

## CONTESTATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE: EXPLORING PATTERNS ACROSS BORDERS AND REGIONS

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In June 2013, members of the Peace Studies Group organised and participated in a panel entitled "Contestation and Political Change: Exploring Patterns across Borders and Regions" at the European Conference on African Studies in Lisbon. The goal of the panel was to explore how contestation within the political realm begins and evolves, taking as examples popular revolts in the Arab world and sub-Saharan Africa, thus contributing to an understanding of the constraints to and potential for political change. This P@x issue presents part of the work discussed at that event and reflects upon theoretical and empirical findings which can help us navigate through popular expressions of contestation taking place across the African continent in recent years – both massive or more limited in scope, with a broader or narrower impact.

Notwithstanding the growing prospects of counterrevolutions which have given rise to the current rather gloomy accounts of the so-called Arab Spring, the full extent of its impact, and the broader articulation with other parts of the continent and the world, remains to be seen and further studied. Equally, the haste to declare sub-Saharan Africa free from a potential spill-over from the wave of contestations in North Africa and the Middle East appears to neglect the multiple forms of protest which spread south and have indeed taken place before

and after 2011. The different outcomes of these various mobilisations in the face of shared structural problems of governance and disadvantageous global market integration give us an interesting entry point to research this varied political landscape and a valuable insight into the nature of citizens' claims and the respective reactions from the regimes and elites in power.

This issue introduces the topic firstly from a theoretical perspective, with two articles: one by José Manuel Pureza, focusing on the concepts of political subjectivity and political action, with the help of Negri and Hardt's ideas on empire and multitude; and another by Sofia José Santos exploring the means through which contestation may take place, questioning our current romanticised perspective of the role of the New Online Social Media in the Arab world's revolts. Our bulletin then moves on to present three case studies: the so-called "bread-riots" in Mozambique in September 2010, by Teresa Almeida Cravo, which analyses the dynamics between popular demands for political change and the government's strategies to impose a neoliberal agenda; a piece on Malawi, by Andrew Brooks, which assesses Joyce Banda's rise to power as a case of a Gramscian moment of passive revolution; and finally the cases

of Kenya and Zimbabwe, by Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho, which revisits the concept of power-sharing as a form of co-opting political contestation.

In the "In the Radar" section, Redy W. Lima examines the affirmation processes of the youth in Cape Verde, while Maria Raquel Freire and Licínia Simão analyse the recent events in Ukraine. Finally, "Living Peace", developed by the NGO Promundo-US, is presented in the project section.

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## P@X Theory COUNTER-HEGEMONIC COSMOPOLITANISM CHALLENGING PEACE RESEARCH

The articulation between global neoliberal capitalism and its debilitating effects in state regulatory competences gave rise to a move from institutions as *loci* of concrete governance of the world. Contemporary global governance is being filled above all with the standardization of practices of nation states and of the requirement of a universal adoption of a set of institutional arrangements at the level of each state (Duffield, 2001). It is therefore a non-participatory universalism imposed namely through different conditionalities established by external entities.

The replacement of the traditional role of nation states by the emergence of this diffuse global form of global governance raises the need to identify the new forms of cosmopolitan politics that emerge from it. Cosmopolitan politics is not an homogeneous field but rather a field of dispute. As Jabri puts it, “cosmopolitanism makes possible not just government through security (...) but the articulation of solidarity (2012: 635). Within this contradictory framework, global counter-hegemonic agency is performed by different actors. States themselves can play that role, giving place at what Santos (1998) calls “the state as a newest social movement” (also Pureza, 2001: 248). But social movements are undoubtedly the most prominent players of a counter-hegemonic cosmopolitan agenda.

The role played by heterogeneous social movements in the uprisings that took place in different Arab countries since 2011 – namely if it is seen as part of a worldwide struggle for emancipation, embodied also in the proliferation of new social movements against the narrowing of the democratic space in Europe and in the most social massive protests in Brazilian cities – is a challenging example of a new type of agency at the global sphere. Apart from local agendas, all these movements share the same complex relation with global good governance standards. This complexity lies in the simultaneous demand for a full practical accomplishment of the good governance discourses (human rights, minimum democratic standards, non discriminatory rule of

law, transparency and struggle against corruption) and a critical distance against it, denouncing its deficits (social and economic rights and not only political rights; participatory democracy and not only representative democracy) as well as its instrumental nature for the hegemony of liberal forces. Should we accept this common agenda of an in-depth (political, economic, social and cultural) democratic transformation shared by the Arab, European and Brazilian movements and our conclusion should be that we are facing the emergence of a new global actor whose local struggles are expressions of a global re-politicization of the public sphere (Jabri, 2012: 636; Fraser, 2007).



Occupy TV, 2012

The multiplicity of axes of social and political mobilization is another relevant element to be considered at this point. Modern references go together with ancestral concerns; cosmopolitan creeds go together with the defense of narrow identities; the struggle for freedom goes together with the struggle for economic, social and cognitive justice. This dynamic combination between heterogeneity and commonness makes the new social movements struggling for democracy in Cairo or Tunis as well as in Madrid, Lisbon or São Paulo a new specific form of global agency.

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Contemporary politics of contestation and the role played by emancipatory (yet heterogeneous) social movements with counter-hegemonic proposals as their main subjects are therefore new topics to be included in the peace research agenda. Those of us whose work is focused on bringing the original emancipatory agenda back to the core of peace studies should put all the emphasis on the study of the struggle against the new forms of embodying the empire – namely when it assumes an informal sophisticated look – and the inherent cultural and structural violences (including those that are vehicled by peace discourses and operations) as major realities to be critically analyzed.

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## P@x Theory

### NEW ONLINE SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE ARAB SPRING: DEROMANTICISING AND SETTING NEW RESEARCH AGENDAS

Analyses on the uprisings and democratization processes taking place in the Arab region since December 2010 have claimed the centrality of the New Online Social Media (NOSM) in the organisation of the protests, identifying them as the crucial actor in propagating and mobilising the people to contest the repressive political regimes in power. The relation these reflections have established between NOSM and the Arab Spring has been one of indispensability and centrality.

