami haksolok tanba voluntariu nain ruanulu resin mak hetan ona servisu nuedar funsionariu lokal ba agensia ONU balun, no sira seluk servisu ho agensia Estado no ONG sira. Tinan 2012, IEPC pubika livru ida konaba kestaun petitionariu, no livru rua sira seluk konaba transformsaun polisial no movimento klosan klandestina sira, neebe sei iha prosesu editing. Konaba peskizadores sira, bainhira hahu programa nee, hau mak uniku akademiku iha área Estudo Dame nian. Ohin loron, ami iha PhD ida iha área Edukasasaun ba Dame, no magister nain tolu iha área hanesan, no tinan ida nee mak ba dahuluk, UNTL apoiu Instituto para Estudos de Paz e Conflito, hodi hari programa posgraduausaun Estudos de Paz e Conflito. Pelumenos estudante nain 12 mak admitidu ona atu hahu programa nee, no entre sira nee, nain rua, liu husi programa kooperasaun regional ho Peace and Human Security, halao dadaun sira nian estudu iha Universidade de Osaka iha Japão. IEPC tenta dadaun atu multiplika ninian relasaun neebe dinamika ho plataforma regional no internasional sira, instituisaun akademiku sira, inkluindu Universidade sira balun iha Portugal.

Ohin loron, Instituto para Estudos de Paz e Conflito kaer ba pilares tolu iha ninian programa mak hanesan programa pós-graduação, pesquisa e treinamento, partikularmente iha área lideransa nian. Fulan Stembru 2012, IEPC komesa ona programa Mulheres, Paz e Lideranca, no estudante nain ruanulu resin husi Universidade sira iha sidade Dili mak tuir ona programa nee too tinan 2012 remata. Atu aseguir kualidade hanorin, ami mos iha planu atu konsidera transformsaun ba pedagogia edukasaun nian iha Timor Lorosa’e. Ita presiza kahur metodu klasiku tutorial ho paradigma foun sira mak hanesan métodu partisipiatoriu e a pesquisa de acção ba transformsaun sosial. Peskiza asaun tulun estudante sira hodi hatoman an ho kestaun fundamental global nian no komunidade lokal ninian inkluindu instituisaun sira neebe estudante sira afilia ba. Ami iha possibilitade boot atu kontribui ba prosesu rekonstrusaun nasau RDTL no bele mos kontribui ba dialogu povu nasau
P@x Theory

seluk seluk no komunidade akademiku iha sira
rajaun Asia no Pasifiku.

Antero Benedito da Silva
anterob@gmail.com

Professor, Peace Studies, National University of
Timor-Leste (UNTL)

Notes:
[1] Tetum version of the text ‘The Study of Peace:
how it emerged and where it is’, by Antero
Benedito da Silva.
TIMOR-LESTE: TEN YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE AND DEMOCRACY

Timor-Leste has recently celebrated the tenth anniversary of its restored independence, in a year that also saw the organisation of competitive and highly participated presidential and legislative elections. The first centenary of the Revolt of Manufahi was equally remembered, and the first steps were taken towards adequately signalling 500 years from the arrival of the Portuguese. The celebrations of independence have thus been placed under a long-term historical perspective, and the nation can proudly exhibit success in the process of democracy-building. I would like to delve on the later issue borrowing the historical perspective that frames the experience of the past ten years in a broader context.

The restoration of independence – as the Timorese constitution considers the event of 20 May 2002 – actually symbolises the end of a protracted process whose origins go back to the Portuguese colonial experience and the Indonesian neo-colonial domination. The later, by the sheer brutality of the methods employed, was responsible, in the words of Benedict Anderson, for a rapid crystallisation of a new Timorese nationalism. Its roots go deep into the time of Portuguese colonialism, as the commemoration of Dom Bonaventura’s revolt aims to signify, and may also be grasped from the 1959 Revolt of Viqueque, somewhat more blurred and ambiguous. One of the most outstanding moments in the affirmation of the rising nationalism was lived in the immediate aftermath of the Lisbon events of 25 April 1974, when rival solutions surfaced for the destiny to be followed by Timor in the process of self-determination that was then open and judged possible. It would be as a deep and generalised reaction to Indonesian rule, however, that Timorese nationalism constituted itself in the form that was patent in the eyes of the world at the time of the 1999 referendum. If the coincidence between the end of classical colonialism (Portuguese) and (Indonesian) neo-colonialism in a symbolically charged moment was not enough to individuate Timor-Leste, the fact that it possessed a plural nationalist movement, composed of distinct socio-political strands of opinion, would make this a singular case.

It is true that back in 1974 the nationalist movement had already presented a plurality of options, and alliances between the three main contenders were done and undone is a short period. One of those options – integration in Indonesia – was the winner on the short term, after stormy months of confrontations that infamously ended on December 7, 1975. The other two had different trajectories during the following 24 years. Meanwhile, new actors were born or suffered profound changes to the nature of their cultural meaning. Two examples may be quoted here: the students movement accompanied the growth of literacy and schooling levels and became a force in itself, notably in urban environment that was also in accelerated development; and the Roman Catholic Church of Timor which underwent a process of “timorisation” that encompasses a number of senses, and became capable of articulating a visceral revolt into a sense of national liberation.

The existence of pluralism is a requisite for the establishment of a democracy, and Timor-Leste has had since the very beginning a plural nationalism that offered a fundamental basis for the construction of that institutional “common house” that we call democracy. It was obviously necessary to translate the grassroots pluralism into forms of political organisation which could nurture it. That was certainly not an easy process, not because there was no good will, but as a consequence of the paradoxical nature of the task of building a democracy through a “benevolent autocracy”. Such was the role of the United Nations Transitional Administration of East Timor in 1999-2002.

The kind of problems raised by this sort of approach can be illustrated by the process of constitution-making. While a sizeable part of the Timorese leadership that was deeply entrenched in the Resistance struggle supported the idea of having a “constitutional
The convention” that might adequately express a new form of participative constitutionalism, high UN officers believed that only a classical model based on (premature) elections for a Constituent Assembly would provide the kind of guarantees the “international community” was ready to understand without too much effort. A constitution-making process was thus designed in opposition to many Timorese actors expressed wishes, and bestowed upon all of them as a new born child requiring their attention.