"New media", "social media", "networking media" are different terms used to refer to new online communication tools such as blogs, facebook, youtube, twitter. They are specifically defined by offering, at any time, through any electronic device, free access on demand to contents created or chosen by individual users in an interactive (creative or reproduced), mobilising and networked logic (Aday, 2010; Bennett, 2003). They allow for the same construction of narratives – public and private – as conventional media do, but their working logic is based not on the masses (which means one centralised point of production and the masses at the reception) but rather on the concept of irradiation (Malini, 2007). Information is sent and shared in micro, but multiplying, segment logic, fuelled by multiple identity preferences (e.g. political, gendered, sexual, cultural, ethnic, national) in a free direct expression, and access rational (without any mediation but the technological). This constitutes their originality. With it three main important consequences arise concerning its potential to promote a deeper democracy. First, NOSM can be immune to mass media political economy. The ownership of today's media rests on large economic groups or the state, which tends to favour political and economic elite interest, seek to audience accumulation, promote increasing commodification of information (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) leading to what some refer in a derogatory fashion as 'infotainment'.

Second, NOSM working dynamic doesn't go along gatekeeping procedures nor does it need to produce rapidly and along the perspective of editors or elites, which tends to produce stereotyped information ridden with plenty of silences and half-truths. Third, NOSM easily dodges modern journalism's canons, specifically those who dictate the dominance or the privileging of institutional, formal resources instead of popular ones and enable other sources, narratives and voices to be equally heard.

Therefore, the eruption of NOSM has challenged traditional and conventional flows of information and communication, defied state information monopoly as well as corporate information control and created the possibility for alternative public spheres and forms of resistance to emerge. With the introduction of NOSM, new activists, new groups, political parties and discourses previously excluded from participation, entered the political marketplace of ideas.

There were precisely these characteristics – individuality, truth, authenticity, freedom – that have opened doors for a romantic approach on the new media as tools of emancipation, a space of contestation and resistance of populations, particularly in political repressive contexts. This romanticisation is mostly based on three presuppositions. First, there is a generalised belief that the internet is the ultimate modern technology of freedom, i.e. a tool to energise citizen information, political participation and citizen contestation politics. It is perceived as a powerful tool of autonomous political expression outside and against domination systems – creating almost a micro-cosmos where there is only good use of NOSM as well as no offline reality –, and a good political and social space regarded in its own right rather than a complex object used within a specific reality, context and actors. Second, the idea that radiation media directly opposes mass media dynamics as if conventional mass media and political regimes or political power didn't also have access to those platforms openly or in disguise as cover action.

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Also, as the Internet looms larger, so does authoritarian (and democratic) governments interference with it. Third, non-western political discursive spaces as the 'arab street' are conflated with (typically) western public sphere as a single concept, despite being inherently different from each other, which makes the centrality of the NOSM in non-western political contexts even more questionable.

Additionally, this romanticised perspective has neglected the different national and international actors that in fact make use of the NOSM, dismissed the local realities and idiosyncrasies in a standard operating procedure framework, and rendered invisible the articulations and linkages with other instruments of mobilisation. Different questions arise. Are the NOSM truly emancipatory tools or just another contestation instrument or platform marked by old vices and virtues? Should the idea of "power to you" be replaced by "power to whom?" And to what extent these new media are not a mere possibility of re-editing conventional media?



An opposition supporter holds up a laptop showing images of celebrations in Cairo's Tahrir Square, after Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak resigned February 11, 2011. *Reuters*.

Despite the willingness to prevent from falling on the fallacy of the false dilemma – both perspectives critical and romantic are plausible and not necessary contradictory –, three points should be further analysed in order to deepen the analysis of the role of the NOSM and contestation politics. First, identify and analyse the different agencies making use of the NOSM.

Second, explore the articulation between online and offline political processes - How do they complement, contradict or overlap each other? Third, understand the synergies between conventional media and NOSM (e.g. in Egypt, the total circulation number of dailies reportedly doubled during the revolution). Four, explore the NOSM not only as a platform for international political intervention, but also, just like a trojan horse, as a way to control and combat political contestation.

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## THE PACIFICATION OF DEMOCRACY? POWER SHARING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN KENYA AND ZIMBABWE

**P@X Studies**

Power-sharing agreements have been recurrent in the African continent: just between 1999 and 2009, these type of political dispensations have been implemented in 17 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa alone (Mehler, 2009a). Although primarily used as mechanisms for peace in both relatively high (e.g. cease-fire agreements and/or transition out of civil war, such as in Angola in 2002 or the Sudan in 2005) and low-intensity violent contexts (electoral violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008), their implementation has produced differentiated outputs, highlighting the frail efficacy of these accords, in spite of policy-makers preferences for its use.

Moreover, their viability as an instrument for peace and democracy has been severely contested in the academic field. Such inconsistencies and inability to reach a consensus reflect, first, a lack of dialogue within different academic strands of research (Jarstad, 2008) and a predominance of elite and institutional-driven analysis. Second, they shed light on the negotiation *praxis* of these type of agreements among local elites and international facilitators which, in turn, presents, more often than not, a disregard for the security and interests of those it's supposed to protect – its citizens – frequently neglecting or even ignoring the affected populations (Mehler, 2009b), as partly reflected by the recurrent exclusion of civil society organizations from the negotiating process. This characteristic of several negotiating processes has paved way to an erosion of vertical relations of accountability and transparency in the social contract between populations and ruling elites in many African countries and, as notes LeVan (2011), have produced a somewhat little noticed change in paradigm regarding foreign aid and liberal democracy promotion, by shifting the primary focus from the importance of building and strengthening political institutions to the “peace before process” imperative. The quest for immediate and unrelenting political stability privileges thus short-term security concerns over long-term factors.

This paradigm shift for the precedence of immediate peace creates a burden on the democratic game as well as in its institutions. This is because, first, elite accommodation through power sharing does not necessarily represent peace for a society, as these agreements are reached - more often than not - in contexts where the same elites are responsible for the eruption of violence. Second, neither the definition on the level of inclusion of a “government of national unity” (or grand coalition) nor its mandate necessarily reflects a popular democratic will, but are instead defined among international mediators and domestic (and very often, belligerent) political elites at the negotiating table. However, such erosion of vertical relations of accountability and transparency does not cause a linear effect in the increment of contest politics, particularly if the political elites at the negotiating table are themselves responsible for the violent upheaval and hold influence over some of the security sector. Such a scenario carries with it another dangerous precedent: it allows consideration to the possibility of gaining access to power through circumvention of the democratic rules of the game, by refusing to accept inconvenient electoral results and threaten to or provoke a violent reaction until one is included in to a hypothetical power-sharing arrangement (of which the events in the Ivory Coast [1] following the presidential elections of November 2010 are a vivid and recent example).

An additional perversion is the possibility of power-sharing deals can make unaccountable or even exempt the very same elites they are accommodating in power. In Kenya, the International Criminal Court-led investigation of the atrocities that occurred in the post-electoral period of 2007-2008 was politicised in the 2013 electoral campaign. The electoral contenders indicted by the ICC upheld the narrative that the international judicial process was a political manipulation to use them as scapegoats while simultaneously preventing them of running for office and holding unaccountable other political contenders, particularly those who signed the power-sharing agreement.

This reflects the possibility that the price to pay for more political inclusion can be the unaccountability and lack of transparency of political elites before, while and after holding office. By peace-keeping political elites through their accommodation in offices of power and influence in a scenario where the same elites might be inciting or co-perpetrating violence, power-sharing is commonly portrayed as a lesser evil in comparison to a return to full-fledged open violence. However, the toll this might inflict in democracy promotion and consolidation on the long-term can be cumbersome.

In Zimbabwe, the mainstream narrative of the electoral violence upheld a dichotomous view of victims (MDC) vs. perpetrators (ZANU-PF). If one accepts this perspective, the power-sharing agreement can be seen as re-legitimizing the bargaining position of ZANU-PF and President Robert Mugabe after they suffered an electoral defeat in the first round that saw them, for the first time in the history of the country since independence, not being the most voted party and after the refusal to accept the electoral results of the second-round by the international community. Nonetheless, the power-sharing agreement was frequently called a 'farce' [2] by both parties in the inclusive government, in which the 'politics of continuity' (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010) remained, with ZANU-PF controlling the core of governance in the country. The inclusion of the MDC in the so-called 'government of national unity' without any discernible benefits in the change of governance, together with MDC corruption scandals and a growing anti-democratic behaviour resembling the likes of ZANU-PF [3] paved the way for MDC's defeat in the 2013 elections. In September 2013 has also brought a new development in the political party landscape coming from grassroots' movements: the National Constitutional Assembly, a platform of several civil society organisations who played a major role in giving birth to MDC in 1999, has announced it had become a political party [4].

As the recent history of these two examples illustrates, a greater inclusion and representativeness of a cabinet does not necessarily mean more democracy or a

or a successful transition of a society from conflict to peace. Instead, aiming for inclusiveness and broader representation through the reduction of uncertainty in elites' accommodation, power sharing poses a serious threat of institutionalisation of conflict as a reality that pervades the field of political competition of access to power to the extreme complete democratic and institutional gridlock. Depending of the political will of these elites is more than the functionality or the efficiency of these power-sharing agreements, but is also the democratic process as a whole, its institutions and its contracts.

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## PASSIVE REVOLUTION IN AFRICA: JOYCE BANDA'S NEW MALAWI

The wave of political contestation which spread across Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt did not travel south of the Sahara. An African Summer has not followed the Arab Spring, although struggles in the Mediterranean and Middle East have contributed to rising the political temperature further south, influencing protesters in Senegal, South Africa, Mozambique and Malawi. Events in Tahir and Taksim Squares can be contrasted to the circular motions of political evolution in Africa where rather than political transformation, the maintenance of the status quo has been long observed. This article examines how the survival and reorganisation of capitalism is continually managed through minor periods of political upheaval in Africa. Crisis in Malawi and the rise of Joyce Banda is analysed as an example of passive revolution in action. Antonio Gramsci's approaches to questions of ideology, power and transformation can be mobilised to investigate how strategies of capital accumulation are sustained and expanded, whilst popular emancipation is fore-stalled. Using a brief example from Malawi, I will explore if Gramsci's philosophy and his reflections on state power can travel and make sense outside of the original historical context?

Passive revolution can be defined as fundamental social change, but this is change without an attempt to embrace the interests of subordinate classes. It is a term which has been much used and abused. In Gramsci's prison notebooks it is depicted as process by which "the absorption of the enemies' *élites* means their decapitation, and annihilation often for a very long time" this is achieved via *revolution* without a *revolution* or as a "passive revolution": a revolution from above (1971: 59). Certain subordinate demands from below are accepted whilst equality between classes is constrained. Passive revolution occurs at times of tension, when there are demands for change or the ruling class faces challenges. One such moment of organic crisis developed in Malawi in 2011-12.

In 2009 the DPP ruling party of Bingu Mutharika won a landslide victory, having delivered economic development between 2004 and

2009. Joyce Banda was chosen as vice-president, but soon fell out with Mutharika. Following the election Malawi entered a period of economic chaos and conflict with donors as the currency (Kwacha) was overvalued. The IMF turned off credit and begged the government to devalue, but Mutharika resisted and crisis ensued. Balance of payments worsened as revenues from tobacco farming fell. Everyone felt the impacts, but particularly middle classes who were faced with fuel shortages and a lack of consumer goods. In July 2011 nationwide demonstrations against Mutharika broke out and in reaction he attempted to pacify and stir up anti-western rhetoric. Mutharika strengthened his power, postponing council elections, regulating the media and expanding police powers. There was a developing organic crisis in Malawi, as society called for political change. The aspiring bourgeoisie, frustrated intellectuals, students and urban working class were profoundly dissatisfied with Bingu Mutharika's second term. Dissatisfaction which crystallized in violent confrontations and the revolts were suppressed by coercive apparatus of the state. But the opposition was weak and this was more of a 'crisis' than a 'revolution'.

On the 5 April, 2012 Mutharika unexpectedly died of a heart attack and Joyce Banda came to power. Her appointment has been widely welcomed by the international community. After six months in power Joyce Banda's main policy interventions included a currency devaluation of 49%, which improved the business environment for transnational firms, but hit the incomes of urban wage earners. In parallel there have been some reversals in the restrictions to social freedom which marked the end of the Bingu regime. Rather than social revolution, Malawi has effectively been turned around, away from a hegemonic, despotic course. What has occurred under Joyce Banda's premiership is a passive revolution resulting in a transition to the type of benign pro-western compliant liberal African society championed by the IMF. Gramsci's historicism can be used to explain Bingu Mutharika's death as an 'event' e.g. change which happens within the limits of the possible.