Among the constitutional options, one of the most relevant was the choice of the government system, which Timor-Leste retrieved from the experience of democratic Portugal, as it had done with various other elements of the colonial past that were revamped into new configurations. Semi-presidentialism has given rise to heated, passionate debates on its virtues, but I believe the Timorese experience offers support to the benefits of its adoption. The main virtue of the Timorese regime – in spite of shortcomings derived from a specific choice of a President of the Republic endowed with severely limited powers, if compared to other Lusophone countries, as noticed by Marina Costa Lobo and Octavio Amorim Neto – was its plastic capacity to adapt to the plural nature of the Timorese nationalism. On top of that, it offered the President several means to pursue inclusive policies and bring inside the “common house” political forces that failed to easily find their place in the frame of other incipient institutions of the Republic. When “authoritarian temptations” were detected by independent observers like Jacqueline Siapno or Sven Gunnar Simonsen and associated with the exercise of a little controlled executive power, it was up to the President of the Republic to exercise a moderating role. When the system of checks and balances that should count on the contribution of the judicial branch, the media, civil society and the electorate revealed comprehensible weaknesses before the executive power (“Strong Government, Weak State”, wisely wrote Anthony L. Smith), it was again up to the President to summon mechanisms of horizontal accountability that mature democracies may have other means of deploying. Disposing of limited competences, but having at the same time an enormous capacity to articulate forms of political legitimacy that go beyond what Weber called rational-legal authority and invade the field of “charismatic leadership” (mainly in the case of Xanana) and to pull them towards institutionalization as democratic leaderships, the Presidency of the Republic elected by universal suffrage but devoid of executive functions in parallel with a government emanating from Parliament seems to have revealed itself as an adequate form of representation of the Timorese plural nationalism.

Today, the institutional edifice of the state is far more balanced than in the days that followed independence, when an uneven development of the various branches was notorious. The arch of power is wider, and the power of voice has grown. This is an unfinished process that nevertheless seems to have solid and stable foundations, and unquestionable democratic pedigree.

Rui Graça Feijó
ruifeijo@ces.uc.pt
Post-doctoral fellow, Centre for Social Studies
IDEAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WALLS PAINTINGS AND GRAFFITI OF TIMOR-LESTE

The aim of this article is to analyse the graffiti and wall paintings of Timor-Leste as spaces of freedom of expression and dialogue about the perceptions of human rights during the first decade of the country's independence [1]. Through this visual analysis of wall paintings and graffiti photographed between 2003 and 2012, I argue that the younger generation uses this public space as an alternative means of communicating ideas and emotional experiences, which I group in the following areas: conflict memories and social catharsis; resistance and identity; political protest and demand for rights.

Memory and Social Catharsis

The wall paintings and graffiti are part of the landscape of the cities and villages of Timor-Leste. Some represent memories of violence and of the Indonesian occupation, and these can be seen in paintings where skulls, demons, angels and ghost figures abound. The Timorese traditional practices are rooted in a strong relation with the past, through which the memory, the commemoration and the rituals that celebrate the past and that honour the death build a path that is absolutely necessary to reach justice and to go on with social life. Hence, mural paintings have a very important role in the memory and, at the same time, in the individual and social catharsis. According to the poet Abé Barreto Soares (Parkinson, 2010), there is a need of “expression of the human emotions”, “either bad or good” and so the “fury and frustration” have found “a therapeutic space” in the walls.

We can set a parallel between the Timorese reality and the experience of Northern Ireland, where the memory of a violent and social fragmented past is celebrated in wall paintings. After three decades of conflict and the peace process, the walls of the city of Belfast are still covered with the symbols of the heroes and spaces of struggle representing both sides of the conflict (Rolston, 2010).

In Timor-Leste the wall paintings, with representations of the ghosts and spirits, are an expression of fundamental values of the Timorese identity: the respect for the ancestors and for the heroes deceased in the war and the sacrifice (sutar), as well as the suffering (terus) of the Timorese people during the years of Indonesian occupation (Silva, 2010).

Resistance and identity

The “street art” in Timor-Leste celebrates also the independence achieved and the resistance against the invader. The struggle against the colonialism (funu) is one of the elements where the nation is rooted and that unites all Timorese, regardless of their ethnic group or political affiliation (Leach, 2008). The younger members of the so-called fourn [2] generation, the generation that was born during the Indonesian period and that was educated in the independence period, sought the recognition of their role in the resistance movement (Bexley, 2007). The wall paintings are a public space for the affirmation of their role in the narrative of the struggle for independence, from which they have been marginalised. The young generation expresses its nationalist pride and sense of nation through the painting of walls with symbols of the resistance and images of its leaders. The artists use the revolutionary iconography, using the images of Che Guevara (1928-67) and Bob Marley (1945-81) [3].

Painted wall in Dili. Photograph by the author, 2012.
Political contestation and claim of rights

The graffiti as a means of resistance and protest against the legal, political and religious authority is characteristic of “younger cultures” in many parts of the world. We find well-known examples of this in the ex-Soviet Union, Germany, Northern Ireland, Nicaragua and Palestine (Ferrell, 1995: 77). It is still a “weapon” of the contemporary activists in countries such as Mexico, USA, Venezuela (Abreu Sojo, 2003) and Egypt (Cavaluzzo, 2011).

In Timor-Leste, the years of independence have brought the guarantee of democratic rights, the recognition of the Timorese cultural identity and the possibility of access to civil and political rights. All this had been denied by the colonial rules throughout the history of the country. However, the youngest generation has been assisting to the paradox between the dominant human rights discourse and the prevalence of social unfair practices during the post-colonial experience of Timor-Leste (political violence, an inefficient system of justice and order maintenance, unequal access to economic rights and employment), which represents an effective challenge to a human rights culture in Timor-Leste.

During the 2006 crisis, the walls have “screamed” words of frustration against the political leaders after the political violence that followed the discharge of the petitioner soldiers from the armed forces. The painted walls and graffiti reflected the nation’s contradictions, mixing walls written with accusations and sentences of outrage of a youth that felt marginalised, with graffiti calling for peace and national unity.

The right to Justice is one of the areas that worry more the Timorese society. There is a tension between the needs of peace and reconciliation and the denial of the rights of reparation to the victims and their families, resulting from the killings and serious crimes during the Indonesian occupation (Kent, 2011). The conflicts over land ownership are another of the most prominent challenges in the country, given the lack of legislation that regulates a complex situation resulting from the juxtaposition of several colonial regimes and traditional ownership regimes.
In Timor-Leste the painted walls are, for the younger generation, a place of political contestation, but also of expression and dialogue about ideas of identity and culture, justice and reconciliation, following a global tradition of “muralism” as a form of socio-political protest. The street art in Timor-Leste reflects local concepts of human rights. These walls represent “an ethical vision of a desired future” (Quartaet, 2009), resulting from past and present experiences, at the same time, of injustice and success defending social justice and human dignity, that have crossed the lives of consecutive Timorese generations.