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The death of Mutharika provided the opportunity for a passive revolution, which led to a period of embedding of transnational neoliberalism. Joyce Banda quickly surrendered the initiative to transform Malawi and recent events have led to the creation of a new institutional framework consonant with capitalism. The changes wrought by Banda are 'passive' as they are accommodated within the current social formation, exemplified by the support she received from the military, business, international media, and the IMF. There has been the inclusion of new social groups within the hegemony of the political order, but without an expansion of mass control over politics. This echoes what Fatton (1986) found in Senegal in the 1980s "the IMF-inspired plan of austerity has reinforced social inequalities and failed to confront those dominant political forces which have a vested interest in the preservation of the status quo." Joyce Banda is internationally celebrated as she offers a more palatable flavour of capitalism.

Mutharika's death occurred at a time of heightened social tension. In Malawi passive revolution was enabled by this event and the state was steered away from autocratic national capitalism to a more international neoliberal model. Joyce Banda's policies are supportive of the expansion of transnational capital accumulation and this Malawian case study fits within Gramscian analysis of passive revolution. The changes wrought through the state are an example of radical change without mass participation and thus is a 'revolution from above'. Mutharika's death provided the opportunity (or pretext) for the consolidation of capitalism as the mode of production, which was not consciously made by a national or international capitalist class, or indeed by Banda herself. The lack of an architect for this project further contributes to it being a passive rather than a directed change.

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**P@X Studies**

## THE 'BREAD RIOTS' IN MOZAMBIQUE: FRELIMO'S GOVERNMENT IN THE FACE OF CONTESTATION

**P@X Studies**

Food riots have consistently been an integral part of revolutions throughout modern history. They played a significant role in the peasantry's mobilisation and open revolt leading up to, and throughout, the French Revolution. So too were they instrumental to the American and Russian Revolutions. Even those more sporadic uprisings against food shortages or rises in food prices with less definitive political consequences caused, at the time, enough apprehension on the part of the ruling elite to force concessions, such as the famous 1977 Egyptian bread riots. The twenty-first century is no exception. A global rise in food prices in 2007-2008 and again in 2010-2011 led to outbursts of protests worldwide. The popular revolts known collectively as the Arab Spring, some of which brought down whole regimes, were, to a great degree, motivated by the rapid deterioration of living conditions caused by a dramatic increase in the cost of basic needs. Sub-Saharan Africa has also seen uprisings, if less revolutionary in outcome, spurred on by this very same impulse.

Either as isolated events or as part of massive social movements leading up to revolutions, food riots are an interesting lens through which to analyse the politics of contestation and political change. Here, we look at Mozambique and the so-called "bread-riots" of September 2010 in order to delve into Mozambican state-society relations, as well as into the nature and dynamics of popular challenges to the political order and demands for societal transformation.

Food represents up to 70% of a Mozambican family income and the country imports over 60% of the wheat necessary to feed its population. This worrying combination has made the country and its people consistently hostage to international markets. As wheat prices soared around the world, between August and September 2010, reaching their highest level in two years, Mozambicans were hit hard. The Frelimo government had long implemented a policy of vital subsidies intended to lower the general cost of basic necessities. Faced, however, with a global hike in prices combined with the decline in value of the Mozambican metical against the South African rand, the government declared the "irreversibility" of price rises.

In September 2010, an approximately 30% rise in bread prices, alongside double-digit increase in water and electricity in one of the world's poorest countries, triggered widespread opposition to the government's decision and ultimately severe unrest, dubbed the "bread riots".

The demonstrators – mainly the young and unemployed urban poor – organised largely through mobile phone messages, barricaded the capital's main streets and suburbs with burning tyres, tore pictures of President Guebuza and looted shops. The government banned the protests and shut down the country's SMS service, yet the riots continued. Police repression followed, with protesters claiming live rounds had been fired. 13 people died, 500 were injured, and 160 were arrested during those first days of September 2010. The outburst was the most violent since February 2008, when another hike in fuel prices and living costs sparked a similar reaction from the most deprived. Mozambicans in general stood in solidarity with the "rioters" and their firm opposition to the unbearable rise in the cost of living.



Mozambican protests, 2010, *Reuters*.

Fearing a deeper contestation to the party's rule, Frelimo ended up making a full reversal of the announced price hike, choosing to reinstate subsidies in order to offset its impact – as it had done in 2008. These concessions were sufficient to appease the revolt and satisfy the protesters. With a more serious crisis averted, Mozambique did not see a significant upsurge in political contestation during and immediately following the Arab Spring, unlike countries such as Angola or Senegal. Yet new demonstrations in Maputo in November 2012 against the rise in bus fares of 40% and the protests against

population displacements due to coalmining in April 2013 suggest the ruling elite's vision for the country is far from consensual. So what do the "bread riots" in Mozambique tell us about the politics of contestation more generally?

The first preliminary findings point, unsurprisingly, to similarities with other popular contestations across the world. Historically sources of social unrest, price hikes in the cost of basic goods have proved to be a fierce motivation for citizens' uprisings in the twenty-first century, as market integration and capitalist relations become increasingly entrenched, especially in low-income countries. Moreover, the spill-over effect of the traditional and the new online social media, as well as the power of dissemination of new technologies, play an increasing role in sustaining these riots for longer than expected of a typically unorganised reaction by the urban poor, and, most importantly, are essential in raising solidarity from the elite civil society. Another parallel which can be drawn from popular contestations elsewhere is the national governments' difficulty in reconciling domestic demands with global pressures – a complexity which suggests the response to price volatility will inevitably have to be negotiated at the global level.



Mozambican protests, 2010, *The Guardian*.