Marisa Ramos Gonçalves
marisamrg@yahoo.com

Institute for Social Transformation Research, Faculty of Arts, University of Wollongong, Austrália

Notes:
[1] The visual analysis of graffiti and painted walls in Timor-Leste is the departure point of a PhD research project with the theme “Intergenerational perceptions of human rights in Timor-Leste: Peacebuilding and social cohesion”, which uses as main research methodology focal discussion groups. This research project aims at contributing to a critical knowledge of the Timorese human rights perceptions and how this concept is being translated and appropriated locally to a vernacular form.
[2] This expression means “new generation”.

References:


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MEMORIES FROM TIMOR

I wrote this article thinking about the relevance of talking about a crucial period for the Portuguese state, for its commitment and engagement in the process of Timor-Leste’s independence. It was also a disturbing period for the Portuguese National Defence, due to the instability and continuous change at the decision-making level which, however, left its foreign policy towards Timor unchanged. The Portuguese military contingent, in 2001, with up to 900 troops, represented for a small country like ours a considerable effort and a clear orientation of the importance of the Timorese cause to Portugal.

My presence in Timor-Leste took place in the context of two completely different missions. In the first one, I was the Chief of Intelligence of the PKF (Peacekeeping Force) during UNTAES, where I had the task of replacing INTERFET’s Australian cell of Intelligence. Due to security threats such as the militias’ actuation, which were destabilising the whole independence process, this mission turned out to be very complex in its initial stages. In my second mission I was the Commander of the Central Sector.

Timor-Leste was divided into three sectors, and the Portuguese one had around 1300 troops from Portugal, Kenya and Brazil. After September 2000 this sector was reinforced by South Korean, Philippine and Mozambican forces. The Portuguese contingent was composed of a battalion-level unit that integrated a Marine Company and a Deployment of “Alouette” helicopters from the Portuguese Air Force. We also relied upon a Kenyan Company to provide security in the Ermera District. The Central Sector Command was based in CAICOLI (Dili) and acted upon a third of Timor-Leste’s territory, which effectively represented providing security for six districts and 50% of the population. The area of operations belonging to the Central Sector covered the districts of Liquiçá, Dili, including the Ataúro Island, Aileu, Ermera, Manufahi (Same) and Ainaro. It was not possible to maintain a permanent presence, even in the most remote zones, due to the large extension of this area.

The achievement of this objective was also hardened by the field characteristics. Among others by the Ramelau range, that caused severe restrictions to mobility, together with a limited road network, a mountainous terrain and bad road conservation, further constrained by the raining season. In the accomplishment of my duties as Sector Commander, there were two marking events that always come to my mind. The first one was when we started Operation Cobra. I was extremely worried because since the end of the Portuguese colonial war there had not been counter-guerrilla operations. We had Special Forces’ elements infiltrated to control militia groups, and capture or eliminate these individuals. I had the feeling at the time that undoubtedly the great physical and psychological training given to the Portuguese military forces contributed to self-confidence.

The second one was even more striking. During this operation, a helicopter disaster occurred and two Portuguese troops died. The death toll rose to eleven, among all the different UN contingents, during the first ten months of the mission. The funeral ceremonies at Dili’s Cathedral and at the airport were loaded with sentiment, emotion and tears that run down the faces of most of the military forces and Timorese population.
attending these events.

As a conclusion I would state that Operation Cobra made possible stability and security, creating conditions to the increment of CIMIC activities, especially in the districts of Ainaro and Manufahi. A lot remained, however, to be done, mainly in the fields of humanitarian assistance and infrastructure rehabilitation. We had to have in mind that the primary focus of the Peacekeeping Force was assuring security. Activities aimed at supporting local populations were always carried out according to the means available, and became a secondary practice of the mission, with great engagement and dedication from our part.

We always considered extremely important to support projects that aimed at the development of working habits among the Timorese population, that would lead the people of the future country to achieve their own means of subsistence and renewed confidence in their capabilities. We have also taken advantage of the Timorese natural learning capacity to receive instruction from the Portuguese personnel in different areas such as civil construction, education, civic education, physical training and public health. There is a lot more to say about Timor-Leste and I finish by stating that it was a professional experience that I have lived intensively, under UN service during thirteen months. I have learned a lot, not only in the operational field, but also during the contact with socio-political, regional and administrative structures of Timor-Leste, and with the strong exposure to the media, with its pros and cons. Still today, I remember with pride my experience in Timor-Leste because I feel that I have made part of the process that led to the birth of a new nation in the new millennium.

Major-General Martins Ferreira
ferreira.jam@mail.exercito.pt
Portuguese Army
P@x Observatory

Resources on Timor-Leste,
historical memory and Statebuilding

Forum ONG Timor-Leste (Fongtil)
http://fongtil.org/

Luta Hamutuk
http://lutahamutuk.org/

East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN)
http://www.etan.org/

La’o Hamutuk
http://www.laohamutuk.org/

Fundasaun Mahein
http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/

Amnistia Internacional
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/timor-leste

Human Rights Watch
http://www.hrw.org/asia/east-timor

International Crisis Group

Relief Web
http://reliefweb.int/country/tls

The Timor-Leste Studies Association
http://tlstudies.org/

Center for International Conflict Resolution – Columbia University
http://www.cicr-columbia.org/?page_id=183

RMIT University
http://www.timor-leste.org/timor-leste-research/

East Timor Law Journal: Analyses of legal issues in Timor-Leste
http://easttimorlawjournal.wordpress.com/

UNMIT
http://www.unmit.org/
http://www.momentum.tl/

A journey to the uma lulik country

Ten years is not a long time, but aside from independence, Timor-Leste has already a long history that needs to be accounted for. As independence was declared, one of the main efforts regarded the building and strengthening of the institutions. This statebuilding process has resulted from the role that the Timorese have or had in it. “Pobu Doben, Maun Bot Taur Matan Ruak, Lasama, Xanana, Cláudio Ximenes, Luolo, Mari, Lere”, were the first words of the speech of President Ramos Horta on May 20, 2012, in Tasi Tolu, where the ten years of independence were being celebrated and President Taur Matan Ruak was taking office. In each of these names there was a fundamental piece of the building and consolidation of the new state.

This biography is part of this approach: to give a perspective of the history, to mark a position regarding the questions of the past, the history of the resistance, the referendum, the UN intervention and the independence, as well as the future of the new state, being an itinerary through the most important questions of Timor-Leste.

It is divided in three symbolic parts: “Yesterday”, “Today” and “Tomorrow”. The first one addresses essentially the guerrilla, where Taur Matan Ruak had an active participation, mentioning also the role of the Catholic Church and its role regarding the independence. The second, “Today”, is the largest one and begins with the Referendum of 30 August 1999. It goes through the transition phase, the demilitarisation (Falintil, F-FDTL), the creation and consolidation of the defence and internal security (F-FDTL, PNTL), going through an analysis of the government of Xanana Gusmão, the reach for social consensus regarding the pacification (the leaders’ meeting in Maubisse), justice and traditional institutions and the language question. It finishes with the instability of 2005-2007 and with an analysis of the attacks against the President Ramos Horta and the Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão.