Notwithstanding the label of "bread riots", food is rarely the only grievance featuring in these protests. In Mozambique, as elsewhere, popular revolts combine several reasons for discontent. Besides the spontaneous – and violent – rejection of the simultaneous rise in the price of bread, electricity, petrol and water, in what was a clear opposition to the drastic deterioration of Mozambicans' living conditions, these citizens questioned as well the resilient levels of poverty in a fast-growing economy, corruption at the governmental level or the lack of social safety nets. Indeed, while directly contesting the

announcement of price spikes, protesters not only affirmed the political consensus surrounding the *right* to affordable and accessible basic needs, but also challenged the government's accountability in the daily management of the country's resources and questioned the efficiency of its provisions of goods.

Yet crises born out of awareness of dispossession, increasing inequality and marginalisation from economic growth do not necessarily a regime change bring. Having failed to predict the level of opposition its measures would generate (on more than one occasion) – which appears to hint at the growing distance between the President and his traditional constituents – the government has managed a smooth exit from a tense situation by announcing the reinstatement of subsidies, while leaving the structural sources of discontent largely unaddressed. The government appears, in this sense, to have learnt to survive in a context of successive crises. Conscious of the inherent contestation to these sorts of unpopular measures, Frelimo has devised a strategy of advances and retreats, in which it tests the water and curbs contestation when necessary, while consistently pushing forward its neoliberal agenda. The question remains, however, for how long it can continue on this course.

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**P@X Studies**



## YOUTH AND PROCESSES OF AFFIRMATION IN CIDADE DA PRAIA, CAPE VERDE

Cape Verde is a young nation. It has only been 38 years since its independence from Portugal and 54,4% of its population is under 24 years old, the average age of the population being 26,8 (INE, 2011). Whilst it is true that the country's youth is seen as added value, "the driving force of development", according to the 2013 Youth Strategic Plan, which reinforced Cabral's motto "children are the reason for our revolution", official discourses still reveal colonial continuities that posit the youth as dangerous, lazy, disruptive and irresponsible.

Martins (2010) observes a clear discrepancy between the official narrative and the reality of the youth in the archipelago, specially in the discourse of the Minister of Sports and Youth in 2009: "there have never been so much opportunities for the youth in Cape Verde. The problem is that young people do not seize these opportunities because they are interested in doing other things." This type of discourse, common within public authorities and some private sectors engaged in youth work, attempts, on the one hand, to draw attention away from the successive failures in implementing public policies aimed at youth and, on the other hand, to blame the youth for the high rates of alcohol abuse, teenage pregnancy and street violence, perceived as a result of the excessive youth interest in parties in detriment of seizing new opportunities. Incorrect or not, these accusations not only ignore the unequal social structure in Cape Verde, but also result in the growing unease within the youth.

Despite the increase in opportunities for the young people witnessed since the democratic opening of 1991, the country's fragile economic, educational and welfare system together with the global labour crisis (Lima, 2011) prevent the fulfilment of youth aspirations such as stable employment, housing and opportunities to start a family (Martins, 2010). However, the major source of youth dissatisfaction has been the severe labour market segmentation, controlled by nepotism, family kinship, sexual relations and political party membership.

In this scenario in the search for affirmation and social mobility the youth uses strategies and resources according to his/hers position in the social chess. If the youth who are close to the centre – centre not as a geographical space but rather a symbolic space, where power is represented – chose party politics as the arena in which to search for empowerment, both Bordonaro (2010; 2012) and Roque & Cardoso (2010) draw attention to the fact that the involvement of peripheral youth in criminal activities in Cape Verde should also be perceived as an empowerment or affirmation strategy.

With the consolidation of the country's criminal market, whose ultimate expression is the drug trafficking, many disenfranchised young people find work and social valorisation opportunities in this economy. Street gangs, the armed wing of drug trafficking organisations, emerge in this context as new models of social integration and community cohesion, hence contributing to the perverse integration (Castells, 2003) of marginalised youth.

In 2013 there were 92 active street gangs in Praia. Between 2010 and 2012 there were 30 on-going armed confrontations between some of these groups (Lima, 2013). If, on the one hand, confrontations result from drug trafficking control in peripheral neighbourhoods, high schools and nightclubs, on the other hand, they are also connected with an alleged masculinity crisis of its members (Bordonaro, 2012) and the need for these groups to increase their social and local powers.

In order to reverse this scenario, in the aftermath of the legislative and presidential elections in 2011, the Youth and Internal Affairs Ministries in partnership with some non governmental organisations, community associations and informal groups, started the process of pacification of the newest war which has been taking place in Praia over the last decade by using "smart power" (Nye, Jr., 2012). That is, combining intense police repression in so-called problematic neighbourhoods with investment in community-based social projects promoted by

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some youth groups and local associations, many of them co-opted by state institutions. These actions resulted in the easing of shootings, even though the criminality rate in Praia kept on increasing (MAI and INE, 2011), specifically in regards of street robberies, locally referred to as “kasu-bodi”.

When analysing the decrease of street gang-related violence since 2012 it is important to keep in mind that many influential members of these groups capitalised their family networks in Europe and migrated to Europe. It is also worth mentioning that the case “Flying speedboat” presented as the biggest blow in the Cape Verdean drug trafficking structure, may have also contributed to the apparent quietness in gang activity, once, according to some gang members, there have been fewer drugs circulating in peripheral neighbourhoods and hence fewer motives for conflict. This, despite the scenario presented by the former Cape Verdean president, Pedro Pires, who defended in the aftermath of the apprehension of 500 kilos of cocaine in the Canary Islands originated in Cape Verde that the country was no longer a drug transit space between South America and Europe and was now becoming a warehouse of international drug trafficking.

Currently, new forms of youth protagonism and spaces of social and political contestation and affirmation have emerged in Praia, which have been gradually substituting gangs as spaces of social insertion and community cohesion. Among these youth movements, which proclaim themselves as social movements supposedly inspired by Amílcar Cabral, the hip-hop movement based on the afrocentric ideas of the group Ra-Tecnologia, the movement Korrenti Ativista and the movement Sankofa standout. The latter, which has an horizontally shared leadership, is primarily comprised of former gang members and positions itself in opposition to the remaining youth groups, which are perceived institutionalised and hence at the service of the hegemonic power that attempts to control the youth and thereby perpetuate hegemonic power.

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## THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE AND THE RUSSIA-EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS

The situation of tension and violence taking place in Ukraine since November 2013 is indicative of the internal discontent with a corrupt and not very efficient regime and of the fragile relations between Russia and the European Union (UE) regarding its shared neighborhood region. The lack of dialogue between these two actors in the management of this crisis reveals the coldness that has returned to the so-called 'strategic partnership'. In fact, during the past months the intervention of both sides in the Ukrainian crisis has been characterized by the failure to take into account mutual interests and expectations at an international level. Internally, in Ukraine this mismatch was reflected by the intersection of influences and highly unlikely combinations of protestors from different political backgrounds and with differentiated agendas. While the dissatisfaction with the ruling regime appeared to unite the protestors of the Kiev's Independence Square, the alternative models of political, economic and security governance were not part of a common denominator. This very same perspective extends beyond the Independence Square and projects itself into a more structural division in Ukraine, which, in simplified terms, opposes a western area, with a historical ties to Poland and Germany, and a Eastern area, historically connected to Russia. This division has been singled-out as the country's geographical as well as political and ideological fracture point.

The situation in Crimea, which is involved in secessionist fears, reinforces this fracture and underlines the position of Russia that does not wish to be sidelined in a process where it sees itself as the main actor. In fact, Ukraine is perceived by Russia as part of the nation's cradle, constituting a central element of Putin's undergoing project of an Euroasian Union.

In turn, for the EU, Ukraine is the most important eastern partner in its neighborhood policy, given its economic size and symbolic relevance to the broadening of EU's limited integration space. In this framework, the ongoing reform of Ukraine's power structures should address the crosscutting preoccupations about the need for improved transparency and participation in governance processes, without excluding Russia.

This has been perhaps one of the most critical aspects in all the process. Ukraine should follow its course autonomously and independently, proceeding in a multivectoral fashion, which has characterized its foreign policy, and responding to the need to find balances in the management of its western and eastern relations. In face of the unfolding scenario, this difficult management of balances seems to be the only way forward, given the country's geostrategic location, which impedes it to make exclusionary options.

All possible scenarios, which include Ukraine's partition, the adoption of a federalization model or the building of a political consensus for a solution involving the maintenance of the country's territorial integrity are ridden with complexity. The violence that we have witnessed, the radicalization of positions, the lack of international dialogue and the immersion of opposing interests in all the process underlines the need for pressing internal stabilization, avoiding Dantean-like scenarios such as civil war, and inclusive strategies between Russia and the UE. However, so far the signs point out to great fragility and urgency. In addition to the political crisis, Ukraine faces a serious economic and financial situation, which the current political turmoil has been aggravating. The EU talks about structural adjustment with the support of the International Monetary Fund, while Russia offers less conditioned aid packages, despite the fact that the political options associated to each package are differentiated and well-known. Forcing Ukraine to an option either/or is in fact forcing the adoption of radical positions, inciting contestation and violence between groups with somewhat antagonistic visions regarding the country's future and feeding instability in the EU and Russia's borders. Managing differences in a negotiated package between these two giants seems to be a small exit for a major crisis [1].

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\*This text was written on 28 February 2014.

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## LIVING PEACE

*My husband made me pregnant every year. I delivered babies yearly like an animal. Now he completely changed: he works on the field with me, he is nice and we are like lovers like when we were young and he is accepting to do family planning. (Luvungi, mother of 8 children)*

After conflict ends, violence often continues for traumatized families: their homes become the battlefield where men seek to regain a sense of power and control lost elsewhere in life. In even the most peaceful societies, women and children are often subject to men's acts of violence and abuses of power. When men experience high-levels of trauma in war and conflict, they are often more likely to use violence against their families. Loss of property, health and family as a result of war affect men's identity and their former status as providers in their families.

According to a 2012 survey conducted by Promundo-US, Sonke Gender Justice and the Institute for Mental Health of Goma, 73% of men in the Democratic Republic of Congo are ashamed to face their families because they can't provide for basic financial needs (Slegh, Barker, Ruratotoye, e Shand, 2012). Changes in household dynamics and economics as a result of conflict, combined with men's sense of a loss of power, often fuel violence at home.

In the same survey, 22% of women and 10% of men in Goma have experienced sexual violence (in which a combatant was the perpetrator) during conflict. Women who were raped reported losing their reputation in their families, and these women are often expelled from their homes: 43% of men agreed "a man should reject his wife if she is raped" (Slegh, Barker, Ruratotoye, e Shand, 2012). Qualitative data finds that even when these women are not expelled, they often suffer increased levels of violence at home, due to their husbands' shame and frustration.

As one woman in a focus group explained: "The community makes it very difficult; my husband feels ashamed, and me too. People don't respect him because he has no work and a wife that was raped."

Often children also suffer: "He is beating his children. He says, 'I have problems because of your mother, that is why I beat you.'"

To restore peace in communities and at home, we must create opportunities for men and women to re-envision their partner relations, and what it means to be men and women beyond the context of war. With this in mind, Promundo, along with local partners created Living Peace Groups – a program combining group therapy and group education, together with community outreach and mobilization, as a pathway to sustaining, and living, peace, and reducing men's use of violence against women in post-conflict settings.

### A Plan for Living Peace at Home

The World Bank's LOGiCA (Learning on Gender & Conflict in Africa) Program has supported Promundo to work with local partners in Burundi, DRC on the development of Living Peace Groups since 2012. Three curricula were developed, implemented and tested in Goma, DRC (with Heal Africa and the Institute for Mental Health Professionals), in Burundi (with CARE Burundi) and in Luvungi, DRC (with Women for Women International). In total, 27 groups were implemented over 10-15 weeks, with 324 men, and in some cases, their female partners.

The three core elements of this approach are:

1. **Community based activities:** Recruit and implement therapy groups in collaboration with local community leaders and structures.
2. **Restoration of social relations:** Reconstruct bonds in a way that promotes shared decision-making and respect, to assist in healing individual trauma, broken relationships and to engendering resilience.
3. **Conflict resolution:** Develop individual, couple, family and community coping strategies that are constructive, gender-transformative and culturally appropriate.

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The methodology is based on best practices with male social group therapy programs and gender transformative group educational programs developed by Promundo, which have been assessed in numerous impact evaluation studies around the world.