Symptomatically, the last part, “Tomorrow”, addresses the phase in which Timor currently stands: towards development, trying to figure out its own development model and what is in this the role of the new generations, from the perspective of the President that appointed the youngest Chief of Staff ever.

The Timorese society is made of subtle details, with very precise codes, which only some are able to understand. Being a contemporary analysis, this book is full of this subtness and mostly relevant messages. One of the strong signs of the President, shortly after taking office, was to send its assets declaration to the Court of Appeal in an unprecedented and emblematic gesture in Timor-Leste. There was a great expectation of whether this would generate similar attitudes in the political leadership class, but nothing followed. Nevertheless, the position was marked. How to interpret, also, Taur’s position regarding the need for universal healthcare system, accessible to all citizens (p. 456), and the absurd of the health spending abroad by the country’s elites, when reading the press release from the Council of Ministers of December 5, 2012, where it has analysed “The prospect of a system of referring patients for medical treatment outside of the country, especially, Parliamentarians, members of Government and veterans[1]”. 

This book is noteworthy above all by its empirical contribute regarding the reality in Timor-Leste and the main forces and dynamics that exist in this society. Whatever the focus of the analysis, be it from the future perspective of the country, from the peacebuilding and statebuilding policies of the country, from the UN intervention or international cooperation, this analysis cannot be pursued without understanding the social reality. This requires knowing the country of the uma lulik, the biru, the lia mate and the lia moris (sacred houses, amulets, death and alive representatives), among so many other things.
“Probably an analysis of the UN performance is also not complete without understanding the deep meaning of this sentence: “We were humiliated but the ultimate victory will be ours[2]” (p. 469), which appears among many other considerations that undoubtedly carry with them a strong meaning.

As so many times it has been said, the future of Timor is still open. So it is the writing of history, the facts that only now it is possible to start registering. It is in this context that the biography of Taur Matan Ruak should be placed: an empirical contribute from the former guerrilla man, former Chief of Defence Staff and current President of the Republic. The biography of Taur Matan Ruak is full of hints to read the reality critically. “Two Sharp Eyes” (Matan Ruak, in tetum) that go through the past, present and future of this young country.

Carla Luís

carlafluis@gmail.com

PhD candidate, PhD Programme in International Politics and Conflict Resolution, CES/FEUC

Notes:


This book, organised around three different sections – ‘Background’, ‘Assessment’ and ‘Reconstruction’ –, aggregates various and very insightful contributions on the political, diplomatic and security developments in Timor-Leste. What is common to all the books’ diverse and rich contributions is the underlying idea of a gradual process of cultural and political identity building central to the overall reconstruction process Timor-Leste is still going through. The first section- ‘Background’ – provides a broad historical context focusing on the various dimensions that have influenced, directly or indirectly, this young country’s current situation: the colonial rule, the demographic characteristics or its cultural identities. In chapter 4, a central part of the book, Dionisio Babo Soares analyses some of the most fundamental developments that Timor-Leste has experienced at the political level, both before and after the referendum, namely the ‘scorched earth’ policy promoted by Indonesia and the pro-integration militias, the introduction of a peace force in the territory led by Australia (INTERFET) or the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) that marked the beginning of a new episode in the country’s history and its path towards independence.

*Out of the Ashes* also provides an interesting overview of the diplomatic efforts put forward involving the UN, Indonesia and various other international actors actively involved in the long and complex political process to support a peaceful resolution of the dispute, with a special focus on the New York’s May 5 Agreement (1999) that paved the way to the referendum that would later result in the independence of the territory. The campaign for independence as well as the impacts and
implications of the popular consultation are also thoroughly assessed in this book. Ian Martin - former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Popular Consultation and Head of the UN Mission in Timor-Leste –, for example, shares (with a clear personal approach) some reflections on the UN mission’s goals, implications and dilemmas.

Within the ‘Assessment’ section, authors discuss and analyse the wider implications of an independent Timor-Leste, focusing on issues related to post-referendum violence, refugee flows, reconciliation processes or the immediate risks of implosion that could question the viability of a peaceful political transition in the immediate post-referendum. In the final section – ‘Reconstruction’ – there is a particular focus on the international strategies put forward to help dealing with the enormous challenges of building a new, independent and consolidated state in such a fragile context. Particular emphasis is given to the Joint Assessment Mission and Reconstruction and on the main challenges faced by the UN in the country, in particular those related to economic development, reconciliation or institutional building. One of the final thoughts shared by Babo Soares is that addressing these challenges is crucial to the survival of a nation and depends above all on ‘how its people endeavour to sort out problems within their own society’ (p. 275). These are some of the major challenges and conquests that characterise Timor-Leste still today within the consolidation process of the new 21st century country and that are thus well illustrated in this book.

Daniela Nascimento
danielan@fe.uc.pt
Researcher, NHUMEP, Centre for Social Studies (CES)
OBSERVING PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN TIMOR-LESTE, 2012

Being accredited electoral observers in the 2012 parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste was a unique opportunity to observe directly how democracy is practiced in a country that became independent only a decade ago. These were the third parliamentary elections (2001, 2007 and 2012) in Timor-Leste. The research team visited various voting centres in the Dili district, in two sub-districts – Cristo-Rei e Vera Cruz – at different moments of the Election Day, having included both urban and rural areas.

The voting centres opened officially at 7 a.m., but since 6 a.m. the polling staff responsible for the voting centres was expected to prepare the polling stations and check the electoral materials. We first visited Sabraka Laran (Cristo-Rei), where, around 6:30 a.m., there were already people in line. The preparation of the polling stations and the checking of the electoral materials were done by candle light which conferred a certain solemnity and at the same time an almost mystic sense to the preparation process. One of the polling stations was mobile and, after opening, moved across the road to a Prison. The second voting centre was in Dare (Vera Cruz) located uphill. The lines were long, but everyone waited for their turn orderly without any problems. This was a more rural area with a higher percentage of older people than in the previous voting centre. People at Dare looked at us with pride for being in line waiting to participate in the process. The organization of the polling stations there was excellent, allowing for a constant flux of people entering and leaving the polling stations at a regular and quick pace. We met the Australian Ambassador there. The third voting centre visited was at the School Hati-Kudus, again in Cristo-Rei, where lines were long and composed by young and enthusiastic people. The fourth voting centre was in Hera, still Cristo-Rei, but in a rural region, where, around 1 p.m. the environment was very laidback, with no-one in line and only with the occasional voter showing up. We stayed in Hera until the closure of the three polling stations at 3:00 p.m., when the checking and opening procedures of the ballot boxes took place. And finally, already after 5 p.m., we observed the counting and validation of the votes at Salim Colmera (Vera Cruz), where the environment was again laidback, although everyone was following the counting and validation of the votes with eagle eyes.