### The Change

Nearly universally, men and women reported significant, positive changes through the end-line survey. Although both men and women stated that more change is needed – to achieve gender equality in the home, to reduce violence, to support men's and women's needs related to trauma – participants were consistent in reporting the following behavioral changes, especially among men:

- Reduced alcohol abuse and drinking
- Controlled frustration and aggression
- Income-sharing with wife and family
- Peace at home and happier children
- Improved health outcomes

It is also important to note – as another indicator of impact – that many groups decided to continue the weekly meetings on their own initiative after the pilot phase.

The following are examples of how participants described the impact of the program:

#### Solidarity and social connectedness

*The spirit of the group, knowing you are not alone, respect, love and care for each other helped me to change. (Man, Goma)*

#### Self-reflections and group accountability

*The other men helped me to discover the errors I made at home, in making my wife a slave. It opened my eyes. (Man, Burundi)*

#### Economic improvement

*I have made mud bricks and bought iron sheets for roofing and am currently preparing the ground for me to build a new house. This would not happen if the intervention was not there. (Man, Burundi)*

#### Improved partner relations

*I regret all the years I was like a lion, drinking and beating my wife and not taking care for our family. I have asked her to forgive all the bad things I did to her. Now we talk, share and live in peace. (Man, Luvungi)*

#### Reconciliation

*I was raped by the M23 and my husband rejected me. We lived in separated rooms. After the 4<sup>th</sup> session, on a Saturday, he came to my room and asked me to come back to him. We are a couple again and I felt like the day of my marriage. (Woman, Goma)*

#### Peace at home

*In my house is peace now, actually the amount of peace in my house can fill in ten baskets. (Participant, Burundi)*

Men and women alike found Living Peace Groups to be *transformative* at multiple levels. By being able to reflect on their trauma and create social bonds within the groups, men and women were then able to take their new knowledge and behavior into their homes. They created cycles of rewards for living peace: social connections in the community, peace at home, better partner relations, higher family income and happier children.

As a result of these promising results, Promundo is working to scale-up the community based approach in the new initiative: *Living Peace: men beyond war*. The Living Peace website and network will be one of the means of expanding and highlighting Living Peace Groups along with partner programming in post-conflict settings. Nationally, it will seek to unite partners to advocate for policies that support non-violence and gender equality in peace-building and support the women, peace and security agenda at the national and global level. For more information, visit [www.menbeyondwar.org](http://www.menbeyondwar.org).

Promundo-US

Promundo seeks to promote gender equality and end violence against women, children and youth.

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## PSG's Attic

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**Barker, Gary, Moura, Tatiana e Ratton, José Luís** (2014) **A guerra não declarada contra os jovens negros brasileiros**, *Brasil Post*, [http://www.brasilpost.com.br/tatiana-moura/a-guerra-nao-declarada-co\\_b\\_4738616.html](http://www.brasilpost.com.br/tatiana-moura/a-guerra-nao-declarada-co_b_4738616.html)

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**Lopes, Paula Duarte** (2013), **"A austeridade como ameaça à segurança humana"**, in Eduardo Paz Ferreira (org.), *A austeridade cura? A austeridade mata?* Lisboa: Lisbon Law School Editions.

**Moura, Tatiana e Santos, Sofia José**; (2014), **"Father's Day: How to Avert a Crisis of Care?"**, *Men Care Blog*, <http://www.men-care.org/Blog/Default.aspx?id=55>

**Santos, Rita; Cravo, Teresa Almeida (2014), "Brazil's rising profile in United Nations peacekeeping operations since the end of the cold war", *NOREF Report*, March.**

**Santos, Rita; Roque, Sílvia; Moura, Tatiana (2013), "Missed Connections: Representations of Gender, (Armed) Violence and Security in Resolution 1325", *RCCS Annual Review*, 5, 3-31.**

**Santos, Sofia José (2014), "A Guerra na Síria", *À lupa, Rede Angola*, <http://www.redeangola.info/especiais/siria-retrato-de-um-pais-em-guerra/>.**

**Santos, Sofia José (2013), "UNSCR 1325 National Implementation: challenges ahead", *IDN Cadernos*, 11, 183 - 193.**

**MARCH**

**Gary Barker, Rita Santos, Sílvia Roque, Sofia José Santos, Teresa Maneca and Tatiana Moura** participated in an internal seminar with Oystein Holter, Oslo University, and Natko Geres, Croatian NGO Status M, on “**Gender and crisis in Europe**”, 29-31 March 2014, Centre for Social Studies, Coimbra.

**Teresa Almeida Cravo** presented the communication “**Security Sector Reform and the Rule of Law: A Critique of International Intervention in Contexts of Instability**”, 55<sup>th</sup> Annual Convention, International Studies Association, Panel “Second Generation Security Sector Reform”, Toronto, 27 March 2014.

**Teresa Almeida Cravo** presented the communication “**Criticality in Research**”, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Westminster, Cumberland Lodge, 21 March 2014.

**Teresa Almeida Cravo** presented the communication “**Western Development Aid and the Construction of Success Stories**”, Department of Psychology, Politics and Sociology Seminar Series, Universidade Canterbury Christ Church, 13 March 2014.

**Daniela Nascimento** presented the communication “**A influência dos Direitos Humanos na Diplomacia Portuguesa durante a II Guerra Mundial**”, Seminar on “Diplomatas Portugueses durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial”, University of Coimbra/Fundação Aristides de Sousa Mendes, Coimbra, 21 March 2014.

**Daniela Nascimento** presented the communication “**Seremos todos iguais e Livres?: Os Direitos Humanos no mundo**”, CES goes to School, Agrupamento de Escolas de Pombal, 10 March 2014.

**Sofia José Santos** presented the communication “**Manobras mediáticas ou mediaticamente manobráveis? Media e política-externa dos Estados: o caso da não-intervenção na Síria**”, International Relations Undergraduate Program, School of Economics, University of Coimbra, 13 March 2014.

**Sofia José Santos** presented the communication “**Media e diplomacia: modelos teóricos, debates e desafios**”, International Relations Undergraduate Program, School of Economics, University of Coimbra, 12 March 2014.

**FEVEREIRO****FEBRUARY**

**Rita Santos** presented the communication "Gendered 'gun wars' in Brazil: gendered representations of armed violence, self-defence and (in)security", *Resisting war in the 20th century*, Instituto de História Contemporânea, New University, Lisbon, 27 February 2014.

**Sílvia Roque** presented the communication "Guerillas, gangsters and beyond: gender, violence and resistance in (wartime and) post-war El Salvador", *Resisting war in the 20th century*, Instituto de História Contemporânea, New University, Lisbon, 27 February 2014.

**Teresa Almeida Cravo** presented the communication "Linking Rule of Law to Peacebuilding: The EU's Experience in the Security Sector Reform", *Rule of Law Workshop: The Rule of Law as a Strategic Priority in the EU's External Action*, Centre for Global Governance Studies, Universidade Católica de Leuven, 28 February 2014.

**Daniela Nascimento** and **Paula Duarte Lopes** presented the communication "Portuguese development aid contribution to peace consolidation in Timor-Leste", *Resisting War in the 21st Century*, New University, Lisbon, 28 February 2014.

**Daniela Nascimento** presented the communication "Para além das cinzas: uma análise crítica da cooperação portuguesa para o desenvolvimento em Timor Leste", final session of the research project "Consolidação da paz e a sua sustentabilidade: as missões da ONU em Timor Leste e a contribuição de Portugal", funded by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia [PTDC/CPJ-CPO/115169/2009 - FCOMP-01-0124-FEDER-014433], Museu do Oriente, Fundação Oriente, Lisbon, 28 February 2014.

**JANUARY**

**Maria Raquel Freire** presented the communication "Rússia, Ucrânia e a Segurança Europeia", Course of National Defense 2013/2014, Instituto de Defesa Nacional (IDN), Porto, 7 January 2014.

**DECEMBER**

**Sílvia Roque**, **Tatiana Moura** and **Teresa Maneca** were in Maputo in the course of the research project "Adapting the International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES), to urban settings of Post-Conflict and Urban Violence", from 1 to 8 December 2013, where they met with the research team from Centro de Formação Jurídica e Judiciária (research partner) and with several Mozambican institutions in order to present and discuss the project.



**Katia Cardoso** interviewed **Redy Wilson Lima**, guest assistant lecturer at Instituto Superior de Ciências Jurídicas e Sociais (Cape Verde) to CES Podcast. December 2013.

**Maria Raquel Freire** presented the communication **“Building what peace in Timor-Leste? UN intervention, bottom-up dynamics and (in)formal processes”**, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, San Diego, USA, 2 December 2013.

**Licinia Simão** presented the communication **“Europe whole and free once more? The European Union and its Eastern neighbours”**, no Programa televisivo Kathedra (Televisão Estatal da Abkhazia), State University of Abkhazia, Sukhum/i, 4 December 2013.

**Maria Raquel Freire** presented the communication **“A União Europeia e a Rússia: que realidades, que desafios?”**, Humanities School, University of Coimbra (FLUC), Coimbra, 17 December 2013.

## NOVEMBER

**Maria Raquel Freire** presented the communication **“Intervention, legitimacy and enforcement in international interventions”**, Peace and Justice Studies Minor, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, San Diego, USA, 6 November 2013.

**Maria Raquel Freire** presented the communication **“The International System and Global Governance: The United Nations role in peacekeeping. The case of East Timor”**, MA in Peace and Justice Studies, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, San Diego, USA, 12 November 2013.

**Maria Raquel Freire** presented the communication **“Conflict analysis, prevention and resolution: the role of the OSCE. The cases of Estonia and Moldova”**, MA in Peace and Justice Studies, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, San Diego, USA, 21 November 2013.

**Katia Cardoso** presented the communication **“Quando o sonho americano é interrompido. O impacto da deportação na vida dos imigrantes”**, High School Dr. Manuel Fernandes, Abrantes, “O CES vai à escola”, 28 November 2013.

**Daniela Nascimento** presented the communication “**Relações Internacionais- uma abordagem teórica**”, *Workshop Geopolítica - elementos de estudo*, Aveiro, ISCIA, 29 November 2013.

## OCTOBER

**Teresa Almeida Cravo** was awarded with the **2013 Best PhD Student Paper Prize** by the European International Studies Association (EISA).

**Daniela Nascimento** presented the communication “**Ação Humanitária, Cooperação e Desenvolvimento: Sudão**”, *IV Curso de Operações de Paz e Ação Humanitária (OPAH)*, *Ius Gentium Conimbrigae* – Centro de Direitos Humanos, Brigada de Intervenção, Coimbra, 12 October 2013.

**Maria Raquel Freire** presented the communication “**Novas Guerras e Resolução de Conflitos: o caso Moldova/Transnistria**”, *IV Curso de Operações de Paz e Ação Humanitária (OPAH)*, *Ius Gentium Conimbrigae* – Centro de Direitos Humanos e Brigada de Intervenção, Coimbra, 12 October 2013.

**Teresa Almeida Cravo** presented the communication “**The Construction of Mozambique’s Success**”, *International Relations Research Seminar Series*, University of St. Andrews, UK, 14 October 2013.

**José Manuel Pureza** presented the communication “**Entre o luso-tropicalismo e o pós-colonialismo: Portugal e as operações de paz nos países africanos de língua oficial portuguesa**”, *International Seminar on “Descolonizando as Relações Internacionais: as contribuições dos Estudos Pós-Coloniais”*, organised by Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 30 October 2013.

**José Manuel Pureza** presented the communication “**The Euro crisis through postcolonial lens**”, *International Seminar on “Descolonizando as Relações Internacionais: as contribuições dos Estudos Pós-Coloniais”*, organised by the Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 31 October 2013.

**Teresa Almeida Cravo** presented the communication “**Security Sector Reform versus Everyday Politics: The Case of Guinea-Bissau**”, *Warwick Graduate Conference in Security Studies*, University of Warwick, UK, 31 October 2013.

**NEW PARTNERSHIP**

CES has established a partnership with **Promundo-Europa**, a delegation of Promundo Institute, Brazil, launched in Coimbra on the 14th January 2014. This partnership aims at promoting research on masculinities and gender relations within the context of current European financial and economic crises as well as developing, evaluating and expanding programs and campaigns that promote gender equality, the reduction and prevention of violence, and social justice within a research/intervention nexus. For further information, please go to [www.promundo.org.br](http://www.promundo.org.br).