Throughout the visits to the different voting centres, several issues stood out. In relation to the organization of the voting process and the polling staff, the process seemed well organized for a country that still has profound basic infrastructural problems and the polling staff seemed well prepared to guarantee that the process took place within the legal framework in effect; it should also be noted that the fact that the voting ballots had to be signed and stamped in front of the voter contributed to decreasing the possibility of electoral fraud due to the inclusion of extra voting ballots. Some issues, however, deserve further scrutiny for future elections: the location of the ‘voting booths’ with the voters’ backs towards the room constrained in a certain way the right to a secret vote; the sheer size of the voting ballot also constrained the right to a secret vote, and we verified afterwards during the counting and validation of votes that in some cases it is possible that the vote was not validated due to the fact that some people folded the ballot to vote, and when ‘perforating’ with a nail, ended up inadvertently making two ‘holes’ in the ballot; in some cases due to the number of people inside the polling station, the person responsible of providing the ballot had no way of confirming if that person had been already properly identified.

Regarding the participation of police forces, in the voting centres visited their presence was peaceful and discrete. The national legislation in effect...
requires police officials in each voting centre, distanced at least 25 meters from the polling stations, except if they there is a need to enforce public order.

Only in Salim Colmera did we see police officials within the 25 meters’ radius and, in effect, two elements were taking notes of the counting and validation of the votes, without, however, interfering in any way with the process. It seemed to us that their presence, in effect, conferred some additional feeling of security to the people participating when the discussions got heated.

In relation to transparency, the whole process in these voting centres seemed totally transparent, with participated and open discussions, when necessary, on the sometimes ambiguous procedures or on the procedural changes since the presidential elections (March-April 2012), with decisions taken by consensus, and with the possibility of all accredited observers of witnessing the whole process and, during the counting and validation of votes, with the possibility of any person being present.

Finally, regarding the participation of voters, the older ones conveyed a sense of pride in participating and the younger ones a sense of celebration. Based on reports from other official entities and other electoral observers, Election Day proceeded without any major incidents to report. Of course, some aspects may be considered problematic, when framed within the individual experiences of each team member and the electoral observation manuals available, such as the use of ink to identify who has voted, which violates the right to anonymity of voters. Yet, it seemed to us that some of these procedures, for now, contribute in a more positive than negative way to guaranteeing the democratic and legitimate nature of the electoral process from the standpoint of the Timorese.

Maria Raquel Freire
rfreire@fe.uc.pt

Ramon Blanco de Freitas
ramon@ces.uc.pt

António Leitão
antonioleitao@ces.uc.pt

Paula Duarte Lopes
pdl@fe.uc.pt

NHUMEP, Centre for Social Studies
PROMOTION OF COMMUNITARIAN PARTICIPATION AS A MEANS TO PREVENT THE NATURAL RESOURCES CURSE

There is an interesting phenomenon to which social scientists call “natural resources curse” (Auty, 1993). In this context, one can say that countries rich in natural resources, such as mineral resources and oil, have a bad performance due to a number of factors, which, according to some studies, are: (i) high poverty levels, (ii) corruption and weakened democracy and (iii) violence and civil instability. During 1989-1998, around 41% of conflicts across the world took place in the African continent (Wallensteen e Sollenberg, 2001). In fact, the majority of these conflicts, both intra- and interstate, happens as a result of natural resources disputes; the richest countries are also characterized by the lowest levels of quality of life and a permanent threat of war. Examples include Angola, Sudan, Congo, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Liberia.

Besides the facts above mentioned, one can also refer to economic reasons, such as the lack of employability in the extractive sector, since it is a system intensive in capital and not labour intensive, resorting mainly to advanced technology and highly qualified human resources. The dependency these countries have from the extractive sector income, both from financing the state budget, leading to what often is called the ‘price shock’, and from the unpredictable price variation due to market fluctuations creating economic and political instability. Another factor, called the 'Dutch Disease', reveals that the economies of countries rich in natural resources tend to decrease. This is due to the neglect and lack of investment in the productive sector, such as agriculture, which has always been the basis of the economy ('Dutch Disease, The Netherlands, 1970). In the case of the Netherlands, one witnessed a decrease in the secondary sector, being that it is more common to witness negligence regarding the primary sector when it comes to developing countries. Basing the economies of these countries in non-renewable sources of energy also compromises their future. This occurs due to the lack of knowledge regarding the use of renewable energies as a sustainable source in the long-term. Finally, the lack of transparency and accountability regarding the extractive sector occurs from the exploitation phase to the collection of income.

Based in all these experiences, the concept of “natural resources curse” describes and explains, in fact, the failure of countries rich in natural resources in benefiting their own communities which end up not profiting from what is theirs by right.

**Timor-Leste context**

In the micro context in Timor-Leste, a Portuguese colony for almost 450 years and an Indonesian occupied territory for 24 years, the knowledge of the existing natural resources and of which is the best management practice is totally unknown for local communities. The first government after independence gave the first positive steps in preventing natural resources wealth from becoming a curse. One of the positive aspects was the creation of the Oil Fund, crucial for the transparency and accountability of the extractive sector (International Best Practice Adopted). The Timorese Government committed, in this way, to actively implement the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), guaranteeing that during the budget execution process transparency is respected to avoid corruption. Despite this initiative, there is a series of obstacles that might lead Timor-Leste to this ‘inevitable’ curse of natural resources.

The execution of the state budget does not yet fulfill the requirements of transparency and accountability. According to the information provided by Transparency International, Timor-Leste ranks 143 with an overall score of 2.4 regarding corruption. These values indicate that the levels of corruption are high and that Timor-Leste’s performance is still in red. These circumstances contribute to the fact that investments done, both in human capital (education and health) and in the agricultural, touristic and infrastructural sectors, are still insufficient and inadequate. On the other side, the Timorese government also reduced its non-oil income, domestic fees through the taxes law reform in 2008.
In fact, the resolution of these problems is not easy, mainly when there is no political will to promote good governance by the countries rich in natural resources. In fact, in the majority of these countries there is a system of transparency and accountability, which in practice is just a formality. The democratic countries, leaders of the world, which depend on oil and gas imports, are often not interested in using diplomatic pressure to demand for fiscal transparency and adequate budget implementation. Multinational oil companies also promote ‘good relations’ with governments and do not make any demands regarding transparency of budget management. Both parts benefit from silence.

Who may control? These conditions reveal that in fact there is no other way but through direct participation and sharing of responsibilities with civil society and communities. These can work in order to put pressure on the government for an efficient and fair natural resources management, guaranteeing also transparent processes.

The model used by Luta Hamutuk for promoting communitarian participation includes the creation of spaces for debate and public discussion between the community and its government officials and the organization of thematic seminars at district and national levels. Another line of action includes capacitating and qualifying rural communities regarding how to monitor extractive companies’ activities and the state budget in respect to national development. Yet, another of Luta Hamutuk’s contributions is the simplification of official documents into a more accessible language, as in the case of the reports on gas and oil reserves, the Oil Fund and the state budget, and its distribution to local communities. Luta Hamutuk also accompanies communities in their monitoring and advocacy activities.

Conclusion

Luta Hamutuk believes that through these strategies and the promotion of these public debate spaces it is possible to develop perspectives on how to improve natural resources management. These communitarian participation models help their concrete involvement in the nation’s development and their active participation in monitoring their resources, which should be managed based on public interest. The result are informed communities, involved and strengthened by the will of questioning about the transparency of processes and the way their government manages natural resources, the wealth of the nation. Luta Hamutuk has been promoting a higher participation by civil society in general and of the communities with which it works, since it is after all the people itself that has in its hands the ‘arms’ to become the leading-actor in the fight and prevention of the natural resources curse.

Zenilton Zeneves
zenilton_zeneves@yahoo.com
Instituto Luta Hamutuk, Dili

References


2012 is clearly a special year for this small Southeast Asian country. In the Western part of the Timorese island, in what is now the Oecusse exclave, one can find a historical monument marking the ‘discovery’ of the territory by the Portuguese in 1512. In 1912, already as a part of the sovereign Portuguese territory, an uprising led by Dom Boaventura reflected an early will of the Timorese people to be responsible for its own future and write its own destiny. That could have happened in November 28, 1975, after 63 years of Portuguese domination, with the declaration of independence of the territory and the election of a President of the Republic. However, an Indonesian invasion came to occupy the territory before under Portuguese ruling and postponed the Timorese dream for another 24 years. It was only in 1999 that, after a referendum organized under the aegis of a United Nations (UN) peace mission, the Timorese people exercised its right to self-determination and voted against becoming an Indonesian province with special autonomy and, consequently, chose the path to independence. The cornerstone of this still young democracy took place on May 20, 2002, when its first President of the Republic was elected, Xanana Gusmão, according to democratic rules established by the Timorese Constitution. This date also marked the transition of the UN administration of the territory to the Timorese government.

It was definitely unique having been in the country during 2012. Not only because electoral events are extremely important to the democratic reinforcement of State institutions, but also because these took place in a highly emotional environment associated with the commemorations of the 500 years since the Portuguese arrived to the territory, the 100 years of the Dom Boaventura uprising and the 10 years of the restoration of independence. I landed on this island on January 21, 2012, after travelling almost 34 hours. I brought with me a copy of the terms of reference, where my responsibilities were explained. I arrived half-lost, for everything was new and unfamiliar. I remember the day I arrived at the UN compound to pick up my identification card. That blue and white flag made me smile. After three intensive weeks of training and briefings, and although lost with jetlag, I got a better picture of what would be my contribution to this country and to its people, and, more specifically, who was to organize the next elections.

As a United Nations Volunteer (UNV), I was assigned the mission to support, in the Díli district, the work of the national institution responsible for the presidential and parliamentary elections in the country: the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE). At STAE there were four UNV per district, two in logistical support, where I was included, and two in voters’ education support. With the institution responsible for supervising the elections, the National Commission for Elections (CNE), there were also four UNV per district, two in voters’ education support and two monitoring the activities before, during and after the elections. Unlike other elections that took place in the past, these presented a new particularity: the UN would only have a supporting role, being the national institutions responsible for its organization and supervision as well as for rendering it operational. In a certain way, this aspect made the activities of the UNV difficult, since sometimes it was not easy to distinguish through tenuous line between support and interference in the work of the national staff. However, with the daily work and the interaction with the national staff, that line became increasingly perceptible. I had to support and advise STAE staff in questions related to logistics that were less developed, in order to optimize processes as well as human and logistical resources, so that the elections would take place in a transparent and swift way and according to the legislation in effect.

Be mistaken those who think the Timorese do not know how to organize an election! They know what and when it happens; they know the actions that need to take place every step of the way; they know the legal framework in effect. There was however a will of the Timorese State to improve and develop further the organization of elections, being consequently necessary an injection of know-how and capacity-building.
For example, the use of a database system with the voters’ information that was used to register them was substantially altered, and was now being done in real time through the internet, abandoning the practice of taking the physical records to the STAE’s headquarters. For this effect it was necessary to set up equipment as well as maintain and operate it. Regarding the transportation of the voting materials, there was no vehicle management plan for its delivery and pick-up, being done randomly, which made the process slow and with the propensity for flaws.

In the Election Days it was fascinating to see the voters’ lines, in a total of 125 thousand registered in the Díli district, at the voting centres proudly waiting for their opening, exercising a right that was so hard to obtain. Voting took place without anyone realizing that in total, in the Díli district, and for each Election Day, around 300 to 400 ballot boxes, between 14 and 19 vehicles, and around 600 voting booths circulated, which provided for 54 voting centres and 134 polling stations. Activities initiated at 5 a.m. and only ended around 3 a.m. the following day, after picking-up and counting all ballots.

After the two elections there were several congratulations directed at the Timorese State, recognizing their legitimacy and transparency. The Timorese had not only prepared, organized and conducted the elections but they had also participated in the process. On a personal level, I recognized the success of the mission at a lunch with the STAE staff from the Díli district when,


(after a very formal speech by its coordinator, I received a hug with the words “maun Tiago, servisu makaas. Obrigado barak!” (Brother Tiago, good work/well done. Thank you very much!) Mission accomplished!

Tiago Alves

tiago.alex.alves@gmail.com

Graduation in International Relations by the University of Coimbra, United Nations Volunteer (UNV) in Timor-Leste.
THE EU AND THE NOBEL PRIZE FOR WHAT PEACE(S)?

This article had two motivations. The first followed some conversations with fellow colleagues on the tendency to treat peace like something in itself, as a metaphysical entity, something that transcends the way it is reproduced in different contexts. The second motivation is related to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the EU. I wanted to know which peace(s) were used to justify the award. In parallel, I stumbled on a José Manuel Pureza’s (JMP) text criticising the 2012 Nobel Prize. At that moment I noticed that I had several tools to develop a reflection on the subject: through JMP [1] and the Committee’s [2] texts, I could identify different reproductions of peace, and, within those, the ones which had been used to justify the Nobel; through JMP’s perspective I could elaborate a kind of an audi alteram partem, a critical analysis on the official justifications for the 2012 peace award.

This exercise relies on three assumptions. First, it tries to eschew the metaphysical outlook on peace, the objectivation of peace as something transcendent, unique, immutable, with an existence of its own. From a semiotic [3] perspective, I point to different expressions of peace mentioned in both JMP’s and the Nobel Committee’s texts in order to demonstrate that peace does not exist beyond the different immanent physical, verbal and non-verbal ways it is expressed in different (con)texts. Second, it is an attempt to (re)interpret, to decode/re-encode, appropriate and expand JMP’s perspective in order to use it as a context of (re)interpretation and critical analysis, as an audi alteram partem of the Committee’s official announcement. At the end of the article, this audi alteram partem will be complemented by a third voice, a view on peace expressed by a common individual. Third, by identifying several expressions of peace, the article reveals the extreme volatility of peace, its chameleonic character, capable of assuming several significations in a small text. Peace is almost everything. At the same time peace is almost nothing. In verbal terms, it is just a + sign: it works as an adjective which gives a positive character to the name or utterance which is qualifying and, at the same time, takes their shape, masks them, until it is no longer possible to distinguish, beyond the adjective, the original name or utterance. These are the points of departure to discover a meaning of peace in a given context of sings. For instance, in JMP’s text, even if it is not mentioned, the combination of some utterances lead me to decode/encode them as socialist peace.

According to JMP, there are three types of peace in the EU, which, since 1992, have been progressively replaced by something else.

- **Socialist peace**: “[the EU] started to give primacy to competitiveness over [socio-economic] cohesion”;
- **Union between European peoples**: “[the EU] started to give primacy to the market over the Union”;
- **Absence of war**: “[the EU] started to give primacy to military intervention over prevention and peaceful management of conflicts outside its borders”.

In other words, JMP argues that there were non-peaces which took a dominant role over the peaces which used to sustain the existence of the EU. These non-peaces are “military interventionism” and “social violence” or “social aggression” (i.e. competitiveness and market translated into social aggression). JMP also explains that the **socialist peace** ("cohesion", "social model of salary complemented by public services and social rights"; “peace by social justice”) was determinant for the existence of the EU. Finally, this author claims that even if the Nobel Committee tried in some way to reward the UE as a project of peace based on the **socialist peace**, in the end, by ignoring the replacement of several peaces, specially the socialist peace, by non-peaces, it rewarded something different from peace, and it neither contributed to the realization of peace in Europe, nor to the continuity of the EU.

According the Nobel Committee’s official announcement, the 2012 peace prize was awarded to the EU due to its 60 years’ contribution to peace as forgiveness (“reconciliation”), democracy (“democracy”), the absence of identity conflicts ("ethnic and national conflicts"), the absence of ideological conflicts (“the division between east and west”); the absence of war/use of organized violence (“from a continent of war into a continent of...
of peace”), and friendship/union between European peoples ("fraternity between nations"). At the end of the text, the Committee emphasised the role of peace as forgiveness, democracy, human rights and absence of war.

Using JMP’s text as a context of interpretation and critical analysis on the Nobel Committee’s announcement, I conclude that the Committee:

- Disregarded the replacement (and its consequences) of certain peaces (socialist peace, union between European peoples and absence of war) by non-peaces (military interventionism and social aggression);
- Did not recognise the importance of socialist peace as a condition for the existence of the European union as a peace project, and as the most important reason to reward the EU with the Nobel; eventually, the Committee’s text makes a timid and inexplicit recognition of socialist peace when it alludes to human rights (does it include socio-economic rights?);
- Emphasised the importance of several peaces, specially the role of peace as absence of war, union between European peoples and democracy, to justify the award. Yet it did not mention the replacement of these peaces by military interventionism; by the imposition of austerity measures (social aggression) by some European states against other European states and peoples; and by the IMF, some European states and market agents’ impositions which go against democracy (against democratic congruence between the rulers and the ruled).

To sum up, from a JMP’s perspective it is possible to conclude that the 2012 peace prize is an award that annuls itself, for it rewards several peaces without recognising the fundamental role of socialist peace as a basic condition for the EU as a peace project; and does not criticise, or even rewards the replacement of several peaces mentioned in the official announcement by non-peaces.

The analysis of JMP and the Nobel Committee’s texts confirmed that instead of one peace, there are several expressions of peace that never transcend the way they are reproduced within a certain context; and that their meaning, in verbal terms, depends on a relation/context of signs, in which certain utterances are the point of departure to discover a certain meaning. For instance, even if JMP’s does not mention it, in his text there are several utterances which converge to a socialist meaning of peace.

Finally, in order to escape the despotism of the aforementioned politico-governmental expressions of peace, without mentioning my considerations on this subject, I asked an old man about his idea of peace. He said “peace is not the absence of war” (n.b. he fought in the Portuguese colonial war). “Peace is satisfaction…peace is when one feels satisfied.” This was the best, the most immanent and universal definition of peace that I have ever heard. Animals need no words to know what satisfaction is, to feel at peace. After a pause the guy added “what we have in Europe today is not peace.”

Marco Rosa
silvarosa.marco@gmail.com
PhD Candidate, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra

Notes:
[2] https://www.facebook.com/jose.m.pureza/posts/149606638518621
[3] Inspired by the semiotic work of Deleuze, Derrida, Jakob von Uexküll or by Espinoza’s theory of signs. On this theory, vide Lorenzo Vinciguerra’s work.
KENYA: REWRITING THE FUTURE?

Kenya is preparing its first elections since December 2007. In the previous elections, the outbreak of violence that took the country to the brink of civil war in just two months – with circa 1500 deaths and 700,000 IDPs – originated a power-sharing agreement in February 2008 to end the violence.

Power-sharing deals have been recurrent in Africa, particularly as a temporary mechanisms within peace accords contexts. Since the turn of the century, a third of the African continent has had or continues to have power-sharing arrangements. Such was the case of the Kenyan deal, achieved in a context of post-electoral violence, with the maintenance of the incumbent candidate Mwai Kibaki in the Presidency and the creation of an extra-constitutional ad-hoc position of Prime Minister for Raila Odinga. The prescription seems simple: in violent settings resulting from severe abuse of the electoral process and where an undisputed winner is not clear, power sharing between electoral opponents aim at peacekeeping and moderating political tensions. This is guaranteed through the formation of a coalition government which, besides the ordinary challenges of governance existing in any country, adopts a reform package that address both the proximate and the structural roots of the conflict. However, not infrequently power-sharing are often seen as ‘marriages of convenience’ with significant hypothetical perils in the short, medium and long term: inter alia, the institutionalization of latent conflicts in society, prone to executive stalemates, as well as the message it sends by setting a dangerous precedent for upcoming elections: the refusal of the democratic principles and electoral outcomes combined with the option of violence as an instrument of access or maintenance in power.

This is precisely the crossroads which Kenya faces at the moment. In spite of several stalemates along the past 5 years, important steps were made along the way. An electoral reform will demand the upcoming candidates for the Presidency to gain wider geographical support and with a majority of votes in order to win an election which can act as a discouragement of ethnic identities’ elite manipulation which has been transformed in Kenyan domestic politics into a zero-sum game throughout the decades.

Arguably, the biggest success of the power sharing in Kenya is the approval by popular referendum of a new Constitution. The debate over which model of constitutional engineering to adopt in Kenya precedes the independence itself and is a highly contentious one. Kibaki’s reversal of position in 2005 regarding constitutional reform has influenced the 2007 elections and perhaps the approval of the new Constitution would not have been possible without the balance of forces in the coalition government, combined with the factor of being the second and last mandate of Mwai Kibaki. The Constitution will introduce a new political-institutional and administrative framework – similar to the north-american model – with strong reduction of presidential powers and with the devolution of power to the local level, creating new arithmetics in the access to governing/executive positions. Reflecting this, it is foreseeable that, even if to a lesser extent, the tensions and risks associated to the presidential race might relocate and multiply throughout the Kenyan territory.

The upcoming elections will also reinforce the influence of information-related technology in Kenyan domestic politics. Besides the introduction of the electronic vote, the Kenyan Government has recently implemented measures in an effort to crackdown hate speech, particularly oriented towards social networks, commentary sections in newspapers, blogs and radio stations.

Concomitantly, civil society initiatives have also been contributing since 2008 to this effort for moderation, accountability and transparency, through the creation of online platforms – such as Uchaguzi or Ushahidi – for the collection of testimonies of illegal activities such as corruption, hate speech and incitement or electoral violence. These initiatives have been 'exported' to other parts of the world like DR Congo, Mexico, USA, Gaza and India. Nevertheless, if on the one hand, new online social media is booming in Kenya, on the other hand, the competition for media control with potential for propaganda
warfare and polarization between Kenyan political elites has become evident in the preparations for the elections. In another context, China has been investing strongly in media ownership in Kenya as well, a foothold which may represent a glimpse of a new Chinese external policy in the African continent.

But surely one of the main contentious issues in the upcoming elections derives from the fact that two out of the three main contenders (Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto) have been indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity in their alleged involvement in the 2007/2008 post-electoral violence. Kenyatta and Ruto belong to the two ethnic groups with wider demographic weight in Kenya (Kikuyu and Kalenjin, respectively) and, in spite of a relatively long history of rivalry and violent conflict particularly in the Rift Valley region, have decided to run in a joint ticket in the Jubilee Alliance. Their trial is set to start in April 2013 and may extend up to the end of 2015. A trial that may not happen in case the Jubilee Alliance wins the electoral race and which may have severe diplomatic and economic consequences for Kenya. However, the risks and tensions may also run high in case the Jubilee Alliance does not win the presidential race, for it will probably mean that for the first time in Kenya the main political office will not be occupied by a Kikuyu or a Kalenjin.

In the next March 4th, Kenya will again hold elections. Much will be different, much will be the same. A new political-institutional framework, electronic voting, a more organized civil society, but the end result will still very much depend on the will of political elites to manage and prevent the rising of potential conflicts, instead of using them for their own advantage, as well as the capacity of the losing candidates to accept the electoral outcome. Otherwise, it will be difficult to break the vicious cycle from power-sharing deals to new power-sharing deals. Additionally, the efforts put in place for the promotion of democracy in the last 20 years may be in irreversibly reversed. Optimists will probably say the post-electoral violence is still present in the country’s memory to repeat the same mistake, the pessimist will say that rarely has Kenya had in power political elites that were able to live up to the responsibilities.

Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho
hadscmb@gmail.com
Researcher in the Centre for African Studies (CEA-ISCTE) / PhD Candidate in Political Science (ISCTE-IUL)
Barrinha, André (2012), "A Turquia e a Primavera Árabe", Ciência e Cultura, 64, 4, 43-46.

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JANUARY

Teresa Cravo presented the communication “Armed Conflicts, Peacebuilding and the Rule of Law”, Harvard Institute for Global Law and Policy Workshop, Doha, Qatar, 5 to 14 January 2012.

Silvia Roque supervised the first training model on Research Methods, directed towards Guine-Bissau NGO under the scope of the project Casa dos Direitos, Bissau 9 to 15 January 2013.


DECEMBER

Sofia José Santos presented the communication "The UNSCR 1325 national implementation: challenges ahead”, seminar on “Gender-based violence in armed conflicts”, Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 4 December 2012.

Sofia José Santos lectured on "Representações hegemónicas e contra-hegemónicas - os media para a paz”, PhD Program in International Politics and Conflict Resolution, School of Economics, University of Coimbra, 7 December 2012.

Maria Raquel Freire presented the communication “Building peace? Or deconstructing pre-informed models? The United Nations in Timor-Leste”, 2012 Annual Asia-Pacific Conference, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Ritsumeikan Center for Asia Pacific Studies (RCAPS), Beppu City, 7 to 9 December 2012.


NOVEMBER


Sofia José Santos presented the communication “Gender and peace media: resistance, resilience and empowerment ... towards emancipation?”, Jornadas Internacionais “Género, comunicacion y construcción de paz en África”, Colegio de Abogados de Bizkaia, Bilbao | ACNUR Euskal Batzordea, 8 November 2012.

Rita Santos lectured on “Feminismo e Relações Internacionais: perspectivas sobre guerra, paz e segurança”, Degree in International Relations, School of Economics, University of Coimbra, 20 November 2012.

José Manuel Pureza was discussant in the panel “Post-Liberal Peacebuilding: From State Formation to Peace Formation”, International Seminar “Post-liberal peacebuilding: is peacebuilding inherently liberal?”, Oslo, 21 November 2012.

OCTOBER


Maria Raquel Freire presented the communication “Rússia e Ásia Central”, Curso de Análise de Dinâmicas Regionais de Segurança e Defesa, Instituto de Defesa Nacional (IDN), Lisboa, 15 October 2012.

Daniela Nascimento presented the communication “A evolução da Ação Humanitária: dinâmicas e desafios”, III Curso de Operações de Paz e Ação Humanitária Ius Gentium Conimbrigae/Brigada de Intervenção de Coimbra, Coimbra, 20 October 2012.

José Manuel Pureza presented the communication “Saúde, direitos humanos e movimentos sociais”, VII Seminário Internacional de Direito e Saúde, Fundação Oswaldo Cruz, Rio de Janeiro, 23 to 24 October 2012.
Maria Raquel Freire presented the communication “Novas Guerras e Resolução de Conflitos: o caso Moldova/Transnistria”, III Curso de Operações de Paz e Ação Humanitária Ius Gentium Conimbrigae/Brigada de Intervenção de Coimbra, Coimbra, 27 October 2012.